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Abstract 
This thesis is a philosophical study of Greek tragedy. Though Greek tragedy is a 
genre of literature, the problems explored in it are of great philosophical significance. It 
presents perspectives that are in contrast with the philosophers'. Philosophers' responses 
to Greek tragedy show their one-sided philosophical views, which I am going to expose 
in this thesis. The philosopher I am going to work on is Aristotle and the concept I pick 
out to analyze is tuche, which means "luck", "chance" or "fortune". Through analyzing 
* 
the concept of tuche as applied in Aristotle's work and in Greek tragedy, we see that it is a 
haunting and desperate problem in Greek tragedy. Aristotle, however, tries to incorporate 
it into his philosophy and ignores its significance, particularly in the Poetics, which has 
long been regarded as the authoritative criticism of Greek tragedy. As a result, his 
explanation is inadequate, compares with the modem liberal critics. From this we see the 
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We arrive at truth, not by reason only, but also by the heart. 
Pascal, Pensees 
Our philosophy -- that is, our mode of understanding or 
not understanding the world and life ~ spring from our 
feeling towards life itself. 
Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life 
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Chapter 1 ： Introduction 
And this personal affective starting point of all philosophy 
and all religion is the tragic sense of life. 
Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life 
Greek tragedy is a golden path for we modem people to understand the history, 
culture, religion, and philosophy of classical antiquity. Greek tragedy has long been 
studied, and historians, literary critics, philologists and particularly philosophers have 
much about it: from Plato's criticism and Aristotle's Poetics, to Votaire, Hegel, 
Jaspers, Heidegger and Sartre; from Nietzsche's famous work Gehurt Der Tr ago die to 
Lessing's Hamburgische Dramaturgie. It can be compared to a huge treasure, which 
has attracted adventurers for exploration and for finding something new and precious. 
Though Plato tries to suppress it, the influence of Greek tragedy on philosophy is far-
reaching. In ancient times, we find traces of Greek tragedy in various philosophical 
fragments, dialogues and texts. Since modem times, Hegel takes Antigone to illustrate 
his theory of conflict and dialectics, while Heidegger regards Oedipus Tyrannus as the 
exemplification of the very process of truth as unconcealmemt. Also, modem ethicists 
still cite the moral dilemmas in Greek tragedy as paradigm cases. 
In fact, the relation between Greek tragedy and philosophy has always been a 
peculiar one. Philosophers, whether they admire tragedy or not, cannot help but refer 
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upon it. Both Plato and Aristotle have their own accounts on Greek tragedy. Their 
disparate views on them show dramatically their philosophical positions. Plato's 
condemnation exposes his rational world-view and the dominating status of reason in 
his philosophy. Aristotle on the other hand admits that tragedy is a noble art, but 
provided that they conform to his explanation. His explanation is strongly influenced 
by and is consistent with his philosophy. It shows also his consistency in dealing 
certain concepts. Though Plato condemns Greek tragedy while Aristotle shows his 
admiration, it is Plato but not Aristotle, who has a better understanding of Greek 
tragedy. 
Jaspers says that philosophy is inseparable from those visions derived from 
Greek tragedy, I think it is particular so when we track down certain concepts in 
Greek tragedy and Greek philosophy. However, as Jaspers continues to note, instead 
of doing full justice to Greek tragedy, Philosophy tries either to overcome it or utilizes 
those visions. “Those visions must be either resisted or incorporated and confirmed".^ 
Jaspers says further that when philosophers realize that some visions are not reducible, 
they “will eventually see them evolve into the instruments of philosophic inquiry，？ M. 
Detieime and Jean-Pierre Vemant, in their study on an ancient concept, ！jnjri<； {metis), 
which means wisdom, cunning and craft, argue that failure would be inevitable if one 
1 Karl Jasper (1952), Tragedy is not Enough, p. 24 
'Karl Jasper (1952), p. 24. 
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tried to discover this concept from theoretical treaties. They then suggest that the 
concept-must be tracked down elsewhere, “in areas which the philosopher usually 
passes over in silence or mentions only with irony or with hostility，？ so that "the 
philosopher can display to its fullest advantage the way of reasoning and 
understanding which is required in his own profession，" In fact, m甜s is only one of 
the many such visions. Tuche, the concept to be studied in this thesis is another one. 
To the Greeks, tuche is a goddess of ocean (see pictures 1 & 2). She is a dominating 
cosmological power that symbolizes change and human vicissitude. The concept 
tuche, which is usually translated as "luck", "chance", "fortune" and (even) “fate”� 
implies the absence of causation, and that the cause of an event is unknown. Mostly, it 
is referred to the act of the gods. 
However, as Jaspers says, though philosophy takes the place of Greek tragedy, it 
cannot invalidate the latter,s philosophical quests and visions. Jaspers then adds, they 
even go beyond philosophy. This is the starting point of this thesis. In this thesis, I try 
to juxtapose, compare and contrast Greek tragedy and Aristotle's philosophy, to see 
how his philosophy resists and incorporates those tragic visions, and how Greek 
tragedy and philosophy differ in their views on man. Towards the end, we will see 
what philosophical implications can be drawn from this study. 
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Chapter two will first outline Aristotle's explanation of tragedy, to see how it fail 
to attend to several essential tragic problems: tragic action, pathos and conflicts. 
These problems have something in common: they are all related to divinity. 
Chapter three will focus on the concept tuche in Aristotle's theoretical and 
ethical accounts, to see how he approaches it. By tracing the concept of tuche as 
applied to the works, we will see how Aristotle takes it as an instrument to further 
support his doctrine of the four causes and his doctrine of happiness by arguing 
against its justifiability and by denying tuche of its significance. Such philosophical 
view is consistently maintained in the Poetics, in which Aristotle uses afjLaprla 
(hamartia), which means a failure, a fault or an error, to explain the downfall of the 
tragic heroes. What Aristotle trying to do，I shall argue, is to make sure that there is 
for such downfall a clear cause in human terms rather than something divine or 
supernatural. 
Chapter four will discuss in details the role of tuche in Greek tragedy. We will 
see that in Greek tragedy, hamartia is not a proper cause of the heroes' downfall. To 
the tragic poets, tuche could be so dominating that one's life is totally determined by 
it, as is in the case in Oedipus Tyrannus. The protagonists' response to tuche, as 
depicted by Euripides' tragedy, reveals the very tragic views on man. 
4 Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vemant (1978) p.4 
4 
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Chapter five is a short chapter dedicated to the comparison of the views of 
- philosophers and the tragic poets. Through discussing the Chorus-Actor dichotomy, I 
try to show that particular views as presented in different tragedies have their 
universal significance. Then, I try also to shows that the tragic poets and philosophers 
differ in their ways of formulating question, which is a noteworthy contrast. In 
addition to this, a review of the tragic view on truth pushes the contrast to extreme. 
In the conclusion, I try to point out that tuche is related to several modem issues 
in science and philosophy. Modem films and novels are also brooding on it. The most 
important of all, it is a problem of our daily lives. 
5 
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Chapter 2: Aristotelian Tragedy or Greek Tragedy? 
"Who has allowed these hysterical sluts to approach this 
sick man's bedside? They have no medicine to ease his pains, 
only sweetened poisons to make them worse. These are the 
very creatures who slay the rich and fruitful harvest of Reason 
with the barren thorns of Passions If as usual it was only 
some ordinary man you were carrying off a victim of your 
blandishments, it would matter little to me — there would be no 
harm done to my work. But this man has been nourished on the 
philosophies of Zeno and Plato , be gone, and leave him for my 
own Muses to heal and cure" 
The Goddess Philosophic expells 
Muses of Poetry, in Boethius, De Consolation 
Philosophiae 
1 Modem Criticism on Aristotle's Poetics 
Aristotle divides knowledge into three branches, namely the theoretical, the 
practical and the productive. Poetry in general is a species of productive knowledge 
(techne). Plato suspects in Ion and Republic if poetry can be counted as knowledge for he 
thinks that in poetry no rational principle can be prescribed. He thinks that the poets are 
possessed by the gods and they do not create with rationality. It is a kind of divine 
madness sent by the gods that enables the poets to create. Tragedy, in particular, is 
banned by Plato from his 'ideal state', for tragedy depicts a world with injustice and evils 
produced by the gods. Besides, tragedy appeals mainly to the lower part of human psyche, 
namely, passion. Plato stresses in both the Phaderus and the Republic that passion should 
be under good control of reason. Most important of all, Plato is contemptuous of 
empirical reality and regards it as mimesis of forms, and poetry is mimesis of the 
empirical reality. Poetry therefore is inferior in both the ontological and epistemological 
6 
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rankings. Aristotle's theory of tragedy, to a great extent, responses to and defends poetry 
against Plato's attack. By including art as a kind of productive knowledge, Aristotle 
admits that art can be approached with rational principles and explanation. He then tries 
to explain tragedy in a way that renders it more 'compatible' with philosophy. 
Aristotle regards poetry as mimetic art portraying human action. Poetry comes to 
existence because of "man's natural propensity to engage in mimetic activity" and the 
pleasure man takes in the mimetic object {Poetics 4). To be exact, the pleasure Aristotle 
refers to here is the pleasure of exercising the understanding and reasoning to identify the 
images with the real. We have such pleasure even when we look at mimesis of painful 
objects, such as lowest animals and dead bodies. Epic, tragic poetry, comedy and 
dithyramb belong to the same genus {mimetic art) but of different species. They differ 
from each other mainly in the media or the objects or the mode of mimesis. 
Among different species of poetry (e.g. epic and comedy), Aristotle grants 
tragedy the most honorable status and spends chapters to discuss it in the Poetics. 
Aristotle's theory of tragedy has been influential. It is generally regarded as a 
paradigmatic theory. Unlike Plato, he is able to take the aesthetic aspect of Greek tragedy 
into consideration, including the purpose of Greek tragedy as a genre of art and the 
audience's response. His theory is both descriptive and normative. On the other hand, it is 
suggested that Aristotle approaches tragedy in an authoritative, prescriptive and scientific 
way, with his theoretical and practical thought in mind. Walter Kaufmaim thinks that 
Aristotle's tone is “as authoritative as the dicta are terse”. ^ Stephen Halliwell points out 
that Aristotle's criticism in the Poetics is not primarily empirical, but a type of 
prescriptive criticism "which has the confidence to judge individual works by reference 
7 
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to the first principles' of poetic art”？ What Halliwell means is that Aristotle gives tragedy 
a formal definition, prescribes it principles (such as plot-structure and the principle of 
probability and necessity) and confines the study of tragedy to a certain subject matter 
{mimesis of serious action). He then ranks the components of tragedy, such as 
characterization, thought and style in relation to its principles and subject matter. It is for 
the sake of these principles and this subject matter that the components are included. 
Besides, he takes some tragedies as examples to illustrate his principles and judges 
different tragedies accordingly. 
It is for this reason that Aristotle's approach has been accused of being reductive 
and one-sided, for he tries to fit tragedy into his own philosophical framework, which 
might not be able to encompass the essential features of Greek tragedy. A definition or 
theory can hardly generalize the fruitful and complex features of Greek tragedy.^ Also, 
there is a great difference between Aristotle's prescriptive approach and the liberal critics, 
"which might seek to do justice to the variety and variability of achievement in the 
” 4 
genre . 
Another strong attack on Aristotle's Poetics is Michel Gellrich's criticism on the 
Poetics. Gellrich starts by pointing out that philosophers' literary theories tend to be silent 
on the problem of conflicts, and Aristotle's Poetics is one of them. Since Aristotle 
regards poetry as techne, Gellrich maintains that, “in the Poetics, we first encounter the 
1 Walter Kaufmann (1968) Tragedy and Philosophy, p.31 
2 Stephen Halliwell (1987), The Poetics of Aristotle: Translation and Commentary, p.10, Introduction 
3 See Stephen Halliwell (1987); Michelle Gellrich (1988), Tragedy and Theory, especially "Introduction" 
and Chapter Two; Walter Kaufmann(1968), Jean-Pierre Vemant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet (1980&1988) 
Myth and Society; Myth and Tragedy, Cynthia A. Freeland (1992), 'Plot Imitates Action: Aesthetics 
Evaluation and Moral Realism in Aristotle's Poetics" in Essays on Aristotle's Poetics, pp.111-132, and also 
Thomas Gould (1966&1990), "The Innocence of Oedipus: The Philosophers on Oedipus the King”, in 
Arion, iv.3,iv,4 and v.4, Ancient Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy. 
4 Stephen Halliwell (1987), pp. 134-135, also p.81 
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effort of philosophy to incorporate poetry, and tragedy in particular, into its orbit of the 
rationally intelligible." ^ On the other hand, as Gellrich goes on to note, “tragic plays tend 
to resist principles prescribed by dramatic theory" but "dramatic theory is always silent 
on those resisting forces or just excludes them."^ What is being excluded is always what 
threatens theoreticians' own views. Gellrich says further, "the interests of theory may be 
shown to collide with or diverge from the interests of tragedy. 
Another problem disturbs the commentators most is that in the Poetics, scant 
attention is paid on the religious and mythical elements. It is well known that the 
religious culture and mythology have great influence on Greek tragedy, but Aristotle on 
the whole speaks little about these. Stephen Halliwell points out that Aristotle 
"neutralizes" the subject matter of Greek tragedy by turning away from the religious and 
mythical tradition. Aristotle restricts the subject matter of tragedy as mimesis of serious 
action, by which the agents' character and virtue are shown. 
In the following, I will first discuss Aristotle's theory of tragedy. Particular 
attention will be paid on the subject matter restricted, and how such restriction excludes 
the anomalies. Those anomalies are counter examples to Aristotle's theory of tragedy. 
Such exclusion, I shall argue, has a lot to do with Aristotle's silence with the religious 
and mythical aspects of Greek tragedy: those anomalies are rich in religious and mythical 
elements. Divine intervention plays an essential role in Greek tragedies, it interferes 
human action, eudaimonia and causality of events to a great extent. Without discussing 
5 Michel Gellrich(1988), Introduction, p. 4 
6 Michel Gellrich(1988), Ibid, p.6 
7 Michel Gellrich(1988), Ibid, p. 6. 
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the positive role of the divine aspect one can hardly have a fall picture of Greek tragedy.^ 
This is especially so when comparing Aristotle's theory to several modem critics, such 
as Vemant, Willimas and Segal, who takes human action as well as divine intervention 
into serious consideration. When comparing Aristotle theory to their accounts, Aristotle's 
theory is shown to be less comprehensive and fruitful. Also, I will show that the nature of 
pathos and conflicts in Greek tragedy would be a more desperate problem than Aristotle 
would think. Surely we gain insight from his ethical dimension, but at the same time, his 
ethical thoughts may have too much control and therefore he fails to pay adequate 
attention on or lightens certain tragic issues. This makes his theory subject to criticisms 
like Gellrich's. 
2 Aristotle,s Theory of Greek Tragedy 
I start with an overall account of Aristotle's theory of tragedy. Although there are 
many notions in the Poetics worthy of discussion, I will focus mainly on plot-structure, 
action and the related notions. I think that such a scope of discussion encompasses 
already the core part of Aristotle's theory of a fine tragedy and the most important 
elements that are relevant to my present discussion. In chapter 6, Aristotle defines: 
Tragedy, then, is a representation {mimesis) of an action which 
is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude — in language 
which is garnished in various forms in its different parts - in 
the mode of dramatic enactment, not narrative, and through the 
arousal of pity and fear effecting the katharsis of such emotions. 
(Chapter 6, 1449b24-28/ 
8 Of course, the religious and mythical aspects are not the only important elements, they are just what I pick 
up to discuss here. There are many other aspects essential to Greek tragedy, such as its social and political 
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2.1 Mimesis and Action 
I have mentioned above that Aristotle confines the subject matter of tragedy 
defined as such to "action which is serious". Action (praxis) is discussed widely in 
Aristotle’s philosophical works. In his ethical works, action in general is teleological and 
aims at some good. It can be achieved by the agents' own efforts and is probably 
voluntary. 10 By attributing seriousness to action in tragedy, Aristotle has in mind action in 
a stricter sense. Action in a stricter sense is rational, involving deliberation, choice as 
well as decision, and Aristotle mentions patently in the Poetics 15 that action exhibits the 
nature of ethical choice (1454al8-21).^^ In addition, Aristotle thinks that the happiness 
and unhappiness of the agents in tragedy rest on their actions (1450al-3). Such 
confinement is significant mainly for three reasons. First of all, it is the seriousness of 
action that allows tragedy to be distinguished from comedy or to be kept in line with epic. 
Comedy is regarded as the mimesis of shameful or ridiculous action, and epic as the 
mimesis of "ethically serious subjects". Epic differs itself from tragedy by its different 
modes and media of mimesis, as well as by its lack of a temporal limit. Secondly, it is for 
sake of di mimesis of serious action that tragedy is a mimesis of noble agents; likewise, it 
is for the sake of 2l mimesis of shameful action that comedy is a mimesis of inferior agents. 
The other elements in tragedy, such as characterization and thought, are related to 
action in such a way: characterization, by which we can judge the qualities of the action 
and the agents, is included for the sake of action. So is thought, by which we can judge 
the capacity of the agents to produce appropriate arguments through their speech. The 
elements. I cannot afford to discuss all the elements here. 
9 Cf. Stephen Halliwell (1987), Chapter 6 
Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachen Ethics, p. 315 translated with Introduction, Notes and Glossary by Terence 
Irwin, second edition, 1999, Hackett. 
11 
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characters and thought of the agents should be good and be appropriate to the kind of 
agent, and the kind of agents to the kind of action. “Besides, without action you would 
not have a tragedy, but one without character would be feasible" (Chapter 6, 1450a23-24). 
By far most, the subject matter of tragedy viewed as such allows Aristotle to approach 
tragedy with his own ethical account. 
22 Plot- Structure 
Now, let us turn to the primal importance of plot-structure. There are six elements 
included in tragedy defined as such: plot-structure, character, style, thought, spectacle 
and lyric-poetry. Among these elements, Aristotle regards plot-structure as the first and 
the most important principle. By plot-structure he means the structure of events, or how 
the events should be arranged. The reason is that "tragedy is a mimesis not of people as 
such but of actions and life, and both happiness and unhappiness rest on action”（ 145 Oal-
3). And events concerning the happiness or unhappiness of the agents in tragedy should 
be arranged in such a way that it rests on their action. Given the reason as such, plot-
structure is regarded as a designed pattern of action, which is the dramatic substance of 
plot-structure. Moreover, for the mimesis of action to be complete and of a certain 
magnitude, the form of the plot-structure should possess a beginning, a middle and an end 
so as to form a whole. In short, dramatic substance (action) and form (a whole) together 
constitute the plot-structure. ^^  
”Cf . Stephen Halliwell (1987), p. 47 
12 Cf. Stephen Halliwell (1987)，Ibid, p. 94 
12 
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2.3 The Principle of Probability and Necessity 
Furthermore, the plot-structure should be checked by the principle of probability 
and necessity. The beginning, which does not follow necessarily any preceding events, 
gives rise naturally to the middle, and the middle to the end. The end should follow the 
middle by necessity, but it needs not to be followed by another event. In other words, 
Aristotle here aims at making tragedy as a self-contained unity, in which the events can 
sufficiently explain each other in a causal manner. Also, it is on such ground that plot-
structure centering on individual fails to attain unity, for Aristotle thinks that, "a plot-
structure does not possess unity (as some believe) by virtue of centering on an individual. 
For just as a particular thing may have many random properties,……a particular character 
may perform many actions which do not yield a single action" (Chapter 8, 1451al6-19). 
2.4 Tragedy and History 
Here comes the distinction between history and tragedy. Tragedy is regarded as 
more universal and thus more philosophical than history. While historians speak of 
particulars with many random properties, poets aim at the kind of speech or action that 
belongs by probability or necessity to a certain kind of character. In other words, the 
agents in tragedy should act and make the kind of speech in such a way that is 
'appropriate' to the kinds of agent they are. For example, when discussing 
characterization in chapter 15, Aristotle points out that it is possible for a woman to have 
manly character, but it is not appropriate for a woman-to be so manly or clever (1454a23-
25). 13 Besides, the agents should show consistency of character. Always “a necessary 
Aristotle's view on female character is challenged. See for examples, Helene P. Foley (1993) "Antigone 
as moral agent" in Tragedy and the Tragic, p.49-73, and Freeland (1992). 
13 
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and probable reason exists for a particular character's speech or action,”丨斗 just like the 
arrangement of events. Aristotle criticizes the inconsistent character of Iphigenia in 
Euripides' Iphigenia in Aulis. Note that while most of the Greek tragedies are named 
after the protagonist, the focuses of Aristotle here are the action and appropriateness, 
rather then the uniqueness or the heroic temper of any particular character. 
2.5 Pity, Fear and Katharsis 
The next question is what has plot-structure to do with pity and fear? According 
to the definition, the essential aim of tragedy is to produce katharsis through arousal of 
fear and pity. Aristotle gives no explicit definitions of pity and fear in the Poetics, as he 
does in the Rhetoric. Pity is "a feeling of pain at an apparent evil, destructive or painful, 
which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall ourselves 
or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall us soon" (11.8, 1385b 12-16). Fear is "a 
pain or disturbance due to imagining some destructive or painful evil in the future. For 
there are some evils, e.g. wickedness or stupidity, the prospect of which does not frighten 
us: only such as amount to great pains or losses do" (11.5，1382a21-25).'^ In short, we 
sympathize with the protagonists' undeserved affliction and are aware that such 
misfortune may befall us. Aristotle here takes the emotional responses of audience into 
consideration. However, the nature of katharsis remains unclear. The term has its medical 
sense, which means 'purgation' (of emotion) and its religious sense, which means 
‘purification�. 16 And whether such responses are of emotional or cognitive remain 
questionable. The cognitivist admits that katharsis involves emotions, but the intellectual 
14 Cf. Stephen Halliwell (1987), chapter 15, p. 48 
15 Cf. The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes. 
14 
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judgment about the particular situation in tragedy is more important. On the other hand, 
the emotivist thinks that the pleasure here arises not from exercising the intellect, but 
from seeing and feeling "the nobility of the human who survives such an extreme 
situation.，，口 
2.6 Recognition and Reversal 
As the purpose of tragedy defined as such is to arouse pity and fear, means to 
achieve such responses should be components of the plot-structure. Such components are 
reversal, recognition and suffering (pathos), which Aristotle thinks they should conform 
also to the principle of probability and necessity. Reversals is “a complete swing in the 
direction of the action" and recognition “is a change from ignorance to knowledge" 
(Poetics 11). Aristotle ranks different kinds of recognition and he thinks that the best is 
the one which “occurs in direct conjunction with reversal", because such combination 
will produce pity and fear. Besides, it should arise from the events themselves, "the one 
which is most integral to the plot-structure and its action"(Poer/c^ 11). He instances here 
Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus. Then, note that except a definition and instances, Aristotle 
speaks little of suffering, which is generally regarded as an important element of Greek 
t r agedy . 18 Suffering is defined as "a destructive or painful action" such as visible deaths, 
torment, wounding and the like. 
2.7 The Proper Kind of Agent 
16 See Jonathan Lear (1992), "Katharsis", in Essays on Aristotle 's Poetics, pp. 315-340 
� Cf. C.A Freeland (1992), "Plot Imitates Action". Freeland takes Nussbaum as example of cognitivist and 
Jonathan Lear as emotivist. Freeland then concludes that both approaches are problematic. And the 
problem has its ground on Aristotle's functionalist and essentialist account of tragedy. 
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For the events to be pitiful and fearful, plot-structure has a lot to do with the kind 
of agent involved. On the whole, Aristotle thinks that the agents should like us, for both ‘ 
pity and fear require us to identify with the agents and to imagine that what befalls the 
agents may befall ourselves or our beloved. Aristotle rejects plot-structure that shows 
firstly, good man passing from great prosperity to affliction, for it would be only 
repulsive (miaron); secondly, wicked man from affliction to prosperity, for it is not tragic; 
and thirdly, evil man from prosperity to affliction, for it is not pitiful. He concludes then 
that the agent should not be excellent in virtue, and falls into affliction not because of his 
wickedness, but because of certain flaw (hamartia). The action ‘somehow，misses the 
mark and makes the agent fall into affliction. By suggesting hamartia as the cause of 
downfall, Aristotle again explains plot-structure to be consistent with his claim that 
happiness and unhappiness rest on agent's action.^^ 
2.8 The Proper Kind of Circumstances 
Furthermore, different plot structure with different circumstances produces 
different tragic effects. Aristotle ranks the circumstance, in which the agent acts in fall 
knowledge but fails to do so, the worst, for this is repulsive and not tragic (as it lacks 
suffering). Aristotle here means that it is repulsive if the agents act intentionally the 
horrible deed in full knowledge. In other words, Euripides' Medea for example, is not on 
his list of fine tragedies. Medea is a barbarian princess. In the tragedy she kills her 
See Thomas Gould (1990). He has worked out a detail study on the problem of'“pathos” in Greek 
religion, tragedy and philosophy. See also part 6 of this chapter. 
Hamartia has been one of the most controversial issues in Aristotle's Poetics. Debates among 
playwrights, philosophers and commentators of the Poetics concerning Aristotle's purpose of suggesting it, 
its meaning and the like keep on going. See for example, E. R. Dodds(1965), "On Misunderstanding 
Oedipus Tyrannus”; Walter Kaufmann (1968), Stephen Halliwell(1987) and Nancy Sherman(1992), 
“Hamartia and Virtue” in Essays on Aristotle 's Poetics etc. 
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children to revenge on her husband, who abandons her and marries another princess. 
Besides，it is not tragic to have no sufferings such as visible deaths, torments and the like. 
Aristotle ranks the circumstance, which the agent does the terrible deeds in ignorance and 
discovers the truth afterward, as "superior", like Oedipus Tyrannus. Oedipus kills his 
father and marries his mother without knowing who his real parent are. He then, in the 
tragedy, discovers the truth after series of events. The reasons, as drawn from the above-
mentioned about the worst plot, are that such circumstance produces nothing repulsive 
and it is tragic for it enables a tragic recognition as well as suffering to occur. Also, the 
agent's being ignorance is consistent with the notion mentioned earlier，hamartia. 
However, Aristotle says right away that the “best’，is that the agent in ignorance discovers 
the truth on the point of committing the horrible deed. He has here Euripides' Iphigenia 
in Tauris in mind. Iphigenia is on the point of killing her brother, Orestes, as sacrifice, 
recognizes him and flees away with him from the Tauris. Aristotle gives no explicit 
explanation for his choice here, however? One plausible explanation is that Aristotle 
thinks that a plot can already arouse pity and fear when it shows the conditions for pitiful 
and fearful events. 
2° There are also debates concerning the apparent double standard of Aristotle's choice here. For instances, 
Thomas Gould accuses Aristotle of his Socratism. He writes "The first (protagonist acts in ignorance the 
terrible deed and discovers it) has more pity and a better pathos, but it has some miaron and not very much 
philanthropon. The second (the horrible deed is avoided) has a weaker pathos and less pity, but wonderful 
philanthropon and miaron at all. The fact that Aristotle gave his highest approval to the second plot is 
testimony to the strength of his loyalty to "philosophy" and Socratism.", Ancient Quarrel between Poetry 
and Philosophy, p. 54. On the other hand, defenders of Aristotle try hard to reconcile these two choices, 
see for example S.A. White(1992), "Aristotle's Favorite Tragedies", in Essays on Aristotle 's Poetics, p. 
221-240. 
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3. The Exclusion 
Besides pointing out what elements Aristotle thinks a fine tragedy should possess, 
it is also important for us to point out what Aristotle thinks a fine tragedy should not have. 
Aristotle constantly draws boundary and relegates certain elements outside the plot. In 
chapter 14, Aristotle excludes the use of spectacle {opsis) to produce not fearful but mere 
sensational effect, for example, Oedipus's self-blinding. Aristotle thinks that it is not the 
poet's art to use spectacle, and it should even fall outside the sphere of tragedy. To this 
Claude Calame responses, “ridding tragedy of all elements of opsis means reducing 
tragedy to a text, setting it apart from its public performance in the context of the cult of 
Dionysus. It cuts tragedy off from its "enunciative c o n t e x t " C l a u d e Calame adds that 
the consequences of Aristotle's excluding spectacle {opsis) are that tragedy can produce 
its essential effects outside theater. The facts that tragedy as theatrical competition and 
cultural activity of the polis, important festival are not taken into consideration. Then, in 
chapter 15, Aristotle rejects the use of a deus ex machina in plots like Euripides' Medea. 
Aristotle thinks that deus ex machina should be used for events outside the plot. What he 
meant by events which should be outside the plot are those "earlier events of which 
human cannot have knowledge, or future events which call for a prospective narrative;….. 
for we attribute to the gods a vision of all things" (1454b4-6). It is argued that such 
exclusion reveals the Aristotle's dissatisfaction with the religious elements. Halliwell 
argues that what Aristotle excludes are events that are "not so amenable to rational 
explanation or interpretation," that is, what cannot be viewed in terms of his own theory. 
"‘Claude Calame(1993), "Vision, Blindness, and Mask: The Radicalization of the Emotions in 
Sophocles' Oedipus Rex”, in Tragedy and the Tragic, p.17-37, edited by M.S.Silk, 1996. Calame goes on to 
discuss in details how the use of opsis in Oedipus Rex produces tragic emotion. For similar criticism on 
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Aristotle says from time to time, “no irrational element should have a part in the events, 
unless outside the tragedy" (1154b7).^^ Another instance of irrational element is found in 
Oedipus Tyrannus (1454b7-9). What is irrational about the tragedy? The answer is found 
in chapter 24 - Oedipus' ignorance of Laius' death. He thinks that the plot that Jocasta 
tells Oedipus how Laius was killed should not be part of the tragedy (line 707 onward). 
Similar reasoning can be found again in chapter 17. Aristotle finds it appropriate to place 
the "reason" of Orestes' arrival in the place in Euripides' Iphigenia in Tauris outside the 
plot. When contemplating the general structure of Iphigenia in Tauris, he writes 
"subsequently, it happened that the priestess's brother came to the place (the fact that a 
god's oracle sent him, and the reason for this, are outside the plot.)" (1145b5-7) ^ ^ 
Aristotle may find the reason of Orestes's arrival neither necessary nor probable. It seems 
that Aristotle here refers to a sphere that is inscrutable to human intelligibility. Such 
boundary not only reinforces the importance of tragedy's internal consistency, but also 
reflects Aristotle's selection. 24 
3.1 Does Aristotle Excludes the Divinity? 
Does Aristotle intend to omit the role of divinity? Roberts defends that Aristotle 
excludes not the divinity, but events that are not well prepared for, unmotivated, 
inadequately connected with the rest of the action and not in a causal sequence, no matter 
Aristote, see also Edith Hall (1993)，"Is there apolis in Aristotle's Poetics?", in the Tragedy and the Tragic, 
p. .295-309. 
“ C f . Stephen Halliwell (1987), p. 48，chapter 15 
Stephen Halliwell (1987), p. 50, chapter 17 
24 See D.H. Roberts(1992), "Outside the Drama: The Limits of Tragedy in Aristotle's Poetics", in Essays 
on Aristotle 's Poetics, pp. 133-154. Roberts writes in p. 137 "the passages that refer to this distinction 
reflect the general importance of boundary and selection for Aristotle, in the Poetics as elsewhere in his 
writings." 
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events of divine or human origin?- Roberts mentions several examples, which shows 
firstly, Aristotle disapproves also irrational plots of human origin, such as'Oedipus' 
ignorance about Laius' death. Secondly, he welcome plots that are inexplicable in human 
terms, provided that they are well prepared for, that is, in the causal sequence. For 
instance, the stature of Mitys falls on the killer of Mitys, for “such events，，，says Aristotle, 
“do not seem to come about by chance" Those plots, though the causes are not clear, 
should be somehow motivated and explicable and therefore “do not seem to come about 
by chance". In other words, Aristotle disapproves the deus ex machina in Euripides 
Medea not because of its divine origin, but on the ground of not well prepared and it 
happens in such an abrupt manner that Aristotle finds that hard to accept. Aristotle's 
outline of Euripides' Iphigenia in Tauris is subjected to similar criticisms. His outline 
runs like this: 
A girl was sacrificed and mysteriously vanished from her 
scarificers; she was planted in another land, where strangers 
were traditionally sacrificed to the goddess whose priesthood 
the girl came to hold. Subsequently, it happened that the 
priestess's brother came to the place (the fact that a god's 
oracle sent him, and the reason for this, are outside the plot). 
Captured on his arrival, he was on the point of being sacrificed 
when he caused his own recognition (whether according to 
Euripides' version, or, as in Polyidus' by saying - as was 
plausible - that it was his own as well as his sister's destiny 
to be sacrificed). The upshot was his rescue (1455b3-12). 
In this outline, we can see that Aristotle omits gods' intervention in Iphigenia's rescue 
and relegates the reason of Orestes' arrival outside the plot. However, Roberts think that 
these events are at least mentioned. They are not stressed because it is not essential to the 
outline. 
25 D.H. Roberts, Ibid. 
26 D. H. Roberts, Ibid., p. 139 
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Though Aristotle does not intend to exclude divine intervention, events of divine 
origin, I think, seems to be a less favorable candidate then events of human origin with ‘ 
respect to Aristotle's requirements. For events of divine origin in Greek tragedy are more 
often irrational in Aristotle's sense, that is, they are more often unmotivated than events 
of human origin. The gods' actions are always hardly intelligible. They always cause 
abrupt changes and is less “well prepared”. As a matter of fact, this is also the very 
feature of the Greek gods, who induce events without "proper" reason (especially the 
gods as presented in Euripides' tragedy), which I am going to discuss in the second half 
of this chapter and chapter 4. Perhaps Aristotle should loose his requirements a bit so that 
his account could be more inclusive. 
3.2 Aristotle on Oedipus Tyrannus 
On the other hand, Aristotle sometimes fails to notice some irrational events of 
human origin. Take one of Aristotle's favorite tragedies, Oedipus Tyrannus, as example. 
Aristotle admits that Oedipus's ignorance of Laius' death is irrational, but there are still 
several events of this sort. Once these events are instanced, his account would sound less 
partial to events of human origin. Oedipus Tyrannus is famous for its highly logical plot-
structure. Oedipus is asked to stop the plague by solving Laius’ murder. He sets out to 
investigate, he sends for the blind prophet, then the shepherd, until the arrival of the 
messenger from Corinth who brings also the terrible truth. What happened is contrary to 
Oedipus' (and probably ours) expectation but in a causal sequence. Oedipus' ignorance, 
his hamartia, as mentioned above, helps explain his downfall as well. Therefore, to 
Aristotle, “to be able to see how an agent came to make a mistake, how it followed in a 
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causally coherent way from judgment and character is to show that the mistake is a cause 
penetrable to human reasoning."工，This play is qualified apparently as Aristotlelian 
tragedy. However, there are several things that are not well prepared in Aristotle's sense. 
For examples, firstly, the death of the king of Corinth which induces the arrival of the 
Corinth Messenger. But this event is relatively understandable, for it is natural for the 
king of Corinth to die in such old age. Secondly, however, why does the old shepherd 
conceal the truth for so many years? If the shepherd tells the truth when Oedipus was 
crowned, many disasters could have been prevented. Thirdly, why were the Corinth king 
and queen reluctant to tell Oedipus the truth? Was that they were unwilling to lost their 
beloved son? If it was so, it would be hard to understand why they did nothing to get 
Oedipus back after Oedipus had ran away from Corinth. Moreover, why was Oedipus so 
haunted by the drunken man's words that drove him to quest for the truth, despite of his 
parents' confirmation of his birth, though it was not true? 
4. The Role of Divinity in Greek Tragedy 
Greek tragedy is a peculiar genre of literature, and one of its peculiarities, I think, 
is its depiction of the peculiar relationship between human and divinity. Tragic action, 
choice, suffering and conflict, to a great extent, mingle with the divinity. Modern liberal 
critics, who try to approach Greek tragedy as it is, tend to widen the subject matter 
instead of narrowing it down and see to the various characteristics. They try also to take 
as much relevant aspects -- religious, mythical, social, political, cultural - as possible 
into consideration, and approach tragic poets and tragedies individually or in a problem-
Nancy Sherman (1992) 
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oriented way.^^ The role of divinity and its relationship with human are well recognized. 
For instance, Vemant describes the characteristics of Greek tragedy as follow: 
Greek tragedy is strongly marked by a number of characteristics: 
tension between myth and the forms of thought peculiar to the city, 
conflicts within man, within the domain of values, the world of the 
gods, and the ambiguous and equivocal character of language. ^^  
And how is the divine aspect essential to Greek tragedy? Vemant explains further: 
But perhaps the essential feature that defines it is that the drama 
brought to the stage unfolds both at the level of everyday existence, 
in a human, opaque time made up of successive and limited present 
moments, and also beyond this earthly life, in a divine, omnipresent 
time that at every instant encompasses the totality of events, sometimes 
to conceal them and sometimes to make them plain but always so that 
nothing escapes it or is lost in oblivion. Through this constant union and 
confrontation between the time of men and the time of gods, throughout 
the drama, the play startlingly reveals that the divine intervenes even in 
the course of human actions. 
Then, how is the relationship between humans and gods peculiar in Greek tragedy? 
Charles Segal, who has written on Sophocles' tragedy, quotes the famous saying of 
Thales to characterize Sophocles' tragedies: "everything is full of gods". He then adds: 
but these gods are remote, dangerous, and awesome powers, easily 
offended but not easily appeased once their realm has been violated 
or their rights infringed. Those gods maintain the world order and 
demand reverence or piety {sebas, eusebeia) from humans; but their 
ways of maintaining this order, which Sopholces, like Aeschylus, 
calls dike^ justice, are neither predictable nor necessarily wholly 
intelligible to mortals.^^ 
See for examples, Jean-Pierre Vemant and PierreVidal-Naquet (1988), Thomas Gould (1990); Charles 
Segal (1995), Sophocles ‘ Tragic \Vorld\ Bernard Williams( 1990). Shame and Necessity, VV. Jaeger (1965), 
Paideia. vol. One. Among which Thomas Gould and Bernard Williams approach Greek tragedies in a 
problem-oriented way. The former deals with the problem of pathos, the later with the problem of shame 
and necessity, as the title of the book suggested.. 
Jean-Pierre Vemant (1988). p. 43. 
30 Jean-Pierre Vemant (1988), Ibid, pp. 43-44 
31 Charles Segal (1995), p. 5 
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In the following, I am going to show the peculiar role of divinity with reference to the 
problem of tragic action, suffering and conflict in Greek tragedy, and see how the theory 
in Aristotle' Poetics fails to attend to it. 
5 The Problem of Tragic Action in Greek Tragedy 
It is widely held that Aristotle's account of tragedy enables him to illustrate his 
ethics and even politics.〕？ In particular, Aristotle defines the subject matter of tragedy as 
“action that is serious，，，which makes moral dimension essential and almost exclusive to 
the understanding of tragedy. One cannot have a fall understanding of Aristotle's theory 
of tragic action without referring to his ethics. I have mentioned that Aristotle's concept 
of action has its broad and narrow sense and both are used in the Poetics, but a fine 
tragedy should be mimetic of action in the narrow sense. Now I try to juxtapose his 
ethical and poetical conception of tragic action. 
5.1. Aristotle on Tragic Action 
To Aristotle, every action or choice of a rational agent aims at some good. 
Happiness is the ultimate good and is the right starting point of ethical inquiry. He 
defines happiness as “a certain sort of activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and hence 
not a result of fortune，，(iVE, book I, chapter 9，1099b26-27).^^ Aristotle then distinguishes 
voluntary action from involuntary action. Voluntary action has its “principle” in the 
For examples, Jonathan Lear thinks that Aristotle's Poetics is an attempt to vindicate his ethical and 
political realism ~ "it aims to show that the polis is adequate to capture all human nature." See Jonathan 
Lear (1995), "Testing the Limit: The Place of Tragedy in Aristotle's Ethics", p. 68, in Aristotle and Moral 
Realism, p. 61-84，edited by Robert Heinaman. S.A. White (1992) writes in "Aristotle's Favorite Tragedy" 
that “ Aristotle's favorite tragedy goes to the heart of his ethical theory"; "his analysis makes a moral 
dimension an essential part of tragedy", pp. 221-222. Nancy Sherman even claims that the Poetics is an 
extended examination of ethics, see Nancy Sherman (1992). 
24 
/ 
- • - • 
• - . • ‘ 
agents and is within the agents' control, and it reflects the agents' character and decision 
(prhoairesis). “Prohairesis” means "choosing (hairesis) before (pro)". It results from the 
agent's wish, which is a rational desire, and deliberation, which is a systematic rational 
calculation. Only prohairesis is the proper explanation {aitia! ama) of an ethical action. 
It is also what distinguishes rational agents from children and an ima l s . In other words, 
as Vemant notes, a rational agent has “the highest degree of consciousness and 
commitment，,35 in his action, he chooses before he acts. An action in the strict sense is 
necessarily the result of the agent's deliberation and character, and they are causally 
integrated. On the other hand, in response to Socrates' view that virtue alone is sufficient 
for happiness, he takes external goods and fortune into his ethical consideration and 
admits that one's action and happiness may be subject to fortune (1100b23-24). Action 
may miss the mark, a virtuous person may fail to obtain happiness, but a noble and 
magnanimous man can bear misfortune with good temper and his virtue shines through 
(1100b31-33).36 
Tragic action of a fine tragedy in the Poetics is precisely like this. Oedipus 
Tyrannus, to Aristotle, shows how the agent carries out an (voluntary) action which aims 
at good, fails because the action misses the mark (i.e. hamartia), but Oedipus is able to 
bear it nobly. This conforms to what Aristotle requires in a fine tragedy: character and 
thought of the agent manifest in his action, the happiness and unhappiness of the agent 
rest on his action, and it is agent's hamartia contributes to his downfall. To Aristotle, as 
Maclntyre points out, there is tragedy only when we have a hero with a f l aw- “a flaw in 
“ C f . Aristotle, Nicomachen Ethics, translated by Terence Irwin. 
34 Ibid, p. 322 
Jean-Pierre Vemant (1988) p. 56 
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practical intelligence which springs from inadequate possession or exercise of some 
virtue”.37 He adds, “if everyone were good enough, there would be no tragedy at all."^^ 
On the other hand, Dodds and Soribji hold that hamartia does not necessarily refer to 
agent's intellectual or moral flaw. Dodds points out that such an understanding of 
hamartia was ascribed to Aristotle by the Victorian and moralizing critics.��Soribji refers 
to the related discussion in Nicomachean Ethics concerning hamartia and related notions 
such as “autuchemcT (arvx^a /misfortune)/® However, even though the agent is least 
culpable of his hamartia, as Halliwell suggests, Aristotle requires the agents to contribute 
their own downfall causally. 4i 
5.2 The Duality of Tragic Action in Greek Tragedy 
As a matter of fact, the causal relation between the agents' character and action in 
Greek tragedy is far from that simple. Viewing from the purely human dimension, the 
agents are never the sufficient cause and reason for his action.42 We are shown that 
something lies outside the agents that contributes to the tragic action. There is always a 
duality or tension constituting the tragic action, as Vemant points out, namely, ethos and 
daimdn, and they are inseparable in Greek tragedy. Aristotle, to a certain extent, attends 
to the former only, by which alone a tragic action cannot be constituted. External 
361 leave aside here the problem "to what extent Aristotle thinks external goods, good fortune and luck 
contribute to happiness?" for a moment, and return to it in next chapter. 
”Alsasdair Maclntyre(1984), After Virtue, p. 161 
Alsasdair Maclntyre( 1984), Ibid, p. 161 
39 See E.R. Dodds (1965) 
40 Richard Soribji (1980), p. 297. See also Nancy Sherman (1992) for related discussion. 
See Halliwell (1987), pp. 128-131. Kaufmann (1968) seems to show similar analysis, p.68. He thinks that 
by hamartia the tragic figures are made to be active but not innocent bystanders. Concerning the debate 
about hamartia, see also E.R. Dodds, "On Misunderstanding Oedipus Rex", Thomas Gould (1965/1990), 
"The Innocence of Oedipus", part I to part III, and The Ancient Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy, 
Freeland, "Plot Imitates Action" and Sherman (1992). I will discuss the problem of hamartia in further 
details in the next chapter, with reference to Aristotle's conception of tiichO. 
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influence has no positive role in Aristotle's conception of action，for character and the 
"mechanism" of deliberation alone are sufficient explanation for an (ethical) action. It is 
not necessary to deny the tragic heroes of their ethos, and the heroes in Greek tragedy do 
have his ethos, which we can learn from their speeches and by which they have different 
tragic endings. In fact, it is necessary to have an individual who possesses characters to 
constitute an action. But at the same time, it is also necessary to recognize that there is 
always a daimon operating, sometimes on the stage, as Athena mAjax, and sometimes in 
the backdrop, as Apollo in Oedipus Tyrannus. In Greek, Vemant points out, daimdn is 
“not usually individualized and which takes action at the very heart of men's lives."斗]In 
other words, the action is necessarily of two levels, Vemant continues to explain, "each 
action appears to be in keeping with the logic of a particular character or ethos even at the 
very moment when it is revealed to be the manifestation of a power from the beyond, or a 
daimdn严 Though Bernard Williams thinks that Vemant has understated the relation 
between ethos and daimdn, and he adds that sometimes there is some obscurity between 
them, the fact that not only the agents' character entails tragic action is clear.^^ There are 
plenty of examples in Greek tragedies that show such duality of action. Such duality is 
also well recognized by the agents themselves and other characters. For example, 
Oedipus is conscious of his daimdn, Apollo, throughout the play. He thinks at first 
Apollo is with him, and finds later that he is hated by Apollo, "who was there bom more 
hated by gods?" (Line 816) “But I am the god's most hated man!" (Line 1517)'^ Others in 
the play see Oedipus' action as guided by a daimdn: learning that Jocasta has killed 
Jean-Pierre Vemant (1988), p.86. 
43 Jean-Pierre Vemant (1988), Ibid, p. 36 
44 Jean-Pierre Vemant (1988), Ibid, p. 37 
Bernard Williams (1994), p.l37 
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herself, Oedipus rushes to the spot as if a daimon leads him the way (line 1260). 
Sometimes, the agents in tragedy regard that they are required to do certain deeds by gods. 
Antigone, when asked by Creon why she buries her brother's corpse against his law to 
put her own life at risk, she says that she is required by the gods to do so. She says, “I 
did not think your edicts strong enough to overrule the unwritten unalterable laws of God 
and heaven, you being only a man" (line 453-456).'^^ Eteocles in Aeschylus's Seven 
against Thebes is fully aware that he is fated to kill his own brother. This is so in 
Oresteia, in which, one of the tragic protagonists, Orestes, is fated to kill his own mother. 
As Jaeger points out, Aeschylus does not intend the 'guilt' of Orestes to be founded in his 
character or nature, but "he is merely the unfortunate son who is bound to avenge his 
father” .48 
5.3 The Tragic Sense of Responsibility 
Only when we attend to such duality can we understand a very important element 
in Greek tragedy, namely, the tragic sense of responsibility suggested by Vemant. It 
“emerges when human action becomes the object of reflection and debate while still not 
being regarded as sufficiently autonomous to be fully self-sufficient.'"^^ The human action 
can be distinguished from the divine, but it is, to a great extent, intervened by it. We can 
see that Oedipus does all the terrible deeds by himself: he kills his father by his own 
hands and he sleeps with his mother and begets children with her. On the other hand, we 
know that, and Oedipus knows at the end that, it is the gods' design before he was bom. 
46 Cf. Sophocles, Oedipus Tyr annus, translated and commented by Thomas Gould, Prentice-Hall Greek 
Drama Series, 1970 
47 Cf. Sophocles, The Theban Plays, translated by E.F. Watling, Penguin. 
Jaeger (1965), Paideia, vol. One, p. 260 
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The tragic element here is not only that his action misses the mark and that he is able to 
bear his suffering nobly. We have to see from Oedipus'first person perspective: he is 
conscious of the fact that he is responsible for and is suffering from what he has been 
trying by all means to avoid, and but the whole thing turns out to be entirely out of his 
own control. As Thomas Gould notes, "Oedipus is quite sure that his daimdn is an 
independent being over whose actions he, Oedipus, has no control.”5�Oedipus cries after 
he blinds himself, “It was Apollo there, Apollo, friends, who brought my sorrows, vile 
sorrows to their perfection, these evils that were done to me" (line 1329-1331). The tragic 
protagonist regrets what he has done, and he feels that he is responsible. Oedipus 
demands himself to be responsible for his deeds, which cannot be “compensated” even by 
his death. There is nothing tragic to the protagonist if he is not conscious of the cruel 
facts or his deeds. As in Heracles, Heracles says bitterly after the disaster, “To a man 
who prospers and is blessed, all change is grief; but the man who lives akin to a trouble 
minds disaster less”(line 219-1221).^^ Also, the chorus sing in Oedipus Tyrannus (line 
1348)，“I could wish you'd never come to know!" The point is, i fAjax did not realize his 
deeds and remain insane, he would not have killed himself; if Hera did not make Heracles 
regain his mind, Heracules would not face such a desperate situation; if Oedipus never 
discovers the truth, he would have been happy though ignorant. The most tragic thing 
here is not only that the gods trick the mortals in such a way, but also let them know the 
trnth, their deeds and tragic responsibilities afterward. The tragic sense here requires the 
protagonist to be aware of the power of the daimdnes, in front of which mortals are 
49 Vemant (1988), p. 27 
50 Thomas Gould (1966), "The Innocence of Oedipus: The Philosophers on Oedipus the King", part I, p. 
380 ‘ ’ 
51 Cf. Euripides, Heracles, translated by William Arrowsmith. 
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powerless. Aristotle's notion of recognition has slightly touched upon this problem. 
Through recognition, the protagonists are changed from ignorance to knowledge. They 
recognize their deeds, while the recognition of their relation to their daimon and whose 
powers are out of Aristotle's consideration. 
6 The Different Conception on Happiness 
To Aristotle, ethos and daimon of tragic action are incompatible, and this, I think, 
has its ground on the different conception of human happiness shared by the tragic poets 
and the philosophers. To the Greeks in tragic ages, "happiness" {eudaimonia) means 
god's good blessings, as Thomas Gould explains, "to be happy is to be eudaimdn, 
blessed with a good daimon; to be unhappy is to be dysdaimdn, or echthrodaimon, cursed 
with an evil or hostile daimdn”，： ''Daimon means more or less the same as 'luck' or 
‘fate’�especially in tragedy".^^ However, it is no longer the case since philosophy takes 
over and dominates the Greek mind, and a scientific world-view takes the place of 
mythical and tragic one. “For any people, Aristotle for instance, this was a dead 
metaphor", as Gould explains further. The relationship between human and daimon 
changes entirely. Greek tragedy often shows daimon tricks tragic protagonists or forces 
them to commit horrible deeds, which the tragic protagonists do not wish or try to avoid. 
Socrates suggests that it is one who chooses one's own daimon, and one is praised or 
blamed accordingly. Besides, he thinks that we should look at one's habits or character if 
52 Thomas Gould (1966), "The Innocence of Oedipus: The Philosophers on Oedipus the King", part I, p. 
379 
53Thomas Gould (1966), "Ibid", p. 379 
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we want to know whether one is happy or not.^^ And though Aristotle takes fortune 
约 into his ethical discussion, he rejects happiness as result of fortune but virtue. To 
a great extent, we contribute to our own happiness (and suffering.) 
7 The Problem of Pathos (Suffering) in Greek Tragedy 
7.1 Pathos and Truth , 
Similarly, the tragic poets and the philosophers have a different understanding of 
"suffering" (pathos). In the Poetics, ‘suffering, is a component of plot-structure, such as 
death，torment, woundings and the like (1452bl0). Suffering is brought about by 
hamarticL However, to the Greeks in tragic ^gQs, pathos is essentially god-caused/' As 
E.R. Dodds points out, pathos means something that "happens to a man, something of 
which he is the passive victim" The Greek used to offer mythical explanation to 
disaster and sufferings, as what the famous Greek myth Pandora 's Box tells us. The 
greatest religious problem brooding on the Greeks of the fifth and sixth centuries is (B.C), 
as Jaeger points out, ‘‘why does God send suffering into the life of man?，，;？ The powerM 
influence of Greek tragedy consists in intensifying the force of this question in presenting 
human suffering. Watching and hearing human suffers presented through the chorus and 
actors, the audience ‘‘felt their highest spiritual energies to resist the storm" and "fall back 
on their last defense—their faith in the ultimate meaning of life." ^^  On the one hand, the 
' 'Thomas Gould (1996)，"Ibid", p. 381. Gould here offers a detail analysis of the different conception of 
daimon between the poets and philosopher. 
55 For a detail analysis on the concept of pathos in Greek tragedy, religion and the philosophers, see 
Thomas Gould (1990) 
56 E.R. Dodds(1965), The Greeks and The Irrational, p. 85 
57 W. Jaeger (1965), p. 251 
58 
W. Jaeger (1965), p, 251. This is more or less like Aristotle's notion “katharsis”, and Jaeger agrees also 
with Aristotle that pity and fear are the strongest psychological effects of tragedy. Jaeger writes in notes 34 
"Aristotle's famous definition of tragedy and its effect on the audience names these two effects, eleos and 
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Greeks weep for the suffering which gods send to them, on the other, they believe that 
mortals' 'leam' {mathein) through suffering. It is more or less a kind of tragic knowledge 
meant by Karl Jaspers: “in and through this knowledge, the whole man is transformed.... 
Man gains the reality and truth of the infinite when he goes to meet his doom".^^ It is 
particularly so in Aeschylus' tragedies. In several tragedies of Aeschylus, the mortal 
agents, through suffering, leam that they cannot resist gods or ‘disobey’ divine justice, 
and their necessity and limitation are manifested. For instances, Agamemnon reveals the 
problem of pathei mathos,, wisdom or revelation through suffering. The chorus sings in 
the tragedy: 
Zeus has led us on to know, 
that Helmsman lays it down as law 
that we must suffer, suffer into truth. (Line 177-179) 
The chorus continues, 
But Justice turns the balance {mathos) scales, 
see that we suffer 
and we suffer and we leam. (Line 250-253) 
This theme is also found in Sophocles' tragedy. For example, the chorus sings at the end 
of Oedipus Tyrannus that through watching the sufferings of Oedipus, mortals leam the 
truth, which is unbearable: 
Here is the truth of each man's life: we must wait, and see his end, 
scrutinize his dying day, and refuse to call him happy 
till he has crossed the border of his life without pain. (Line 1527-1530) 
phobos, as the most importantpathemata which are aroused by tragedy and are subject to the tragic 
katharsis these categories do indeed fit the facts (Aeschylus's tragedy) better than any other." 
Karl Jasper (1969), Tragedy is not Enough, Chapter 4’ "The Subjectivity of the Tragic", p. 72，translated 
by Harald A.T. Reiche, Harry T. Moore and Karl W. Deuctsch. Archon Books, 1969. 
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“Call no man happy until his death", it is the Greeks' widely held belief, as Aristotle 
notices in Nicomachean Ethic，』though it is no longer the case for the philosophers. 
12 The Religious Significance 
Besides, the suffering is of religious significance. When mortals accept god-sent 
sufferings, they become revere to god (eusebes). This theme is recurrent especially in 
Sophocles' tragedies, for examples, AJax and Oedipus at Col onus. As M. Sicherl says, 
“the religious significance of Ajax’ death is confirmed by his consecration as a hero. By 
accepting the sufferings sent by the gods, man becomes eusehes and wins deathless 
excellence {aQavarov aperT^v)", and "by sacrificing himself voluntarily, Ajax purges 
himself of pollution and is reconciled with Athena. Though submitting to change, he 
retains his immutability" (i.e. the quality of gods, see picture Similarly, in Oedipus 
at Colonus, Sicherl continues, "the man who has come through suffering to truth is 
finally received by the gods."^^ Oedipus says when he is ‘about to go' that the hand of 
God directs him (line 1543-1544). And the messenger describes how Oedipus ‘vanishes,: 
“A god was calling to him. 'Oedipus! Oedipus!' it cried, again and again." And Oedipus 
asked Antigone not to watch the 'forbidden mysteries'. Shortly after this was Oedipus 
"nowhere to be seen." The messenger continues: 
We know he was not destroyed by a thunderbolt from heaven not 
61 Aristotle examines Solon's dictum that happiness is unstable and vulnerable. Aristotle agrees partly with 
Solon that happiness depends to certain extent on external forces. However, Aristotle disagrees with Solon 
to great a extent and thinks that virtuous person always retains the one crucial part of happiness, no matter 
what befalls him. See Terence Irwin for an excellent discussion of Aristotle's views with regard to Solon's: 
"Permanent Happiness: Aristotle and Solon" in Aristotle 's Ethics: Critical Essays, p.1-34, edited by Nancy 
Sherman, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999.1 will discuss this in the next chapter. 
62 M. Sicherl(1977), "The Tragic Issue in Sophocles' Ajax���p.97, in Yale Classical Studies, vol. XXV Greek 
Tragedy, p. 67-98, edited by T.F. Gould and C.J. Herington, 1977. The picture shows the feet of dead Ajax 
protrude beyond the border, which may symbolize the religious significance of his death mentioned. 
63 M. Sicherl (1977). 
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tide-wave rising from the sea, for no such thing occurred. Maybe a 
guiding spirit from the gods took him, or the earth's foundations that 
- gently opened and received him no pain. Certain it is that he was taken 
without a pang, without grief or agony -- a passing more wonderful than 
that of any other man. (Line 1607-1660)64 
7.3 Pathos and Pity among Mortals 
Aristotle not only speaks nothing about the religious significance of pathos, he 
fails, as a result, to appreciate tragedies that brooding deeply on the power of pathos 
between enemies. He thinks that plots depicting tragic action between enemies and 
people of natural relation are not pitiful (pathetic), except that there is visible suffering. It 
is pitiful only when tragic action is done between friends or families (chapter 24, 
1453bl5-20). For the Greeks, however, human suffering is universal to all mortals. This 
is what bounds mortals together, distinguishes them from immortal gods. As Charles 
Segal reminds us, "it is a deeply held assumption among the Greeks of the archaic and 
classical periods that the sharing of tears and suffering create a bond of common 
humanity between mortals.，,65 He then instances the confrontation of Achilles and Priam 
in book 24 of Iliad; the bonding between indirect victims and the survivors of the Trojan 
War in the house of Menelaus {Odysseus, book 4). Moreover, Odysseus in disguise and 
the swineherd Eumaeus "share their tales of the misfortunes and vicissitudes of their 
lives" in Odysseus Book 14 and 15. Furthermore, Pindar reminds his audience of the 
community of suffering which unites mortals {Nemean 10.78). I would like to focus here, 
in response to the Poetics on the fact that mortals may have a universal pity to any other 
mortals who are suffering from gods' torment or tricks, though they are of neutral and 
even rival relation. And the most tragic thing, I think, is pity among rival enemies. 
Cf. Sophocles, The Theban Plays, translated by E.F. Watling, Penguin 
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7.3.1 Achilles and Priam in Ilaid 
In the last book of Homer's Iliad, there is a famous passage depicting the shared 
pity of human suffering between enemies. Achilles has killed Priam's son, Hector and he 
refuses to hand the corpse back to Priam. He just lays it bare. Priam begs Achilles to give 
him back his son's corpse. “The majestic king of Troy slipped past the rest and kneeling 
down besides Achilles, clasped his knees and kissed his hands, those terrible, man-killing 
hands that had slaughtered Priam's many sons in battle" (Book 24, line 558-562，see 
pictures 5 & 6). ^^  Then comes Priam's moving speech: 
But I-- dear god, my life so cursed by fate... 
I fathered hero sons in the wide realm of Troy 
and now a single one is left, I tell you. 
.".But one, one was left me, to guard my walls, my people— 
the one you killed the other day，defending his fatherland, 
my Hector!.... ‘ 
Revere the gods, Achilles! Pity me in my own right, 
remember your own father! I deserve more pity ... 
I have endured what no one on earth has ever done before— 
I put to my lips the hands of the man who killed my son (line 576-591). 
Achilles is stirred by Priam's speech. He takes "the old man's hand he gently moved his 
back. And overpowered by memory both man gave way to grief." The two great figures 
then weep together, “and their sobbing rose and fell throughout the house." Then 
Achilles speaks of the suffering and pity among mortals: 
So the immortals spun our lives that we, we wretched men 
live on to bear such torments-- the gods live free of sorrows. 
There are two great jars that standing on the floor of Zeus's halls 
And hold his gift, our miseries one, the other blessings. (Line 612-616) 
He even tells Priam how to face his misfortune: 
65 Charles Segal (1993)，"Catharsis, Audience, and Closure in Greek Tragedy", p. 149 in Tr呢edy and the 
Tragic, p. 149-172 
66Homer, The Iliad, translated by Robert Fagles, Penguin, 1990 
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But then the gods of heaven brought this agony on you~ 
ceaseless battles round your walls, your armies slaughtered. 
You must bear up now.... 
Grief for your son will do no good at all. 
You will never bring him back to life— 
sooner you must suffer something worse (line 640-646). 
7.3.2 Ajax and Odysseus in Ajax 
Likewise, there are tragedies depicting pity of human suffering among enemies or 
strangers, which produce powerful tragic feelings: Sophocles' Philoctetes (Neoptolemus 
toward Philoctetes), Ajax (Odysseus toward Ajax), Euripides' Hecuba (Agamemnon 
toward Hecuba). The most impressive one, I think, is Sophocles' Ajax (see pictures 7 & 
8). Sophocles juxtaposes in Ajax the sharply contrasted perspectives between gods and 
mortals with regard to human suffering: Athena as a powerful god to fool and to mock 
Ajax, Odysseus as an audience watching with pity, and Ajax as the poor sufferer.^^ The 
first half of the tragedy centers on the suffering of Ajax-- he is tricked by Athena, the 
daimon of his enemy, Odysseus, and kills himself tragically out of shame. He dies in the 
middle of the tragedy, leaving the rest of the tragedy in debating how to handle his corpse. 
It is Odysseus who comes to secure for Ajax an honorable burial and to reclaim Ajax's 
heroic status. Despite the fact that Athena fools Ajax to save Odysseus and his army from 
being slaughtered, and that they are rival enemies, Odysseus shows pity toward Ajax 
throughout the tragedy. At the beginning of the tragedy, Athena shows Odysseus how she 
tricks Ajax. She says: 
And there you see the power of gods, 
Odysseus. Is it great? Here was a man 
Supreme in judgement, unsurpassed in action 
Matched to the hour. Did you ever know better?^^ (line 120-124) 
67 For a brilliant account of Sophocles' techniques concerning the contrasted perspectives, see Charles 
Segal (1995), "Drama and Perspective 'mAjax'\ 
68 Sophocles, Electra and Other Plays, translated by E.F. Watling, Penguin, 1953 
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Odysseus replies: 
Never. He was my enemy, but I'm sorry 
Now, with all my heart, for the misfortune 
Which holds him in its deadly grip. This touches 
My state as well as his. Are we not at all, 
All living things, mere phantoms, shadows of nothing? (line 125-129) 
Ajax's bitter suffering bounds him up with Odysseus. As an audience on stage, Odysseus 
shares deeply how bitter suffering may fall on mortals, and he is now with Ajax instead 
of Athena. Witnessing Ajax's suffering, Odysseus cannot help contemplating the 
universal human condition: mortals are mere phantoms and shadow of nothing. Also，it is 
Ajax's suffering that turns him a hero in the eyes of Odysseus. At the near end of the 
tragedy, Odysseus debates with Agamemnon over the burial of Ajax, he says: 
There was a time when I too hated him; 
From the time I won the armour of Achilles, 
He was the bitterest enemy I had; and yet, 
Such though he was, I could not bring myself 
To grudge him honor, or refuse to admit 
He was the bravest man I ever saw, 
The best of all that ever came to Troy, 
Save only Achilles.……(line 1136- 1143) 
Would that be a flaw for a theory of Greek tragedy to neglect tragedy brooding on 
overwhelmingly tragic issues as such? 
8. The Problem of Conflicts in Greek Tragedy 
On the other hand, Aristotle rejects plots, which depict intentional killing between 
family, for it is repulsive (miaron). Gould points out that Plato in the Republic constantly 
uses the words ‘miaron, "to characterizes a psyche in which intelligence has become 
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slave rather than master" “It refers to the triumph of the anti-Socratic element in our 
p s y c h e . I n chapter 13, Aristotle rejects plot that shows good man passing from 
prosperity to affliction (1452b36); and in chapter 14 he rejects plot that shows the agents 
carrying out the incurable deed intentionally (1453b35). With regard to the latter, many 
tragic plots are excluded: Agamemnon's making Iphigenia a sacrifice in Iphigenia in 
Aulis; Clytaemnestra's killing her husband in Agamemnon; Antigone's burying her 
brother against Creon's law in Antigone-, Orestes's killing his mother in Oresteia; 
Medea's killing her children in Medea and Eteocles's killing of his brother in the battle in 
The Seven against Thehen. Explicit antagonism among kinship appears to Aristotle to be 
unacceptable. In fact, the explicit antagonism in Greek tragedy, among kinship in 
particular, exposes some kinds of insolvable and extreme conflicts on which Aristotle 
remains silent: these conflicts are mostly of divine origin. Despite the problem of divinity, 
such unusual silence has its root in Aristotle's ethical account~his optimism on the 
problem of moral conflicts. 
8.1 Aristotle and Greek Tragedy on Conflict 
In fact, we can see here that Aristotle inherits from Plato certain ethical beliefs. 
Plato in the Republic identifies the good of the individual with the good of the polis. And 
Aristotle believes also in the unity of virtues and the harmony between the individual and 
polis. To him, goods and virtues are necessarily in harmony with each other. Virtues 
enable an agent to achieve eudaimonia and the exercise of which entails right action. 
External goods such as health and friends and internal goods are in good hierarchy and 
69 Thomas Gould (1990), p. 17 and p. 52. 
70 Thomas Gould (1990)，Ibid, p. 17 and p. 52. 
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relations. Aristotle's concept of a good person 'spoudaios' in Nicomachean Ethics is a 
person of no insolvable conflict at all. As Maclntyre points oufi , to Aristotle (and also 
Plato), there should be no conflict that is not eliminable. Should there be conflict, it is the 
flaws of character of the agent or bad political arrangements of the polis. On the other 
hand, Gellrich points out that the importation of the concept of ' spoudaios, into the 
Poetics "discourages a view of the tragic action as a representation of internal battles of 
the soul, of intense social rivalries between individuals with competing ethical claims, or 
clashes between mortals and gods.”?� The tragic conflict depicted in tragedy is precisely 
like this. For example, the conflict Antigone faces has little to do with her character. 
Rather, it is the conflict between individual ethical claim and the polls' demand. Vernant 
suggests that the conflict of Antigone and Creon in the Antigone is the tension between 
two types of religious feeling: family religion and public religion. To Antigone, there is 
conflict between dike of dead and celestial dikeP Conflict like this always result in 
explicit antagonism among kinship, which Aristotle rejects. Maclntyre thinks that the 
conflict explored in Aeschylus' tragedies “relied on the contradictory imperatives of 
kinship loyalties and the equally contradictory imperatives of the theology that sustained 
kinship”.74 Such conflict may not have resolution, or is inevitable. For most part, they are 
god-caused, and are ended but not resolved, by divinity, just like at the end of Aeschylus' 
trilogy. 
Alasdair Maclntyre (1984), After Virtue, a study in moral theory, chapter 11 and 12. 
72 Michelle Gellrich(1988), Tragedy and Theory: The Problem of Conflict Since Aristotle, p. 104 
73 Vemant (1988), pp. 40-41 
74 Alasdair Maclntyre (1984), p. 142 
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8.2 Agamemnon — Killing Among Family 
Agamemnon renders a paradigm example of tragic conflict. This tragedy depicts 
Clyteamnestra's killing her husband intentionally. She acts without ignorance of her act 
or the identity of her victim. Such rival action has its origin in another past tragic event. 
The chorus in the beginning sings and recalls the tragic event years ago一Agamemnon's 
sacrificing his daughter. Agamemnon and Menelaus were commanded by Zeus to go on 
an expedition for Priam (line 44-53)/^ However, goddess Artemis becalmed the 
expedition. The reason for Artemis' sending thunder and storm to hinder the expedition 
was that Artemis was angry at the expedition. Calchas brought the oracle back and it was 
said that the only way Agamemnon could do was to sacrifice his beloved daughter, 
Iphigenia. We can see that there were two forces opposing each other, and both of them 
were of external and divine origin. Agamemnon was trapped in such dilemma: to kill or 
not to kill. To kill, he would be the killer of his own daughter and fail to be a good father; 
not to kill, he would fail Zeus, his alliance as well as his fleets. The chorus recalls 
Agamemnon's bitter words: 
‘Obey, obey, or a heavy doom will crush me! 
Oh but doom will crush me 
Once I rend my child, 
The glory of my house -
A father's hands are stained, 
Blood of a young girl streaks the altar. 
Pain both ways and what is worse? 
Desert the fleets, the alliance?' (line 206-213) 
Apparently, it was up to Agamemnon to act or not to act. In fact, there is no choice at a l l . . 
As Nussbaum suggests, "but he is under necessity in that his alternatives include no very 
desirable options", "the special agony of this situation us that none of the possibilities is 
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even harmless.”76 Agamemnon had to choose the one that is ‘less worse'. There was no 
‘better choice'. Agamemnon then ‘decided’： 
'No, but stop the winds with a virgin's blood, 
feed their lust, their fury? -feed their fliry!-
Law is law!-
Let all go well.' (line 214-216) 
This tragic situation can be read as a paradigmatic moral dilemma, in which the agent's 
virtue as a father is in direct conflict with his virtue as a king, the leader of an alliance. It 
is also a conflict between the individual's and the polis' interest. Agamemnon no longer 
called his daughter ‘my child' but ‘a virgin' impersonally here symbolizes that he had 
already given up the former virtue and his individual interest. Even worse, his choice not 
only made him loss his child, but the explicit antagonism among his family starts: his 
wife, Clytaemnestra, out of rages, in turn kills him brutally. His son, Orestes, was 
commanded later both by Apollo to take revenge on Clytaemnestra and by the Furies not 
to take revenge. 
Agammenon's decision here does not come from his character or moral 
deliberation, anything internal to his moral agency. As Bernard Williams notes, 
Agammenon's murderous states of mind is a result, but not the cause of his decision/^ 
The dilemma and conflict depicted have not much to do with the character of the agent as 
Aristotle would think; it was the clash of Zeus's command and Artemis' anger, or what 
Bernard Williams calls “a necessity arising from supernatural forces"^^ that gives rise to 
the tragic conflict. Such necessity, Williams says further, “present itself to the agent as ‘ 
75 Aeschylus, Agamemnon, translated by Robert Fagles, Penguin 
76 M.C. Nussbaum (1986), The Fragility of Goodness, pp. 34-35 
77 Bernard Williams (1990) p. 134 
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having produced the circumstances in which he must act, and he decides in the light of 
those circumstances." ^^  The chorus is well aware of Agamemnon's tragic situation. They 
do not accuse Agamemnon of his cruelty, instead, they call upon Zeus and gods for the 
truth they send to mortals through suffering (line 174-184). The fact the Agamemnon is 
tricked by fate is well recognized by the chorus and Agamemnon himself. After the 
decision is made, the chorus sings that he had "slipped his neck in the strap of fate"(line 
218). And Agamemnon was in bitter anger: 
his spirit veering black, impure, unholy, 
once he turned he stopped at nothing, 
seized with the frenzy 
blinding driving to outraged 
-wretched frenzy, cause of all our grief! (line 219-222) 
8.3 The Nature of Tragic Conflicts 
Tragic conflicts like this is an important feature of Greek tragedy. Greek tragedy 
poses tension and conflict that are to mortals insolvable, or inescapable, as what Eteocles 
is aware of. Knowing that he is going to kill his own brother in the battle, Eteocles insists 
to go despite of the chorus's dissuasion, for he is aware of the tragic fact that he is fated 
and cursed to do so. He replies the chorus, "when the gods decree it, you may not escape 
evil"(line 718-719). Williams explains further that Eteocles' reason to act is the necessity 
of situation presented to him. Even worse, to Eteocles, there is no way out. Williams 
continues, "in this case, the question that might have occurred to Eteocles, "What if I 
don't" cannot occur: the working of the necessity makes sure that there is no moment for 
Bernard Williams (1990), p. 135. He says, "but there was another necessity lying behind his decision, of 
the kind with which we are now specially concerned: a necessity arising from supernatural forces that 
expressed themselves in the situation that called for a decision." 
79 Bernard Williams (1990), Ibid, p. 139 
4 2 
— • 
. - ‘ . . . . . . . . � 
it.，,8o Hindered by his ethical spectacles, Aristotle's theory fails to take this into 
consideration, or misreads tragedies like this. 
9. Conclusion: Aristotle's Silence 
Aristotle's silence on the role of divinity has its grounds on his effort to 
“systematize relationship between character and event" and to make random events, 
radical contingency of action intelligible, “which are conformable to the percept of the 
usual, or the likely He reminds from time to time that there should be no irrational 
component in the Greek tragedy, and if so it should lie outside the plot. This results in 
understating the problem of tragic action, pathos, conflicts, and after all, the tragic sense 
of recognizing the "supernatural necessity"(Williams‘ term), under the working of which 
rational deliberation shows its powerlessness and resolute effort turns out in vain. If what 
Aristotle demands of tragedy is that what happens is contrary to expectation but not to 
reason, I would say that in Greek tragedy, things may turn out not only contrary to our 
beliefs and expectation, but also reason. They are "intelligible" to audience only when the 
role of divinity is well recognized. I am not saying that Aristotle's moral dimension 
worth nothing in studying tragedies, but just that his ethical thoughts are too much in 
control in the Poetics, which results in judging tragedy according to its conformity with 
his own moral beliefs, leaving aside issues that may be a challenge. It results also in the 
levelling down of individual tragic protagonists and the tragic issues are neutralized. 
Protagonists of different temper confront different tragic situations and face them in 
different ways: being tricked by god to commit terrible deeds, Ajax kills himself while 
Bernard Williams(1990), Ibid, p. 139 
81 Michelle Gellrich (1988), pp.111-112. 
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Oedipus and Heracles do not, and the tragic issues in Antigone are different from that of 
in Philoctetes. On the other hand, his formal analysis is done at the expense of the variety 
and plurality of features of Greek tragedy. A definition would not do, as Jaeger says, “a 
general definition would only confuse the issue."^^ We can see here the different 
approaches of tragic poets and philosophers. While tragic poets tend to pose paradoxical 
questions and expose desperate problems that may not have answers or solutions, 
philosophers tend to give definite answers and explanations to those questions, and to 
eliminate problems as much and as best as they can. 
82 Jaeger, Paideia, p. 251 
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Chapter 3 ： Aristotle on Tuche 
Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor the lack of contradiction 
a sign of truth. 
Pascal, quoted from The Viking 
Book of Aphorisms 
1. Aristotle and the Moral Luck Problem ‘ 
This chapter is devoted to the discussion of the problem of tuche 
(chance/luck/fortune)^ in Aristotle's philosophy as presented in the Physics, the two 
Ethics {Eudemain Ethics and Nicomachean Ethics) and the Poetics. I will show that 
Aristotle is consistent in dealing with tuche in his physical and ethical thoughts. His 
consistency consists in declaring that the four causes are conceptually prior to tuche, 
in terms of which is tuche defined. In the Eudemian Ehics, he argues that a fortunate 
person's success is due to tuche is not totally justified. He thinks that "impulse in the 
soul" is a better explanation. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he admits that external 
goods (goods of fortunes) are in certain sense necessary for happiness, but they at 
most play a secondary role. In the Poetics, he plays little attention on the role of tuche 
in contributing the downfall of the tragic protagonists. Instead, he stresses on what 
lies in the protagonists themselves that contributes downfall. In so doing I try also to 
1 As there are three translations of rvxrj, when quoting or mentioning other scholars' views, I use all the 
three translations interchangeably. However, note that it is usually translated as "luck" or "chance" in 
the Physics, but "luck" or "fortune" in the two Ethics. 
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respond to some modem discussions on the problem of moral luck in Aristotle, 
Nussbaum's The Fragility of Goodness (1987) in particular. 
The moral luck problem has aroused interest of a number of scholars in the late 
twentieth century since Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel published papers 
entitled "Moral Luck". ^ They suggest that moral luck is significant to ethical concern. 
For Nagel, moral luck is “a significant aspect of what someone does depends on 
factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of 
moral judgment，，？ Nagel thinks that even though moral luck does not affect moral 
agents' virtues, it does affect their happiness and their views on themselves. Williams 
suggests the concept of "agent-regret" and emphasizes how bad luck may interrupt 
one's life project. Nagel criticizes Kant's ethics for its denial of such problem, so does 
Williams. In addition to that, Williams has also the ancient Greek philosophers in 
mind. Scholars such as Anthony Kenny and Nussbaum have tried to trace the moral 
luck problem back to Aristotle.4 For example, Nussbaum shows agreement, to a great 
extent, with Williams, but in the Fragility of Goodness, she seems to argue that only 
Plato is 'guilty' of this charge. And in the later chapters on Aristotle's ethical account 
2 Bernard Williams, "Moral Luck" and Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck", first published in The 
Proceedings of the Aristotlelian Society 50 (1976). 
3 Cf. Thomas Nagel, “ Moral Luck", p.574, in 20th Century Ethical Theory, p. 573-582, edited by 
Steven M. Chan and Joram G. Haber, 1995. 
4 See Anthony Kenny (1992&1993), Aristotle on Perfect Life, Chapter 5, "Fortune and Virtue" and 
Chapter 6 "Moral Luck", and "Aristotle on Moral Luck", and M.C.Nussbaum, The Fragility of 
Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 
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of external circumstances, fortune and luck, against what she called the Kant-
influenced commentators such as David Ross and H.H. Joachim, Nussbaum argues 
that all these notions do matter to Aristotle's happiness and ethics significantly.^ 
To what extent Aristotle thinks that tuche matters to ethics and episteme after all? 
Farwell and Cooper, for instances, challenge Nussbaum and Kenny. Farewell argues 
J" 
that Aristotle in fact "gives a subtle and interesting argument for keeping luck and 
ethics distinct，? and Cooper thinks that Nussbaum has overstated the authority of 
appearance {endoxa) in Aristotle's ethics and therefore the significance of moral 
luck.7 Also, Kenny thinks that Aristotle regards tuche as a real cause, to which 
Farwell and Kent Johnson object. They think that to Aristotle, tuche is not a real cause 
and is defined in terms of the four causes.^ 
To understand the problem of tuche in Aristotle's thought, it is necessary to go 
through the related texts and related concepts in Aristotle's writings. Nussbaum 
discusses about good fortune, luck, and external circumstances in Aristotle's ethics 
without attending to their distinctions and how Aristotle actually discusses the 
5 M.C. Nussbaum (1986), The Fragility of Goodness. She writes after comparing and contrasting the 
views of Williams and Vemant, "I shall argue that the Platonic conception of the life of reason, 
including its emphasis upon stable and highly abstract objects, is itself a direct continuation of an 
aspiration to rational-sufficiency through the trapping and binding of unreliable features of the world 
that is repeatedly dramatized in pre-Platonic texts", p. 19. 
6 Paul Farwell (1994), "Aristotle, Success, and Moral Luck", Journal of Philosophical Research, vol. 
XIX’ 1994, p.37-50 
7 J.M. Cooper (1999), "Aristotle on the Authority of "Appearance"" and "Aristotle on Goods of 
Fortune, in Reason and Emotion, p. 253-308 
8 Paul Farwell(1994), "Aristotle, Success, and Moral Luck", Abstract, Journal of Philosophical 
Research, vol. XIX, 1994, p.37-50, and Kent Johnson (1997), "Luck and Good Fortune in the Eudemian 
Ethics", in Ancient Philosophy 17 (1997) 
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problem luck in the related works/) In the following, I will show that Aristotle indeed 
tries to minimize the role of luck in his account of theoretical, practical and 
productive knowledge. I will first go through the arguments concerning the problem 
of tuche in Aristotle's Physics and the two ethical works in order to see firstly, how 
tuche matters to Aristotle, and secondly, to what extent Aristotle thinks that it matters. 
The main concern of tuche in the Physics is that whether it is a real cause (ama) and 
how it should be prioritized. In Ethics, Aristotle's concern is whether it contributes to 
or threatens our happiness (eudaimonia/ev^aifjbov'ia) and that, as Farwell points out, 
whether it serves as a cause/explanation (aitia/ama) of an ethical act ion/� 
2. Tuche in Aristotle's Physics 
Aristotle gives a theoretical account of tuche mainly in chapter four to six in 
book two of the Physics. After discussing his four causes in the previous chapters, he 
immediately turns to the problem of tuche (chance) and of spontaneity {to automaton/ 
TO avTOfjLarov, the genus of tuche)Such problems appear to him as endoxa, those 
common beliefs held by others, which he thinks he should see why they are held, or in 
9 See Nicholas P. White, "Rational Self-SufFiciency and Greek Ethics, Review of Nussbaum", in Ethics 
99, (October. 1988)，p.136-146. White writes in p.137 "there is no general investigation of this notion 
(tyche) and related notion like aitia. Aristotle 's treatment of tyche in Physics 4, for example, is only 
mentioned once. Nor is there any general treatment of tyche in Greek literature." 
Paul Farwell, "Aristotle, Success, and Moral Luck", p.38 
11 Unless otherwise noted, for Aristotle's Physics, I follow the text of The Complete Works of Aristotle, 
edited by J. Barnes (sixth printing, with corrections. 1995). 
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what sense they are justified. (195b32-31).^^ There are three beliefs concerning tuche, 
two are held by certain physicists, the third concerns the tragic thoughts of the 
common people. Some physicists think that there is no such thing as tuche, and that 
there is a definite cause of everything. The other thinks that the whole universe is a 
product of tuche. Aristotle instances Empedocles as the former and the atomists 
(obviously, Democritus) as the latter. Besides, he thinks that they have not even 
equated it with any causes they recognized, such as love, strife, mind, fire and the like 
(196al7-18). Aristotle further points out that Empedocles was inconsistent in using 
tuche in his fragments for certain explanations (196a20-24). Concerning the atomists, 
Aristotle thinks that they have contradicted themselves by holding that spontaneity is 
responsible for all cosmic systems on the one hand, and that animals and plants are 
not the outcome of tuche on the other. The cause of both animal and plants is said to 
be nature or mind, that is something other than tuche (196b25-35). Thirdly, the 
ordinary people (most probably the worshippers of the goddess Tuche as in the tragic 
ages)i3 believe that tuche is a genuine cause, which is inscrutable to human thought, 
and that it has much to do with the divine. Aristotle explains in the following chapters 
12 Aristotle says, "We must inquire therefore in what manner chance and spontaneity are present among 
the causes enumerated, and whether they are the same or different, and generally what chance and 
spontaneity are", 195b34-36. 
13 See W.K.C. Guthrie A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4, p.238. Vemant says that Tuche 
appears as a goddess in archaic Greek thought. See Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vemant, The 
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in what sense we can say that tuche is inscrutable to human thought. 
For Aristotle, neither the view that the whole cosmos is due to tuche nor the view -
that there is no such thing as tuche is totally justified. Therefore he has to figure out a 
middle way. The purpose of his account of tuche and spontaneity in these chapters is 
to see in what way they "fit into our causes", and to see “what their place is among 
the causes we have distinguished"(195b35, 196b 8-9). In other words, Aristotle is 
prepared to explain tuche in terms of his four causes and teleological worldview. 
2.1 Tuche and “What Happen always or For the Most Part" 
Aristotle starts by distinguishing tuche from "what happen always or for the most 
part." According to Aristotle' physics, events can be said to happen “always，，，“for the 
most part" or "rarely". In the Physics and other major w o r k s h e associates "always" 
with "by nature and of necessity", "for the most part" with “by nature but falling short 
of necessity" and "rare"' with "incidentally". Necessity is the only concern of 
scientist; it is that which cannot be otherwise. However, it seems to be too ideal and 
rigid, for there are always exceptions in the sciences (and human actions), Aristotle 
therefore substitutes "for the most part" for “always”. Examples of what happens 
14 See Lindsay Judson, "Chance and 'Always or For the Most Part' in Aristotle", note 23, in Aristotle 's 
Physics: A Collection of Essays, p. 73-99. 
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always or for the most part are the upward movement of fire and snow in winter.'^ 
Event induced by tuche is what happens rarely, it comes to be neither “always，，nor 
"for the most part". Tuche is not a cause of anything that happens always or for the 
most part. It is not a proper cause, but can be named as "accidental cause". He says, 
"things do, in a way, occur by chance {tuche), for they occur accidentally and chance 
{tuche) is an accidental cause (197al4-15) ”. 
2.2 Tuche and “For the Sake of Something” 
Aristotle then distinguishes things that come to be “for the sake of something" 
from some which do not (196b 17). For the things come to be “for the sake of 
something", some are in accordance with intention, some are not (196bl7-18). "For 
the sake of something" refers to the final cause, and here it means there is always a 
telos. Though in this class there are something that comes to be with intention while 
other are not, "both are in the class of the things that are for the sake of something". 
Aristotle adds then, “hence it is clear that even among the things which are outside 
what is necessary and what is for the most part, there are something in connexion with 
which the phrase 'for the sake of something' is applicable" (196b 19-22). This is what 
Aristotle restricted as tuche, thing that comes to be by virtue of concurrent. If the 
Aristotle Physics, Book I & II, commentary, p.l05. 
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purpose of A is B, and C is concomitant of B, C is an outcome of tuche in relation to 
A. A is not intended to produce C, but it turns out that C is resulted. In other words, as 
Ross explains, tuche may thus be defined as "the cause per accidens in that division 
of things-for-an-end which involves purposive action."^^ A concrete example would 
surely help to illustrate this. Aristotle instances that a man goes to the market place [A: 
for the purpose of, let say，buying some wine [B], but then meets his debtor and 
collects his debt [C]. His going to the market place is a purposive action, and his 
meeting his debtor is a concurrent of the purposive action and it is also what Aristotle 
meant by chance. Note that tuche is defined in terms of purposive action. If there is no 
such purposive action, there is no tuche 
2.3 The Implications 
What does such explanation imply? As Judson points out, “a chance event {tuche) 
is incidental relative to all the natural and deliberative processes taking place in the 
subject.” 17 Tuche is not a proper cause as the four causes, it is rather, as Aristotle says 
in the Metaphysics, “the privation of cause" {Metaphysics, 1070a6-7). Tuche to 
Aristotle is only a way of describing or explaining events that does not happen for the 
most part. There "is" luck only in description. It is even not necessary to use luck to 
16 Sir David Ross (1995), Aristotle, p. 78 
17 Judson, "Chance and 'Always or For the Most Part' in Aristotle", p. 92. 
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“explain” the above mentioned example with A going to the market place where he 
happens to meet his debtor. Only when we describe it in the acknowledgement of the 
purpose of the action is tuche needed. Another example illustrating this is that a flute-
player builds a house. A house is necessarily built by a builder; a builder is a proper 
cause of the house. Under such description, it concerns nothing about tuche. If the 
builder is also a flute-player, and a flute-player is no proper cause of a house, 
therefore, we have to attribute tuche only when we describe the event like ‘a flute-
player builds a house' (196b26-27, 197al3-15). It is more or less like a name for 
certain event c o n n e c t i o n / ^ As Woods sums up: 
Thus, chance occurrences {tuche) have the feature that they fall 
under no law that holds or for the most part under the 
description under which they are correctly said to occur 
by chance, though they will have some explanation under 
another description.^^ 
The distinction made between tuche and spontaneity further proves Aristotle's 
attempt to confin'e chance to a narrower scope. Aristotle thinks that both tuche and 
spontaneity are accidental causes, but "they differ in that spontaneity is the wider" 
(196b36). Aristotle explains, "every result of chance (tuche) is from what is 
spontaneous, but not everything that is from what is spontaneous is from chance 
Sir David Ross, Aristotle, p.78. 
19 Micheal Woods (1992), Aristotle Eudemian Ethics, Books I, II and VIII, p.166. See also William 
Charlton's commentary, p.108, and Kent Johnson (1997), "Luck and Good Fortune in the Eudemian 
Ethics", p. 86-87, in Ancient Philosophy 77(1997), p. 85-102. They all hold that chance/luck, to 
Aristotle, is only a matter of description relative to the event. 
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打’（197a36-37). In other words, tuche is a subspecies of spontaneity. Tuche has a 
narrower scope, for “what results from chance is appropriate to agents that are capable 
of good fortune and of action generally", and “Hence what is not capable of action 
cannot do anything by tuche (197b2-3, 197b6-7) ”. Tuche is confined only to rational 
beings with the capability to choose; tuche is nothing for deeds done by an inanimate 
object, beast or child (197b7). Spontaneity, on the other hand, “is found in the beasts 
and in many inanimate objects" (197bl4-15). Up till now, we can see clearly that 
Aristotle rejects thing as pure tuche in the sense of irresponsible agent Only when 
there is an agent engaging in rational activity or when there are events related to 
regular causation can there be tuche?'' To give an example，I am eager to hear a 
concert and prepared to queue up for hours for the ticket. I go to the box office as 
early as I can. After lining up for half an hour, a friend works in the box office sees 
me and gives me two free tickets. Surely I would exclaim, "how lucky I am!" 
Aristotle would count this as tuche, for I am a responsible agent, who chooses and 
goes to the box office purposively. On the other hand, if I am not going to the box 
office, but it happens that my friend drops by and leaves me two free tickets, then I 
am an irresponsible agent and it is not tuche. To take another example from Greek 
tragedy, Aristotle would not have counted Ion's reunion with his mother as tuche, for 
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though both of them are eager to meet each other, neither of them take action to 
achieve this goal. -
Guthrie points out that Aristotle limits the field of chance events (tuche) 
arbitrarily.^^The reasons for such limitation by Aristotle are well recognized by Judson. 
Judson explains: 
The analysis of chance as incidentally caused enables Aristotle to 
avoid denying the existence of chance or having to take chance events 
to be altogether random (i.e. with only forwards connections with the 
causal order), and yet also enables him to avoid taking chance to a causal 
force in its own right.二 
This is how Aristotle figures out the middle way, and tries to fit tuche into his account 
of causation. 
Also, this enables Aristotle to conclude that proper cause is prior to tuche. Tuche 
is defined in terms of proper causation and telos, it follows that the latter two are prior 
to tuche. As Guthrie explains, “the essence of event, i.e. its purpose, must exist 
already if it is to have the accidental concomitant, or incidental outcome, which is 
chance (jucM):,] By so saying, Aristotle dismisses Democritus' view that tuche is 
responsible for the whole universe by restating the prior status of mind and nature. He 
states at the end of chapter 6: 
Spontaneity and chance, therefore, are posterior to intelligence 
and nature. Hence, however true it may be that the heavens 
W.K.C. Guthrie (1981), A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4, p. 235 
--Judson, “Chance and 'Always or For the Most Part' in Aristotle", p.81 
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are due to spontaneity, it will still be sure that intelligence and 
nature will be prior causes of this universe and of many things 
in it besides. (198al0-14) 
Guthrie adds also that by stating so Aristotle upholds the thesis of Plato in the Laws 
7 that the world is "a product of design", a view contrary to what the atomists have 
held. Democritus explains the cosmos by atoms and mechanic necessity, and leaving 
thus no place for telos. This is to Aristotle impossible. By explaining tuche and 
spontaneity in such way, Aristotle rejects the atomists' view, and his teleological 
worldview is saveguarded. It is interesting to notice the way Aristotle deals with the 
problem of tuche. He gives it an apparent significance by admitting that tuche is 
indeed generally regarded as cause, and then rejects it by his own theory of cause. He 
opens his front door for tuche, and then repels it through the back door. 
2.4 Remarks 
Towards the end of Aristotle's account of tuche, there is still one point worthy of » 
discussion. Aristotle agrees to a certain extent that the outcome of tuche is 
indeterminate, unaccountable by reason (paralogon/napaXorov) and inscrutable to 
men, the endoxa held by the common people mentioned at the very beginning of the 
present discussion. In his attempt to explain these, however, nothing divine or 
supernatural is mentioned. He simply concludes by saying that there is no place for 
23 W.K.C. Guthrie (1981)，A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 4, p. 240 
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tuche in (his) science. To him, tuche is indeterminate “since cause of this kind is 
infinite" (197al7). Not only a flute-player can be an accidental cause of a house, but 
also, let say, a painter, a poet or a slave. It seems that there is nothing to determinate 
such kind of causation, therefore it appears to us indeterminate. To put it in terms of 
the above explanation, as Johnson says, “there are innumerable descriptions of an 
event such that it can correctly be said that event occurred by chance {tuche)''^^ Then, 
to Aristotle, what is accountable by reason is what happens for the most part, and 
clearly tuche is nothing of this sort (197al9-20). Since a flute-player is not for the 
most part the cause of a house, it enables no reasonable explanation for a house. In 
other words, Aristotle thinks that tuche is not a proper subject for scientific 
knowledge (episteme), for all science is for what is always or what is for the most part 
{Metaphysics, 1027a20-21). He states clearly in the Metaphysics that regarding the 
accidental, "there can be no scientific treatment of it. This is confirmed by the fact 
that no science-- practical, productive, or theoretical- trouble itself about it" (1026b4-
5). And I think this should be kept in mind throughout the discussion of tuche in 
Aristotle's Ethics (Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics) and the Poetics. 
3. Tuche in Aristotle's Two Ethics 
24 Kent Johnson (1997), "Luck and Good Fortune in the Eudemian Ethics", p. 87 
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Aristotle addresses to the problem of tuche in Eudemian Ethics (Book VIII, 
chapter 2) and Nicomachean Ethics (mainly Book I, Chapter 10). Note that the 
modem scholars usually translate tuche as "luck" or "fortune" in his ethical works, so 
I follow their translation in the present discussion. 
3.1 Tuche in Eudemian Ethics - Natural Impulse in the Soul 
The problem of tuche, whether it is a proper cause of change or not, is a matter 
of the theoretical account. Aristotle relegates in the course of his discussion the 
problem like whether tuche is a cause, and why people think that it is not open to 
human calculation, to the fringe of present discussion (1247bl-10).^^ They are 
discussed in the Physics and Metaphysics, as we have seen. Tuche has something to 
do with ethics only when its outcome affects human happiness and when it acts like 
knowledge, which is, as mentioned in the previous section, always or for the most part. 
Aristotle begins his discussion in the EE by saying: 
Since not only do practical wisdom and virtue produce 
welfare (ev-npar/'^ )^, but we say also that the fortunate {rov^ evTvxe?<;, plural) 
prosper, as if good fortune {evrvxT]^ ) produces welfare and the same 
things that knowledge does, we must inquire whether it is by nature that 
one man is fortunate, another unfortunate, and how the matter stands 
in regard to these men.(1246b37-1247b4) 
Aristotle is ready to narrow down his scope of discussion to the continuous good 
25 Unless otherwised noted, for Eudemian Ethics I follow Micheal Woods's Aristotle Eudemian Ethics, 
Books I, II and VIII. Translated with a commentary by Micheal Woods (1992), Clarendon Press. 
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fortune only. We will see later how he relegates good fortune due to external 
circumstance and episodic fortune to the fringe of his ethical consideration. 
Kenny thinks that ‘welfare’ here cannot mean happiness, for he thinks, “neither 
in the NE nor in the EE would Aristotle have agreed that true happiness could come 
about by mere luck {tuche).I agree with Kenny's view on this, but with a different 
justification. When we go through the whole discussion of luck and good fortune in 
EE, we will see how Aristotle denies tuche to be necessarily the proper cause or 
explanation of good fortune. Rather, Aristotle sets out to differentiate different kinds 
of good fortune, and aims at minimizing the role of tuche and suggesting rather that 
nature is a more appropriate cause of good fortune, the kind of good fortune that 
matters to ethics, and which is thought to be caused by tuche. Therefore, while it is 
right for Kenny to say that Aristotle would not agree mere tuche produces true 
happiness, there is no reason for him to reject welfare here meaning happiness on 
such ground. The're is similar problem in the argument of Nussbaum concerning to 
what extent Aristotle thinks that happiness is vulnerable to tuche. In The Fragility of 
Goodness, she argues that Aristotle is the one who takes external circumstances such 
as external goods and tuche significantly into his ethical account. She takes lines 
1246b37-1247b4 of EE as one of the textual evidences supporting her thesis.^^ In the 
26 Anthony Kenny (1992), Aristotle on Perfect Life, Chapter 5, "Fortune and Virtue", p. 57. 




following, I will show that Aristotle indeed rejects that good fortune is due to tuche. 
Aristotle admits the fact that there are indeed fortunate people, and he proposes 
three possible answers of being fortunate (eutuche), namely, by nature (physis/^vcrei), 
“just as some people are blue-eyed and others black-eyed", by practical wisdom and 
by a god. He then rejects practical wisdom for it is “not irrational but has a principle 
on account of which it acts thus and so, but these people (the fortunate) would not be 
able to say why they succeed"(1247a 14-16). This brings out the first "feature" of 
being fortunate: it is irrational {alogoHaXojoi). To Aristotle, an action is rational and 
explicable only when it is the outcome of pro aire sis and practical wisdom. Only 
prohairesis and practical wisdom are the rational explanation of an ethical action. 
They are crucial concepts in Aristotle's ethics, for they together combine a rational 
and systematic mechanism of an action (as I have mentioned in the previous chapter 
concerning tragic action). This implies that action via good fortune is irrational in the 
sense that it is not via his mechanism of action. Good fortune, no matter by nature or 
by luck, is in this sense irrational. 
Aristotle then rejects the view that good fortune is by god, for “it is strange that a 
god or divine being should favor such a man (those like a badly constructed ship), 
rather then the best and the wisest" (1247a57-28). The only plausible answer is 
Philosophy, p. 330 
28 We can see here that the rational worldview held by Aristotle, which is entirely different from that of 
60 
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therefore by nature. However, Aristotle thinks that what happens by nature is “what 
occurs in the same way always or for the most part"(124-7a31-32). This gives rise to 
difficulty. Aristotle thinks that tuche is precisely opposite to “what happens in the 
same way always or for the most part", as shown in his theoretical account. Therefore 
he immediately narrows down his interest in continuous fortune. The reason, I think, 
lies in Aristotle's partial concern of the above-mentioned good fortune, the kind acts 
like knowledge. Knowledge is that which is “for the most part", so do the kind of 
good fortune that matters to ethical concern. Therefore, he simply asks, “since we see 
some people enjoying good fortune once, why should they not succeed again, for the 
same reason, and yet again?"(1247b9-10) And since “the same thing has the same 
cause", and tuche is an indefinite and indeterminate cause, so this (continuous good 
fortune) will not belong to luck (te/ze)"(1247bl2). Aristotle concludes right away 
that good fortune by nature is not a matter of tuche. With the presupposition that good 
fortune is continuous with same cause, Aristotle just ignores non-continuous good 
fortune. 
Aristotle then introduces "impulse in the soul" as the cause of good fortune.^^ As 
Johnson notes, Aristotle here tries to fill the crucial explanatory gap between cause 
the tragic poets'. While Aristotle thinks that gods should be just in favoring good and wise persons, 
tragic poets thinks that gods are unjust and good and wise persons are sometimes hated by god, as 
Oedipus Tyrannus tells us. On the other hand, Aristotle thinks that if it is gods give us any gift, "it is 
reasonable for them to give us happiness more than any other human good”(7V£, 1099b 11-13). To Plato, 
gods are just, so do Aristotle. 
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and effect by natural constitution, so as to prevent good fortune from being 
unaccountable, "andso might not be appropriately said to be from luck (tuche)：''' 
Impulse is irrational but it is a natural constitution, and this is the more appropriate 
cause of the success of the fortunate. People with such natural constitution succeed 
and prosper. The cause of their successful actions, then, is their natural impulse, via 
no reasoning or deliberation. The fortunate people are naturally well endowed 
(evrvxei^ (jivo-ei), and natural impulse does not belong to the realm of tuche. Aristotle 
instances those who can sing well but are not capable of teaching other to sing. These 
people cannot give a rational account of their action in terms of proairesis, for their 
action is a result of natural endowment rather than practical wisdom. Aristotle further 
defines “men who are fortunate" as "men who succeed most of the time without 
reasoning", and concludes, “it is therefore by nature that the fortunate are 
fortunate"(1247b24-28). Despite that good fortune {eutuche) contains the element of 
“tuchi,,, Aristotlre argues that “eiauchi” does not belong to "tuche'' but “physis”. 
Aristotle then goes on to distinguish different kinds of good fortune. Besides the 
kind of good fortune due to correct impulse or desire, he adds the condition that there 
may be fortunate people who reason badly. There are altogether three combinations as 
29 op^ai ev T7J Tpvxfj 
30 Kent Johnson "Luck and Good Fortune in Eudemian Ethics", p. 90. See also Vide M. J. Mills, 
"Aristotle's Dichotomy ofEvrvxia： Eudemain Ethics 0，2, 1247b 18 -1248bl5",Hermes, 109 Bd. Heft 2, 
1981, p. 282-295. Mills agrees with Dirlemier and von Fragstein's interpretation on the ftinction of 
opfj^ a'i here, and shows similar analysis to Johnson, see p.283. 
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follow: 
Original Combination: impulse +no reasoning = good outcome (good fortune 
due to good natural endowment) 
Combination (a) Choice resulting from impulse/desire + Bad Reasoning = (i) 
good outcome (good fortune due to natural goodness)/ = ii) greater/better 
outcome (the extra outcome due to tuche) 
Combination (b): no impulse + bad reasoning = good outcome (good fortune due 
to pure tuche) 
Aristotle thinks that there are two alternatives: either to admit that the kind of good 
fortune in (a) is the same as in (b); or to admit there is more than one form of good 
fortune, and tuche is of two kinds (1248al-20). Obviously, Aristotle takes the second 
alternative. There should be two kinds of tuche: “tuchi” in model (a), which produces 
good outcome together with naturally good impulse or inclination, and tuche in (b), 
the pure one. In other words, while there is always an account of the good outcome in 
(a), for "the desire is natural is not altogether without reason" (1248a7), there is no 
proper explanation in (b). Aristotle thinks that (b) is the kind of 'good fortune' 
contrary to every sort of knowledge and correct reasoning, and therefore something 
else should be its cause (1248a3-5). Aristotle now asks, whether ‘good fortune' in (b) 
is indeed good fortune, and his answer is no. His reason is simply that since there is 
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always a possible reason for good fortune (as in (a)), and “because luck {tuche) is a 
cause of things contrary to reason”... since it is contrary to knowledge and the 
imiversar'(1248a8-10). By arguing in this way，Aristotle seems to imply also that 
“威乏,,in (a) is not really tuche at all. Tuche, for this reason, is not the proper cause 
or explanation of good fortune. Aristotle then concludes: 
So this argument does not demonstrate that people have 
good fortune by nature, but that not all who seem to have 
good fortune prosper by luck {tuche), and not through nature; nor 
that luck {tuche)is a cause of anything, but that it is not a cause of 
all the thing it seems to be.(1248al2-16) 
Now the aim of his present discussion is clear: Aristotle shows us that the people's 
common belief that good fortune is due to tuche is wrong. The kind of good fortune 
matters to ethics should "produce welfare and the same things knowledge does’’， 
therefore, it must be the kind which is “for the most part" and continuous. Therefore, 
tuche defined by Aristotle as such cannot be its cause. It seems that Aristotle's task 
here is to lighten the role of tuche in good fortune, and in turn the role of tuche in 
producing welfare, which matters to his ethical discussion. 
Aristotle then shows in the rest of chapter 6 that good fortune is indeed a god 
moving in the soul, just like a god moving in the universe (1248a26). Aristotle thinks 
that there must be a starting-point (arche) in the soul of the fortunate. Neither tuche 
nor intelligence is the cause, however. His argument is that if tuche is the cause of 
desire or impulse, it will also be the cause of deliberating and thinking, and everything 
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will thus be by tuche (1248a23). This conclusion is to Aristotle absurd, and thus the 
postulate is refuted. If intelligence is said to be the cause, then, one may ask, what is 
the cause of intelligence? There is a problem of infinite regression, if we say that 
deliberation is the cause of a preceding deliberation, and so is thinking (1248bl7-18). 
Aristotle requires here a starting-point of reason, which is superior to reason, to 
explain the change in the soul, by which no further cause is needed. He then 
concludes, “what then could be superior to knowledge and intelligence but a god" 
(1248a29). This kind of good fortune is continuous. Fortunate people of this kind 
succeed in accordance with their impulse. If there is any other kind of “good fortune", 
then it is not continuous and people of such kind succeed contrary to their impulse. 
However, Aristotle does not show interest in the latter kind, to which he gives no 
further explanation. To Aristotle, such kind of 'good fortune' does not matter to his 
ethical consideration. 
3.2 Tuche in Nicomachean Ethics: External Goods and Tuche', Happiness and 
Blessedness 
Similarly, in Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle takes external goods into his 
ethical consideration, but to the extent that they play at most a secondary role in 
contributing happiness. Aristotle makes three main points concerning the role of 
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external goods and fortune in contributing happiness. First of all, he admits that 
- happiness “needs external goods to be added’’，"since we can not, or cannot easily, do 
fine actions if we lack the resources" (1099a27). Secondly, though we need external 
goods, happiness is a not the result of them. External goods do not constitute the core 
part of happiness. Rather, happiness is “ a certain sort of activity of the soul in accord 
with virtue" (1099b26). Thirdly, in other words, external goods play a secondary role 
in happiness. To have a better understanding of the secondary role external goods, it is 
necessary to consider in what sense does happiness needs external goods. 
3.2.1 The Secondary Role of External Goods 
What is external good? To Aristotle, there are three kinds of goods, namely, 
external goods, goods of the soul and goods of the body (1098b 12-14). Goods of the 
soul refer to an agent's virtue of character and intellect, the main point of discussion 
in the NE. Other than goods of the soul, there are external goods. Cooper 
distinguishes two usage of external goods, namely, the narrow usage and the broad 
usage? 1 The narrow usage refers to that which external to the person as an embodied 
soul, such as good birth, wealth, political power and friends.^" The broad usage refers 
to that which external to the soul, as Aristotle instances, good looks. Those things are 
31 John. M. Cooper, "Aristotle on the Goods of Fortune", in Reason and Emotion, Essays on Ancient 
Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory, pp.292-310，1999. 
32 John. M. Cooper, Ibid., p. 295 
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good in the sense that they are beneficial to an agent's rational pursuit. 
Among such a wide range of external goods, "some are necessary conditions of 
happiness, while others are naturally useful and cooperative as instruments (i.e. 
friends, wealth and political power" (1099b27). Some are necessary conditions for 
lacking of which “mars our blessedness" (1099b3). If one is bom ugly, like the 
elephant man, surely he is not a good candidate of being happy, for he may not have 
friends, one of the instruments of happiness. The instrumental external goods matter 
to happiness for the possession of which helps flourishing one's life. They are never 
the purpose and the explanation of virtuous actions, nor the possession of which 
contributes to a better good than happiness, but nonetheless they make one happier. 
External goods circumscribe the context which one can exercise one's virtue. 
The more external goods a virtuous person possesses, the better the position he has 
and therefore the fuller the happiness he can achieve. In other words, if a virtuous 
person possess less external goods, he is in a less preferable position to exercise his 
virtue, when comparing to one who possesses a good deal of them. To take an 
example, if a virtuous person who lucks nothing but is childless, his context of 
exercising virtue is limited. Comparing to a virtuous person who lacks nothing and 
has a child, the former virtuous person is certainly less happy than the latter, for his 
context of exercising virtue is less preferable. On the other hand, external goods 
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enable one to retain what he has achieved and possessed. To take an example, if a 
virtuous person has a child, but then he lost his child，what he formerly achieves is 
impeded and is less happy, when comparing to another whose child stays well. 
In other words, to Aristotle, as Cooper points out, some external goods “are used 
only as instruments in the virtuous man's project", while others “are needed as 
antecedently conditions that make possible the M l exercise of the happy man's 
virtuous qualities of mind and character”." External goods contribute to one's 
happiness provided that the person who possesses them is a virtuous one. The reason 
is easily understandable: Aristotle defines happiness as “ a certain sort of activity of 
the soul in accord with virtue". It is virtue, not external goods, forms the crucial parts 
of happiness. If one possesses external goods but is not virtuous, those external goods 
mean nothing, even worse, this person may make use of these external goods as evil 
devices. In other words, to Aristotle, only when one is virtuous is external goods 
“good,，； only when a virtuous person makes use of the external goods properly can 
external goods be contributive to happiness. As Irwin notes, "external good is not a 
part of happiness if it is isolated from virtue", "because they are not parts of happiness 
in their own right’，.34 
“John M. Cooper, Ibid, p. 302 
Terence Irwin, "Permanent Happiness; Aristotle and Solon", p.6, in Aristotle ’s Ethics Critical 
Essays, pp. 1-33, 1999 
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To summarize, there are several combinations of virtue and external goods 
which determine different "degrees" of happiness: 
(a) Virtue + abundant external goods = fullest happiness 
(b) Virtue + reasonable amount of external goods = happiness 
(c) Virtue + less external goods = less happiness, but is still happy 
(d) Virtue + no external goods = no happiness 
(e) No virtue + any amount of external goods = no happiness 
Still, there is one more case that we should consider: fortunate person, whom 
Aristotle discusses in the EE. A fortunate person, according to Aristotle, is a person 
whose “good” actions are not via deliberation, but something other than that. If a 
fortunate possesses similar external goods and circumstances of a virtuous person, 
does the same actions and achieves as a virtuous man does, Aristotle would not 
consider the fortunate person achieves true happiness, for his action is not via 
deliberation. What the fortunate person achieves is "welfare" but not happiness, 
though it is akin to happiness. As Cooper points out, Aristotle regards the fortunate 
person as mimicking the virtuous and practically wise person.^' In other words, 
35 John M Cooper, "Aristotle on the Goods of Fortune", p. 307, 1999 
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possession of external goods does not distinguish a fortunate man from a virtuous 
man. It is the virtue of character and intellect that distinguish them. 
3.2.2 External Goods and Tuche 
This brings out another point that needs further consideration. In EE, Aristotle 
spends chapters on discussing the case of fortunate people. Being fortunate is not in 
the agent's control，no matter it is due to nature or tuche. Being fortunate due to 
natural is like “some people are blue-eyed and others black-eyed" (EE, 1247al4), 
which the agent has no control. It is akin to external goods, in the sense that external 
goods are also what the agent has no M l control of. (Indeed, Aristotle takes external 
goods into his account of happiness in response to Plato's belief that possessing 
virtues alone is sufficient for happiness. Aristotle is more considerate to add that 
exercising virtues should be added. Exercising virtues involves factors lie outside the 
agenfs control, and external goods must be added.) Therefore, being fortunate cannot 
be regarded as crucial and stable constituent of happiness, for Aristotle would not 
agree the crucial and stable part of happiness is constituted by something an agent has 
no full control. As Irwin reminds us, the crucial and stable part of happiness is 
constituted by virtuous activities, which is the most stable and is invulnerable, while 
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external goods constitute the rest of happiness.^*^ However, as I have shown in 3.1, 
- Aristotle suggests that natural impulse in the soul is a better explanation for being 
fortunate than tuche. Natural impulse is certain sort of external goods in the sense that 
the agent has no fall control of. When juxtaposing these two views, we can reasonably 
doubt that whether external goods, to Aristotle, are necessarily due to tuche. If 
external goods are not necessarily due to tuche, then, though Aristotle thinks that 
external goods affect happiness, it does not necessarily follow that tuche affects 
happiness. 
3.2.3 Happiness and Blessedness 
Nussbaum argues that to Aristotle, tuche matters to happiness. One reason for 
her to say so is that Aristotle intends no salient distinction between happiness 
{eudaimonia) and blessedness (makarid) and they are interchangeable.^^ She takes 
passages from the Friendship Book in Nicomachean Ethics, where “happiness，，and 
“blessedness，’ are used alternatively, as textual evidence to support her thesis (which I 
will refer to later). If this is the case, there are obviously lines (particularly in Book 
One) suggesting that happiness can be impeded by major strokes of misfortune. Now I 
argue that these two concepts, though closely related, are not interchangeable. 
36 See Terence Irwin, "Permanent Happiness: Aristotle and Solon", 1999 
37 Though I think that "beatitude" is a better translation of''makarid", but I use "blessedness/blessed" 
in the following discussion, so as to be consistent with Irwin's translation. 
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Therefore fortune does not necessarily affect happiness. The reason is that if the two 
concepts are interchangeable, there are many difficulties in understanding those 
passages. Once these two concepts are differentiated, we can see that the arguments in 
these chapters are consistent. Aristotle actually makes distinction between these two 
concepts and he uses them respectively with careful consideration. Happiness, as 
discussed above, is activity in accordance with virtue and with external goods that is 
necessary. Blessedness, I shall argue, is happiness plus extreme good lucks; one can 
be called blessed if one is not struck by or free from major misfortune.38 When citing 
Solon's belief, Aristotle has Solon to mean “that when a human being has died, we 
can safely pronounce [that he was] blessed [before he died], on the assumption that he 
is now beyond evils and misfortunes (1100al7-18)". Besides, "blessedness" 
sometimes denotes something divine and is associated with the gods, while 
"happiness" does not. In EE, "blessedness" is related closely to "happiness" (1214a30, 
1215al0-11 and 1215bl4). “Blessedness，，here, as Irwin notes, “seems to indicate a 
higher degree of wellbeing than the merely eudaimonia person possesses，?）In 
addition, in EE 1215bl4 for example, Aristotle seems to use "blessedness" to denote a 
life free from pain and misfortune, or a life of contemplation. In other words, 
See Anthony J. Celano, "Aristotle on Beatitude" in Ancient Philosophy, 1985; 5, p. 205-214 and 
"The Concept of Worldly Beatitude in the Writings of Thomas Acquinas", Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, 1987; 25, p. 215-226. He argues that happiness and beatitude (blessedness) should be 
differentiated, and such differentiation enables Aristotle to minimize the effects of luck on life. 
39 Irwin, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, p.190 
7 2 
‘ m 
“ ： - - J - . . - -
• - . , ：‘ • . 
- - ‘ 
- , , • 
“blessedness，，encompasses "happiness", but being happy is not necessarily being 
blessed. Of course, one may argue that Aristotle may not use these two words 
consistently in the two Ethics, Now, I show that such distinction is consistently made 
in the Nicomachean Ethics. And this can be illustrated by examining Aristotle's 
response to Solon's say, “call no one happy until he dies", which is also recurrent in 
Greek tragedies. 
Aristotle regards such belief as common opinion {endoxd) and he sets out to 
examine this endoxa in book one chapter 10. Celano points out that Aristotle asserts 
that there are two possible interpretations of Solon's claim. "The first is that a man is 
happy only when he is dead and beyond fortune's wheel.''�o This is easily refuted by 
Aristotle's definition of happiness. Aristotle defines happiness as activity in order to 
reject Plato's theory that being good and virtues alone are sufficient for happiness, for 
he finds that absurd to call someone who sleeps through his whole life without acting 
happy. If happiness is an activity, and a dead man cannot act, then one cannot be 
happy after his death. Then, Aristotle suggests the second interpretation. He clarifies 
that what Solon means is that one can be safely pronounced as "blessed" after he is 
dead. Note that Aristotle is tricky here to shift Solon's view concerning "happiness" 
to “blessedness” (and this is so in 1100a33-34). Such transformation of Solon's claim, 
40 Anthony J. Celano (1985), pp. 208-209. 
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as Celano notes, enables Aristotle to be in a better position to respond to Solon's 
belief and claim that one can be called happy (but not blessed) only during his 
lifetime. 
The argument runs like this. After shifting the use of words, Aristotle argues for 
the stability of human happiness. People are reluctant to call one happy, for they 
suppose that happiness is stable, but one's life is unstable. Aristotle takes this as 
evidence supporting his account of happiness. He agrees on that happiness is stable. 
He argues then, as “activities in accord with virtue control happiness"(1100bll), and 
that the most stable activity acts according to virtue (1100bl3-14). It follows that 
happiness achieved through virtue is stable. A happy person has this stability (of 
character) and keeps it throughout his l i f e , Aristotle notices that activities, as the 
common people think, may be subjected to fortune. So he is careful to add that the 
happy person will do and study the actions in accord with virtue, and will bear fortune 
most finely (1100bl8-21)/^ The point is that if one's whole life is free from 
misfortune and the agent acts virtuously throughout his lifetime, it is certain that one 
can be called "blessed". On the other hand, to those who are exposed to fortune but 
act virtuously, Aristotle calls them "happy", but not “blessed，，. It is clear that being 
41 ''imap^ei 射 TO ^'/jrovfievov ro) evBatfLovi, koa ea-rai ha jSiou Toiovro<；" Note that the verbs in this sentence, 
"uTrap^e/" and "eoTa/", are in future tense. Cf. The Liddell and Scott Greek Dictionaries, available on- ’ 
line in the Perseus Project. 
42 "rrpa^ei — dewpifjo-er (will do and study); "o'/W/" (will bear). Cf. The Liddell and Scott Greek 
Dictionaries. 
7 4 
-• . - • 
• - . • . 
• • . 
• ‘ ’ • 
“happy” is not sufficient for being “blessed”�and that happiness is a necessary 
condition of blessedness. One is never ‘‘blessed’’ if one is not "happy" (i.e. act 
according to virtue); but one can be “happy，’ without being “blessed，，. 
Once such distinction is made, the rest of chapter 10 will become clear. He 
concludes that many strokes of good fortune or misfortune will bring about or spoil 
one's blessedness, but the finest still shines. One will do the finest action, from 
whatever resources remained at any time (1100b34-1101a3).'^^ He adds then "the 
happy person could never become miserable, but neither will he be blessed if he falls 
into misfortune as bad as Priam ”（1101a7). How can this sentence be understood if 
there is no distinction between "happiness" and "blessedness"? And if major strokes 
of misfortune can destroy happiness, what is "the finest" that remains to shine? Also, 
Aristotle is confident to say that he who suffers from serious misfortune can return to 
happiness, though it may take time. Obviously, Aristotle means that fortune or 
misfortune can affect merely one's blessedness, not his happiness. Even though one's 
blessedness is destroyed, his happiness is not necessarily destroyed. In short, so long 
as one lives and acts in accordance to virtue, one can be happy. He concludes, “a 
living person who has, and will keep (vrcapxei koI v-nap^ei) the goods we mentioned is 
blessed, but blessed as a human being is" (1101a22-23). 
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Why does "blessed as a human being is" amount to?^^ The reason is that the 
word “blessedness” carries a divine sense. Blessedness, as Celano points out, “is most 
properly reserved for the gods", and Aristotle aims at imparting certain god-like status 
to a human life/^ In the last Book of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle frequently 
associates blessedness with the states of the gods. Aristotle argues that a life devoted 
to theoretical study and contemplation is divinely happy. In that book he distinguishes 
virtue of understanding (i.e. prudence) from virtue of character. Both are internal to 
the agents, but the former needs less external supplies than the latter (1178a25). 
Aristotle stresses that virtue of understanding is the superior virtue and the most 
divine element in the human soul, which enables human to attain “complete 
happiness". In chapter 9, Aristotle argues that the activity according to virtue of 
understanding is study. The reason is that actions according to other virtues (of 
character) are not sufficient to be worthy of the gods, and "the gods' activity that is 
superior in blessedness will be an activity of study", the human activity that “is most 
akin to gods，’（1178b23). In 1178b25-33, Aristotle points out that other animals have 
no happiness because they are not able to study, while "human life is blessed to the 
extent that it has something resembling this sort of activity". Are "happiness" and 
"blessedness" here interchangeable? I think, what Aristotle means is that animals are 
44 Blessed as a human being is,''fiaKap'iov^ ox; avBpumovq' 
45 A. J. Celano (1985), p. 206 
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not even qualified to be happy, not to mention being blessed. 
I now turn to the passages Nussbaum takes to illustrate that happiness and 
blessedness are interchangeable. She quotes, 
There are debates as to whether the eudaimon needs philoi or not. 
For they say that makarioi and self-sufficient people have no need 
of philoi, since they have all good things already But it seems 
peculiar to give all good things to the eudaimonia and to leave out 
philoi, which seems to be the greatest of external goods....And surely 
it is peculiar to make the makarios a solitary: for nobody would choose 
to have all the good things in the world all by himself. For the human 
being is a political creature and naturally disposed to living-with. And 
this is true of the eudaimon as wel l . 
She then concludes without further explanation that “nobody could reasonably 
doubt that the two words are used here with no salient distinction, more or less as 
stylistic variants，，.47 Celano points out that these two words are often regarded as an 
instance of Aristotle's stylistic concems'^^ it is exactly the same case for Nussbaum. 
However, if we do not differentiate these two words, there are stylistic problems in 
this passage. Just replace “makarios ” with “eudaimon ” or the other way round, we 
will find the passage rhetorically strange. The dictum- “and surely it is peculiar to 
make the makarios/ eudaimon a solitary..... And this is true of the makarios 
/eudaimon as well", for example,-- will be rendered redundant . I t seems to me that 
Aristotle is carefully using "makarios “ and "eudaimon “ to differentiate the endoxa 
46 Nussbaum (1986), p. 331. This is her own translation. 
47 Nussbaum, Ibid, p. 331 
48 Anthony J. Celano (1986), p. 205. 
49 The omitted phrase and sentence here are the reasons for the first sentence quoted. The way I 
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he is responding to from his own views respectively. When reading these passages 
with the differentiation I made, there is no inconsistency or difficulty. 
By distinguishing "happiness" and “blessedness”�I hope I have shown clearly 
that Nussbaum's suggestion that “happiness is vulnerable to fortune" misunderstands 
Aristotle. Tuche at most affects one's blessedness, but not happiness. Nussbaum's 
J 
conclusion in The Fragility of Goodness (chapter 11) might have gone too far. John M. 
Cooper criticizes Nussbaum for she argues wrongly about the authority status of 
endoxa in Aristotle's ethics. She has overstated the authority of endoxa, and therefore, 
regarding to the problem of tuche, he comes to the same conclusion as mine. He holds 
that, to Aristotle “eudaimonia is the best thing attainable in a human life it cannot be 
conferred by luck (tuchey\^^ Aristotle does not go as far as Nussbaum concerning the 
role of tuche in happiness. 
4. Tuche in Aristotle's Poetics 
As in practical knowledge, there is no positive role for tuche in the account of 
tragedy at all. In the Posterior Analytics where demonstrative knowledge is discussed, 
Aristotle writes, "there is no understanding through demonstration of what holds by 
rephrase these sentences should distort nothing about this passage. 
J. M. Cooper, Reason and Emotion, Chapter 12, "Aristotle on the Authority of "Appearances"", 
P.291. 
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chance 19-20).^' The first principle of this practical knowledge, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, is plot structure, and the principle of necessity and 
probability governing it guarantees this. The unitary whole of a fine tragedy consists 
of a beginning, a middle and an end, and they are required to follow a sequence 
necessarily and naturally. "Well constructed plots, therefore, cannot either begin at a 
chance point or end at a chance point, but should be constructed in the way just 
described"(chapter 7, 1450b27-34).^^ To secure tragedy the ‘status，of knowledge and 
its universality, tragedy must posses certain principles that enable a rational account 
and formal study. The distinction Aristotle made between history and tragedy is 
another evidence supporting this (see chapter one). Besides, Aristotle thinks that we 
can leam something from watching tragedy, and to him there is nothing to leam from 
chance events {tuche). Frede explains, "the contingence in the sense of what happens 
randomly and for no inherent reason should not play any prominent role in tragic 
development, since there is nothing to be known about ~ or learned from ~ such 
occurrences"." In short, for Aristotle, tuche enables no systematic understanding and 
it resists philosophical explanation. 
51 Cf. The Complete Works of Aristotle, edited by Jonathan Barnes. 
52 Frede's translation, see D. Frede, "Necessity, Chance, and "What Happens for the Most Part" in 
Aristotle's Poetics", in Essays on Aristotle 's Poetics, 197-219. 
“ D . Frede, "Necessity, Chance, and "What Happens for the Most Part" in Aristotle's Poetics���p. 
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4.1 Hamartia — A Cause in Human Terms 
The notion hamartia (apfiaria) further illustrates this. It ensures that there is no -
positive role for tuche to play in the tragic plot. The problem of hamartia has aroused 
many debates. I have mentioned in the previous chapter, now I will discuss it in detail. 
Let's recall the lines where the notion of hamartia is introduced in the Poetics. 
After discussing what kinds of plot construction should be avoided, Aristotle writes, 
We are left, then, with the figure who falls between these types. 
Such a man is one who is not preeminent in virtue and justice, 
an one who falls into affliction not because of evil and wickedness, 
but because of a certain hamartia{ 1653a6-ll). 
Firstly, there are debates concerning whether hamartia is culpable or not. Gould 
strongly claims that Aristotle prevents Socratism from being undermined by 
suggesting hamartia. Hamartia ensures the significant connection between the agents' 
character, action and his happiness, and it is culpable.^^ Zhu Guangjian thinks that 
whether hamartia is an intellectual or a moral flaw does not matter. The crucial point 
is that Aristotle requires the tragic protagonist to have certain flaws, which is culpable, 
so that tragic justice is produced. Tragedy, he farther argues, should not be read like 
this. To him, Greek tragedy is tragedy of fate. He thinks that Aristotle just turns a deaf 
ear to Oedipus' bitter condemnation against Apollo and Antigone's heart-rending cry 
54 See Thomas Gould, Ancient Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy and "The Innocence of Oedipus 
the King". See also Freeland. "Plot Imitates Action" and S. A. White, "Aristotle's Favorite Tragedy" 
for similar discussion. 
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about the conflicting religious and political justices.^^ On the other hand, Kaufmann 
points out that Aristotle's saying that the tragic protagonist should not be an 
outstanding man distracts many critics. He argues that these two points should not be 
associated. When reading these independently, hamartia is not necessarily culpable.^^ 
Kaufmann then suggests that Aristotle intends only to make the tragic 
protagonists active participants and not merely bystanders. Hamartia serves like a 
causal link. Sherman, who holds a similar view as Kaufmann, argues that Aristotle is 
neither Socratic nor Platonic, hamartia in the Poetics "serves to make the action 
causally probable and coherent, intelligible, with probability and necessity，，尸 This is 
to ensure that what happens in tragedy is contrary to belief but not to reason. If so, 
hamartia, though not necessarily culpable, serves as the cause or explanation of the 
horrible deeds or suffering in tragedy. The tragic action is thus made intelligible in 
human terms. However, as I have argued, cause on the protagonists' part alone cannot 
contribute to tragic action: the role of divinity must be added. Moreover, there is 
obviously no hamartia in Antigone, Oedipus at Colonus, and Heracles etc. Antigone 
knows very well the cost of her deeds. Disregarding the dissuasion of her sister, 
Ismene, Antigone insists to bury Polynices, corpse. Ismene begs, “ 0 think, Antigone; 
we are women; it is not for us to fight against men", and Antigone replies, “I will bury 
55朱光潛（1976)，《悲劇心理學一各種悲劇快感的批判硏究》，P. 100. 
56 Walter Kaufmann (1969)，Tragedy and Philosophy, section 15, “Hamartia and hybris" 
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my brother; and if I die for it, what happiness" (Line 60-61, 67-68). In addition to this, 
plots with passive victims such as Euripides’ Trojan Women, Herciculcs and -
Sophocles' Philoctetes etc. are excluded. The plot in the Trojan Women depicts 
mainly the women's miseries after the war. They cry, moan and condemn their fate. 
Women become slaves or mistresses of their enemy, ‘‘all are allotted separately, each 
to man"(line 243, The Trojan Womenf^. Their affliction has nothing to do with their 
action, and indeed, they do not act at all. They are merely bystanders of the war, and 
the passive victims of what befalls them. To Aristotle, tragic plots, which depict 
protagonists as mere victims and irresponsible agents to what befalls them, would not 
provoke pity and fear. 
4.2 Errors and Misfortune 
The next problem concerning hamartia in the Poetics is its relation with 
hamartema {ap^areiia / errors) and atuchema {p/rvxhyba / misfortune). Aristotle 
frequently distinguishes intentional wrong doings from hamartema and atuchema. 
While the former is out of wickedness, the latter two are not, as this is also the case in 
the Poetics 13. Aristotle discusses in NE Book V chapter 6 what makes an action just 
or unjust. When a bad action is done voluntarily, it is an unjust action and the agent 
57 Nancy Sherman, "Hamartia and Virtues", Essays on Aristotle 's Poetics, p. 187. 
The Complete Greek Tragedies, Euripides III, edited by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore. 
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should be blamed. Voluntary action, Aristotle explains, is “up to the agent, who does 
it in knowledge, and hence not in ignorance of the person, instrument and goal, and -
each of these neither coincidentally nor by force"(1135a24-27). On the contrary, 
involuntary actions are "done in ignorance; or they are not done in ignorance, but they 
are not up to the agent; or they are done by force"(1135b32-35). Then, Aristotle says 
“actions done with ignorance are errors Qiamartema) if someone does neither the 
action he supposed, nor to the person, nor with the instrument, nor for the result he 
supposed (1135bl3-14)". Aristotle seems to use Oedipus' patricide as example - a 
man kills a bystander without knowing that the bystander is his father (1135a29-30, 
1135bl5)-- to illustrate involuntary action. Aristotle further distinguishes hamartema 
in generic sense, hamartema and atuchema in specific sense. Hamartema in specific 
sense does not violate reasonable expectation, and the principle of the cause is in the 
agent. Atuchema, on the contrary, inflicts harm that violates reasonable expectation 
(paralogon/papaXoq^ov, the same word used to describe tuche), and the principle of the 
cause is outside the agent (1135bl7-19). In the Rhetoric to Alexander, Aristotle takes 
hamartema in the specific sense and atuchema as defense of one's accused crime. He 
suggests that one "can define a crime an error {hamartema), and a misfortune 
{atuchema) to gain pardon"(1427a30-31). He then distinguishes, “a harmful act done 
because of ignorance must be called error; while the failure to accomplish some good 
8 3 
• ‘ - • 
intention, not through one' own fault but owing to some one else or luck, is to be 
accounted as misfortune"(1427b25-37). -
Sorabji argues that if tragic hamartia in the Poetics is understood as hamartema 
in generic sense, which includes both atuchema and hamartema, then it is not 
necessarily culpable, for it could be atuchema. He tends to agree that tragic hamartia 
is not culpable. The reasons are that, first of all, "Greek tragedies were not always 
portrayal of a weakness punished, but were sometimes studies of the sheer pity and 
horror of human situation，，59. Secondly, “it is Sophocles' message that Oedipus was 
not to blame for these."^° I think that he is right about Greek tragedies and Sophocles, 
but this is problematic for him to take the above points as reasons supporting his 
claim that hamartia in Aristotle's Poetics is not culpable. The reason is that he 
presupposes that Aristotle's account is very "faithful" to Greek tragedies and 
Sophocles, which I have already argued in the previous chapter that it is not so. 
Moreover, he argues, “if Oedipus' patricide is to be fitted into one of the categories of 
NE V 8, it is not a hamartema at all, but atuchema”, for “it is contrary to reasonable 
expectation for Oedipus that he should be slaying his father" 
I agree with Sorabji on that Oedipus' parricide is contrary to reasonable 
59 Richard Sorabji, Cause, Necessity and Blame, p. 296 
Richard Sorabji, ibid, pp. 296-297. 
Richard Sorabji, ibid, p. 297 
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expectation, but the question now is, can tragic hamartia in the Poetics be atuchemal 
Or to be exact, can anything contrary to reason be part of the plot? The answer, I t h i n k , -
is negative. We remember that Aristotle stresses that what happens in tragedy should 
be of necessity and probability and not contrary to reason. To be consistent with these 
major principles, atuchema, given its very nature, cannot be part of Aristotlelian 
tragedy. But after all, Soribji does not interpret Greek tragedy as Aristotle does; Greek 
tragedy is precisely like what he thinks. Now it is clear: by suggesting that 
protagonists in tragedy should fall into affliction due to their hamartia, Aristotle says 
almost nothing about outcome due to external agency and anything unaccountable by 
reason in his account of tragedy. As Frede says, "Aristotle's choice of terminology, 
the employment of eutuchia and atuchia (or dustuchia), may suggest that there is an 
element of chance or luck (tuche) involved here. To attribute this to Aristotle would 
be a clear mistake, however". ^^  
5. Conclusion: Aristotle,s Silence on Tuche in Greek Tragedy 
All in all，tuche is not the cause of tragic action. It is clear that hamartia serves 
as the cause of tragic action in the Poetics, which has a similar function as 
62 D. Frede, "Necessity, Chance and "What Happens for the Most Part", p. 213 
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deliberation as the cause of an ethical action, and natural impulse as the explanation 
of welfare. I have argued in the previous chapter that Aristotle reads Greek tragedy 
with his own philosophical spectacles, which results in failure to pay adequate 
attention to the actual role of divinity in it. Oedipus' relation with the divinity is the 
feature of Oedipus Tyrannus, one of Aristotle's favorite tragedies. It is not a 
coincidence that tuche plays no positive role in his theory of tragedy, a notion that is 
akin to “fate，,(mo/ra/|L6G?pa) and has a close relation to the divine dimension. He is 
consistent with the problem of tuche in his philosophical works, but ends eventually 
in lighten the tragic issues in Greek tragedy. I will argue in the next chapter that tuche, 
like the divinity and fate, is a desperate problem in Greek tragedy, as what Oedipus 
recognizes eventually. Besides, Aristotle rejects plots depicting protagonists of 
excellence fall into affliction, for it is repulsive. Such response to tragedy reflects his 
rational world-view and his resistance to the irrational and tragic world-view. To him, 
more or less like 'Socrates and Plato, it is unreasonable for a truly good and virtuous 
man to suffer from miseries. He expects a rational agent to be in harmony with the 
world. Williams points out that Aristotle (like Socrates and Plato) believes that "there 
were facts about man and his place in the world which is determined, in a way 
discoverable to reason, that he was meant to lead a co-operative and ordered life’�.63 
63 Bernard Williams (1981), "Philosophy", in The Legacy of the Greece, Chapter 8, p. 202-255, edited 
by M.I. Finley, 1981. 
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Tuche and fate {moiral iLolpa) etc., which are unreasonable as they are, should left 
aside. This view is held consistently in his philosophical writings. -
8 7 
Chapter 4: Tuche in Greek Tragedy 
But as I am going back into the house, I see a thing 
inexplicable by words and beyond the knowledge of 
human mind to understand. 
Deianeira tells the chorus something strange 
about the gift from Nessus, which she uses to 
recapture Heracles' love, Sophocles, 
Trachiniae, line 692-694 
J 
In the perspective of tragedy, clarity means first and 
foremost awareness of the unchangeable nature of the 
limits placed on man, and of the inevitability of death. 
L. Goldmann, The Hidden God, p.81 
1. A Deeper Sense of Exposition 
In Greek tragedy, tuche is often identified as divinity. In the second chapter, I have 
criticized Aristotle for his failure to attend to the subtle role of divinity in Greek tragedy, 
and it is therefore bound to be inadequate. Besides, I have argued in the previous 
chapter that Aristotle does try to reduce the problem of tuche as endoxa in his 
philosophical works and he tries to underplay it when dealing with Greek tragedy. His 
silence on these two subjects is premeditated. No wonder Williams says, 
A deeper sense of exposure to fortune is expressed else 
where in Greek literature, above all in tragedy A 
sense of such significance, that what is great is fragile 
and that what is necessary may be destructive, which is 
present in the literature of 5th century and earlier, has 
disappeared from the ethics of the philosophers, and 
perhaps all together from their mind Greek philosophy, 
in its sustained pursuit of rational self-sufficient, does turn 
8 8 
its back on kinds of human experience and human necessity 
if which Greek literature itself offers the purest, if not the 
richest, expression] 
In this chapter, I turn to Greek tragedies and see how the problem of tuche has, as 
Williams suggests, 'a deeper sense of exposure'. This chapter consists of two parts. In 
the first half, I will first give a mythical account of tuche to see how the goddess Tuche 
appears to and haunts the Greek mind. Then, I will analyze in detail the role and nature 
of tuche in Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus and some of Euripides' tragedies. I will show 
that though Sophocles in Oedipus Tyrannus takes tuche as a particular work of fate, 
“yet the effect is the same as that of bad luck”�. On the other hand, Euripides, who 
"makes no attempt to follow earlier poets in justifying the ways of god to man”�，takes 
tuche as the dominating power of mere randomness and changes. Recognizing the role 
of tuche in Greek tragedies, we can see her priority and that hamartia is by no means a 
proper "explanation" of the protagonists' suffering. Also, we can see that different 
tragic protagonists respond to their tuche in their own ways: some dies, some just takes 
it，while other enjoys it or even makes use of it. In the second half, I try to reveal the 
tragic view on man expressed in Sophocles' tragedies, with reference to the role of 
Messenger, Chorus and the symbolic meaning of Nature {Physis). 
1 Bernard Williams (1981), "Philosophy", p. 253, in The Legacy of the Greece, ed. M. I. Finely. 
2 Thomas Gould (1990), The Ancient Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy, p. 273 
3 Jaeger (1965), Paideia, vol. One, p. 334 
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2. Tuchi as a G o d d e s s 
To start w i th , Tuche is pe r son i f i ed as a g o d d e s s in the t rag ic a g e s / C o n c e r n i n g 
h o w t h e g o d d e s s Tuche appea r s to the Greeks , V e m a n t has a br i l l iant descript ion.^ 
A c c o r d i n g to V e m a n t , Tuche and Kaip6<; (Kairos) r ep resen t a pa i r of c o s m o g o n i c 
p o w e r s , w h i c h d e f i n e s " t h e r e a l m of nav iga t ion and the type of h u m a n act ivi ty it 
i nvo lves" . B o t h h a v e a ve ry c lose connec t ion wi th the sea. Kairos m e a n s " t h e 
p rop i t ious oppor tuni ty , w h o s e amb iva l ence m a t c h e s tha t of Tuchi”，Tuche is the 
daugh te r o f O c e a n and Tethys，and she is a lso a goddes s of the sea. B e i n g " a n 
amb iva l en t and a m b i g u o u s p o w e r " , she symbol i zes change and mobi l i ty . She has b o t h 
nega t ive and pos i t ive sides. V e m a n t says, 
Tuche stands for one entire aspect of the human condition 
in a series of representations of the individual buffeted by 
the waves, whirling with the winds, rolling helplessly hither 
and thither without respite. However, she does not only reflect 
the changing surface of the sea. There is also a positive side to 
4 She became goddess Fortuna to the Roman and in the medieval ages. In Boethius' The Consolation of 
Philosophy, Boethius complains to the goddess Philosophie of the fickle and changing nature of Fortuna, 
and spends the whole Book II discusses about her. See The Consolation of Philosophy, translated by 
Victor Watts, revised edition, Penguin Books, 1999. The poem marks the end of the first section describe 
Fortuna as follow: 
'With domineering hand she moves the turning wheel, 
Like currents in a treacherous bay swept to and fro: 
Her ruthless will has just deposed once fearful kings 
While trustless still, from low she lifts a conquered head; 
No cries of misery she hears, no tears she heeds, 
But steely hearted laughs at groans her deeds have wrung. 
Such is the game she plays, and so she tests her strength; 
Of mighty power shoe makes parade when one short hour 
Sees happiness from utter desolation grow.' (p. 24) 
5 Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vemant (1978), The Cunning Intelligence of the Greeks, Chapter 8, 
"The Sea Crow". 
6 Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vemant (1978), Ibid, p. 223. According to the Liddell and Scott's 
Greek-English Lexicon, Kairos means primarily "in or at the right place". It also means "in season, 
seasonable, timely, opportune. Vemant is speaking of the second meaning. 
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her: it is Tuche who takes charge of the tiller and guides the ship 
unerringly to harbor/ 
The importance of Tuche to the art of helmsman is clear. A pilot can only exercise his 
art "within the framework of the uncertainty and instability of the sea", and "the play of 
the tiller cannot be dissociated from the movement of the waves.,，8 It reveals the limit of 
human endeavor and sets the boundary of possibility. Knowledge alone is inadequate 
for a pilot to navigate successfully in an agitated sea. It is also echoed in Aristotle: he 
takes navigation and generalship as examples of skills in which tuch is decisive 
(Eudemian Ethics, 1247a7). Aristotle admits that there is no general knowledge in 
navigation, for what happens when navigating is not for the most part. Certainly it is not 
in the case of ethical action. There is evidence showing how the unpredictable nature 
and the dark side of the sea haunt the Greek mind: they pray before sailing. In Greek 
literature, the characters often struggle with the sea. In Homer's The Odyssey, Odyssey 
7 Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vemant (1978), Ibid, p. 223. Boethius also compares the conditions of 
human in the world as man buffeted by winds, storm and waves. The goddess Philosophie sings at the 
end of section III (Book Two): 
'Often the sea lies calm and still, 
Its shimmering waves at rest, 
And often the north wind chums the deep 
With raging storms and mad unrest. 
The world stays rarely long the same, 
So great its instability, 
So put your faith in transient luck, 
And trust in wealth's mortality!' (p. 29) 
Another notable example is Kierkegaard's. In the Tre taler ved taenkte leiligheder (Three Discourses on 
Imagined Occasions, 1845), he writes .‘Let us imagine a pilot, and auume that he had passed every 
examination with distinction, but that he had no yet been at sea. Imagine him in a storm; he knows 
everything he ought to do, but he has not known before how terror grips the sea-farer when the starts are 
lost in the blackness of night; he has also not known the sense of impotence that comes when the pilot 
sees the wheel in his hand become a plaything for the waves; he has not known how the blood rushes to 
the head when one tries to make calculations at such a moment; in short, he has no conception of change 
that takes place in the knower when he has to apply his knowledge." 
s Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vemant (1978), p. 223 
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struggles bitterly with the sea on his way home. Also, the tragic situation of 
Agamemnon in Aeschylus' Agamemnon has a lot to do with the sea: he has to sacrify 
his daughter so that his allies can sail. 
3. Tuche and Moira in Greek Tragedy— The Religious Significance 
Tuche, together with moira {fj^oTpa, fa te)� i s a featuring problem in Greek tragedy. 
As Jaeger says, "without the problem of tuche or moira (which had been brought home 
to the Greeks by the Ionian lyric poets), true tragedy would never have developed out of 
early ‘dithyramb’ on a mythical theme，，？ They are the cosmogonic powers, which 
together represent something inscrutable to reason, something that mortals have no 
control on, and under the working of which the peculiar human condition is manifested. 
Both of them are closely related to the divinity or daimon. “Daimdn means more or less 
the same as ‘luck，or 'fate', especially in t ragedy" .Moira in Greek tragedy has been 
widely discussed; and it is usually regarded as an impersonal and anonymous power, to 
which even the gods are subjected.^^ It primarily means “apart, portion”, denoting also 
"thepart, portion, share which falls to one" and "one'sportion in life''Its verb means, 
'Jaeger (1965), p.250 
'°Thomas Gould (1965), "The Innocence of Oedipus: The Philosophers on Oedipus the King", part I, p. 
379. See also chapter Two "Aristotlelian Tragedy or Greek Tragedy?", p. 22 
11 See for examples, Bowra, Lesky, Karl Reinhardt, Knox etc. 
12 Cf. Liddell and Scott 's Greek-English Lexicon 
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“to be allotted as one's portion".^^ Then, seeing the working of tuche in events, as 
Thomas Gould notes,.the Greeks “leave it open whether there was no design whatever 
or whether a pattern (usually divine) was merely obscured from him at that point�’.i4 Its 
related verb, tyngchanein, Gould explains, means firstly, “to meet, occur, or fall out 
without forethought or purpose on the part of anyone or anything"; and secondly, “to 
happen actually, in reality, or by nature to be thus and so".^^ Sometimes it is also used to 
ask about what happens. For example, when the chorus asks Tecmessa about what has 
happened to Ajax, they says, “Tell us who share your pain how it happened”(“成/dyo/? 
hemin tois xunalgousin tuchasT in Sophocles' Ajax, line 283). Also, not knowing the 
youngster she is going to scarify is her brother, Iphigenia asks Orestes why he left 
Mycenae, “Have you left your country as an exile, or by what f狄e?,(“phugas <d’> 
aperaspatridos, epoiai tuchif,, Euripides, Iphigenia in Tauris, line 511)" 
In the "mental context"(Vemant's term)^^ of Greek tragedy, it refers usually the 
working of the gods, and therefore it has a close connection with "fate" (see following 
discussion). In Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus for example, “tucM” is associated with 
Cf. Thomas Gould (1970), Oedipus the King, note 864 
”Thomas Gould (1970)，Ibid, note 88 
15 Thomas Gould (1970), Ibid, note 88 
16 Cf. Sir Richard Jebb's translation (available on-line in the Perseus Project). The Latin transliteration in 
this chapter is quoted from the Perseus Project. 
口 Unless otherwise noted, for Iphigenia in Tauris I follow the translation of Robert Potter, which is 
available on-line in the Perseus Project. 
18 Greek tragedy, Vemant points out, can be fully understood only when its particular context is taken of. 
"It was the context that made it possible for the author to communicate with his fifth-century public, and 
that the same context makes it possible for the work to rediscover its full authenticity and to conveys its 
full significance to the reader of today". He thinks that Aristotle fails to do so. Vemant, Myth and 
Tragedy, pp. 29-30 
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“theds,, (god), such as “thedn tuchin”, which means "some gods grant noble fortune" 
(line 1505-1506), and "ara theiai kaponoi talas tucMF, which Jebb translates as “by a 
fate divine and painless"(line 1585). In Philoctetes, Neoptolemus comforts Philoctetes, 
“you suffer this plague's affliction in accordance with god-sent fate" gar nose is 
tod，algos ektheias tuchis” line 1326).^^ Also, in Euripides' tragedies, there are phrases 
alike, for instances, ‘‘the chance dealt out by the gods" and ‘‘a stroke of heaven-sent 
luck" (^'tei tuchei tei ton thedn,,, line 35\,"theou soi ten tiichen didontos eu,,, line 389, 
Iphigenia in Aulis)严 Note that quite often “tuchi” is translated as “fate’’，since they 
have a very close connection. For example, in Iphigenia in Aulis, Euripides juxtaposes 
them on the same line, “ 0 fate revered, 0 destiny, and my fortune!" ("dpotnia moira 
kai tuche daimon t' emos”, line 1136).^ ^ I have discussed in the first chapter about the 
role of the gods in Greek tragedy with reference to several problems, namely, tragic 
action, pathos and conflicts. Now I turn to the problem of tuche with respect to 
particular tragedies. 
3.1 Tuche and Moira in Oedipus Tyrannus 
Sophocles' Oedipus Tyr annus renders a pure example of the relation between 
19 Unless otherwise noted, for Philoctetes I follow the translation of Sir Richard Jebb, which is 
available on line in Perseus Project 
2° Unless otherwise noted, for Iphigenia in Aid is, I follow the translation of Coleridge's, which is 
available on-line in Perseus Project 
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tuche and moira as such. Tuche (and moira) is one of the featuring problems. As Gould 
points aut, references to tuche are made “frequently but very causally in the early part 
of the play”�and it becomes an “ever more desperate problem", it “has been blamed for 
things again and again throughout the play�’.22 In this tragedy, refemces are made 
sometimes to causes that remain unknown to the characters. For example, knowing that 
Oedipus' "father", King of Comith's death, Jocasta says cheerfully, “The man whom 
Oedipus fled long ago, for fear that he should kill him— he's been destroyed by chance 
and not by him" (line 947-949).23 Tuche in such sense is made explicit by the chorus in 
Philoctetes, "this fortune to which you are captive comes from no other source, nor 
from a stronger man's compulsion" (^'kouk allothen echei tuchai taid' apo meizonos” 
line 1097, Philoctetes) 
More often tuche is linked with the divinities. For example, after realizing the 
authentic truth, Oedipus wishes Creon “good fortune" and "be guarded far better by 
divinity than I was"(line 1478-1479). When something is happened by tuche, it means 
also "by gods". Besides, it is to be contrasted with "fate", to which tuche has a close 
relation at the same time. The fate of Oedipus is said to be "god-abandoned" 
(dysdaimon) (line 1300). I think Sophocles intends to underline contrast between ‘‘fate’， 
and ''tuche". When referring to one's end which remains open or unknown, it is usually 
22 Thomas Gould (1970), note 88 and 997. 
23 Unless otherwise noted, for Oedipus Tyrannus I follow the translation of Thomas Gould (1970) 
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denoted by “tuchi,,； when one's end is certain and known, it is usually denoted by 
"fate". For example, when Oedipus is still ignorant about the murder of Laius, he asks 
innocently, "What man's bad luck does he accuse in this?"(line 102). At this point, 
Oedipus does not know it is Laius' fate to be killed, or even worse, by his own son. He 
regards it as a particular chance event befalling Laius. In contrast, later when Jocasta 
tells Oedipus the oracle about Laius Phoebus, she says, “that when his fate arrived he 
would be killed by a son who would be bom to him and me，,(“/zdy auton hexoi moira 
pros paidos thane in, hostis genoit' emou te kakeinou para.” Line 713-714). To Jocasta, 
Laius's being killed is determined. When the truth is still concealed, Oedipus often 
speaks of his “tuchi”(s忧 the following discussion). Those who know the truth speak 
usually of "fate" rather than “tuchi”. For instance, the blind prophect, Tiresias, when 
arguing with Oedipus, he says, “It is not my fate to be struck down by you"("cw gar se 
moira pros g' emou pesein”, line 376-377). When the truth is revealed, Oedipus speaks 
more often of his fate rather than tuche. "Then, let my fate continue where it will” (line 
1458), he cries bitterly at the end of the tragedy. In short, what appears formerly as 
tuche is revealed as fate. It is also why Oedipus wishes Creon of “good fortune" but not 
“good fate", for Creon's future is not yet open to them. Perhaps Sophocles is leaving us 
a hint here, as in the last part of this trilogy, Antigone, Creon does not have good fortune 
at all: he has an end not less tragic than Oedipus. 
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3.2 The Problem of “Necessary Chances”  
- The relation between tuche and fate can be further illustrated by the problem of 
"necessary chances" ^'ies anankaias tuches,,\ which also exposes the deeper sense of 
tuche in Greek tragedy. Williams speaks of fate in Greek tragedy as "supernatural/ 
divine necessities".^"^ Divine necessity for the Greeks is not a plan (as the kind of divine 
je 
necessity for the Jews and the Christians) for an individual. It is "necessary" in the 
sense that it is unavoidable; it is purposive in the sense that it is "designed by a 
supernatural agency that had a motive" and it is usually playing against the agents. ^^  He 
suggests that when the agents are not fully conscious or sure of the supernatural 
necessity in advance, the outcome of supernatural necessity may appear to the agents as 
tuche. The verb Sophocles used for the act of tuche, I think, further supports this. When 
telling Jocasta a past event that there was a drunk man, who told him about his real 
parentage, Oedipus recalls, “I was the first citizen, until this chance attacked me ~ 
striking enough, to be sure" (''egomen d' aner aston megistos ton ekei, prin moi tuche 
toiad' epester line 776-777). The verb "attacked" (epeste), as Gould notes, “is used for 
things that lie in wait, then suddenly spring or threaten or appear，，26. This verb implies 
24 Bernard Williams (1990), Shame and Necessity. He distinguishes between two kinds of tragic necessity, 
namely, internal necessity and external necessity. By "internal necessity" he refers to the necessities 
grounded in the agents' ethos, project, individual nature, and the way the agents conceive the relation of 
his life to others'. See Chapter Five, "Necessary Identities". My discussion will focus on the external 
necessity. 
25 Bernard Williams (1990)，Ibid, p. 104 and p. 141 
26 Thomas Gould (1970), note 777 
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vividly the working of divine necessity in the backdrop, and tuche takes the form of 
particular events. “Tes anankaias tuches,, shows the fatal nature of tuche exposed in 
Greek tragedy, and it conveys a sense of compulsion. For instances, mAjax, Tecmassa 
says, “the fortune that humans are compelled to endure is their gravest evil" (“tis 
anankaias tuches ouk estin ouden meizon anthropois kakon”, line 485-486); knowing 
that Ajax may be “in danger", Tecmassa cries, “Ah, me! My friends, protect me from 
the doom threatened by fatel” (“o/ 'go, philoi, prostet' anankaias tuchis”, line 803). 
Seeing how unfortunate Philoctetes is, Neoptolemus laments for mortals' being 
compelled to bear the fortunes given by gods (“It is true that men are compelled to bear 
the fortunes given by the gods", “anthrdpoisi tas men ek theon tuchas dotheisas est' 
anankaion pherein”, Philoctetes, line 1316-1317.) It is also found in Euripides' 
tragedy, for instance, when Agamemnon laments in Iphigenia in Aulis, “for 
circumstances compel me to carry out the murderous sacrifice of my daughter" (“a//' 
hekomen gar eis anankaias tuchas”, line 511). The problem of necessary chance is 
echoed in Segal. He suggests that in Oedipus Tyrannus, "the detail is sheer coincidence. 
And yet that coincidence contains a kind of symbolic necessity"."^ In short, tuche in 
Greek tragedy shares quite often the sense of necessity of fate, at the same time its 
original meaning is preserved. She is arbitrariness and a certain kind of 'order'. 
27 Charles Segal (1995), Sophocles' Tragic World, p. 152 
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4. Tuche in Oedipus Tyrannus  
4. 1. Tuche and Sophoclean Irony 
I have mentioned that the tragic issue consists in Oedipus' discovery of his relation 
with his daimon严 and the tragic sense is effected, to a great extent, by the tragic ironies. 
A short digression by way of tragic irony will shed light on this problem?^ Oedipus 
J" 
Tyrannus is famous for its uses of dramatic irony in words and speeches. Those words 
and speeches contain "unintended double meaning": when the characters in the tragedy 
say something that “is appropriate for the situation as he understands it", which at the 
same time “reminds the audience, because of its superior knowledge of the facts, of the 
real situation" For example, when asked and learned that it is the former king named 
Laius was murdered, Oedipus replies, “I know. So I was told--1 never saw him"(Line 
105). Oedipus knows that the former king was Laius, but he does not know that he had 
seen Laius years ago. This not only reveals the tragic situation of Oedipus, but also 
reminds the audience of the truth obscured from him. There are many times when 
Oedipus is speaking of the authentic truth without knowing or understanding it. When 
Oedipus declares that he will make all his effort to search the murderer of Laius, he 
justifies his act by the following speech, 
But now, since, as it happens, 
28 See Chapter Two, "Aristotelian Tragedy or Greek Tragedy", part iv to vii. 
29 There are already plenty of studies on Sophoclean Irony, so I am not going to spend much on it. 
30 Thomas Gould (1970), "Appendix: Sophoclean "Irony"", p. 171. There are already plenty of studies on 
Sophoclean Irony, so I am not going to spend much time on it. 
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It's I who have the power that he had once, 
and have his bed, and a wife who shares our seed, 
and common bond had we had common children  
because of this, as if for my own father, 
I'll fight for him,•"... (Line 258-265) 
Oedipus has already spoken out the truth that Laius is his own father, but that is not 
what he means. Through this, the gap between what Oedipus understands and the 
authentic truth is made explicit. It reveals also what Vemant called "the twofold 
dimension"^ ^ of the speech, that of the gods' dimension and of Oedipus' dimension. 
Oedipus is speaking of the truth manifested by oracle, but he understands it in an 
undisclosed manner. The oracle is itself clear and obvious, but it is to mortals 
ambiguous. Oedipus as a tragic protagonist consists in his recognizing the other 
dimension only eventually. 
Irony in speeches and words persists in the whole tragedy. In-deed, irony 
characterizes also the double role that Oedipus is playing. As Vemant suggests, 
"Oedipus is double，,尸 There is a "duplicity of a particular character", as one type of 
ambiguities characterizes Greek tragedy.^^ The tragedy starts ironically with Oedipus as 
the honorable king whose name is known by all men (line 8), who “hold the power" 
(line 14), appears to the Theben the greatest power (line 40) and savior of Thebes 
(line48), and ends in discovering that he is the lowest and the most powerless. He is the 
Vemant (1988), "Ambiguity and Reversal", p. 117 
' 'Vemant (1988), Ibid, p. 116 
“ O n the problem of "ambiguity", see Vemant (1988), Ibid, Chapter Two, "Tensions and Ambiguities in 
Greek Tragedy" and Chapter 5 "Ambiguity and Reversal". 
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reliever of the plague (line 151) but also the cause of it; he is the investigator of the 
deeds done by his own hands. Refusing to believe the blind prophecy for he regards the 
prophecy as “the child of endless night", who has no truth, no strength, and is “blind in 
(your) ears, (your) reason, and (your) eyes" (line 370-371), Oedipus eventually finds 
himself a real blind man, who is unable to see the truth. The reality appears to him no 
longer as what he was so certain of and confident in. As Vemant says, Oedipus 
“becomes aware of the ambiguity of words, of meanings, and of the human condition". 
He recognizes that “it is the nature of the universe to be in conflict" and he eventually 
accepts “a problematic view of the world，，34. This is the tragic message that Sophocles 
transmits. 
Let's return to the problem of tuche. His relation to tuche is one of the ironies. I 
have mentioned above that tuche is linked with the divinities in the tragedy. In the 
beginning, in both the eyes of other and Oedipus, he is the one who brought the savior 
luck to Thebes Cornithi gar kai ten tot' aisioi tuchen paresches hemirf\ line 53), who 
is “in encounter with divinities" (line 33) and "with god's assistance"(lme38). There 
are lines showing that Oedipus believes whole-heartedly in that the god is with him. He 
prays at the beginning, "Lord Apollo! May he bring Savior Luck, a Luck as brilliant as 
his eyes are now" (line 80-81). Later in line 145-146, he claims, “Our luck ieutychais) 
34 Vemant (1988)，/Z?/^/，p.ll4 
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will prosper if the god is with us, or we have already fallen". He thinks that his getting 
away from Cornith "has indeed brought much good luck"(line 998). He even claims 
himself as "the child of C h a n c e " t e s tuches”, line 1080). Refusing to stop 
searching his birth, Oedipus says, "But I who count myself the child of Chance, the 
giver of good, shall never know dishonor. She is my mother, and the months my 
brothers, who first marked out my lowness, then my greatness" (line 1080-1083). This 
is ironic: to Oedipus, it is tuche who revealed to him his evil origin in the first place, 
then brought him honor, power and hence good luck. However, the truth is that tuche 
will mark his baseness again. Oedipus has already spoken of the contradictory and 
fickle nature of tuche and the vicissitude of human life. The sense of contradiction is 
conveyed through putting the perfect opposition “baseness，’ and “greatness，’ on the 
same line. There are similar oppositions m Antigone: "Fortune sets upright and Fortune 
sinks the lucky and unlucky from day to day" (''tuche gar orthoi kai tuche katarrepei 
ton eutiicounta ton te dustuchount ‘ aef, ’ line 1158-1160).^^ By juxtaposing “sets 
upright" and “sinks”�"lucky" and "unlucky" with tuche on the same line, the fickle 
nature of tuche is exposed. 
As a matter of fact, Oedipus is a perfect opposition. Through the tragic recognition, 
Oedipus finds himself "the one who is by gods the most detested of all men" (line 1345), 
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“without god”(line 1359) and "the gods most hated man"(line 1518). He is indeed no 
child of Chance at all. Turning from the blessed to the cursed, from ignorance to 
knowledge, from semblance to truth, from darkness to light (though physically the 
other way round), Oedipus sees the real nature of tuche, he recognizes that the world is 
ambiguous, full of conflicts as well as contradictions. This is also what the chorus sings 
right after Oedipus has proved his birth, 
Oh generations of mortal men, while you are living, 
I will appraise your lives at zero! 
What man 
comes closer to seizing the lasting blessedness 
than merely to seize its semblance, 
and after living in this semblance, to plunge? (Line 1186-1191) 
4.2. Tuche and Oedipus 
Sophocles intends not only to fill Oedipus' life with ironies, but also tuche. It has 
been widely discussed that Oedipus' name which means, "swollen-feet" marks his life 
significantly and ironically. The point I want to make here is that Oedipus was given 
this very name by tuche. When the messenger tries to prove Oedipus that he was his 
"savior" and “rescuer” by Oedipus' pierced feet, he says, "That was the chance that 
names you who you are" Chost'onomasthes ek inches t antes hos e f , line 1036). I have 
. mentioned that the meaning of the verb Sophocles used for the act of tuche is 
"attacked" {epeste,paiein). This verb, Gould explains further, belongs to the group of 
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words meaning to “leap,’，"lunge," "thrust," ‘‘swoop,，，‘‘hit’，and "strike".' ' Sophocles 
used this verb frequently in this tragedy to mark the various chance events. In addition 
to the event about the drunk man, whose words kept coming back in Oedipus' mind and 
drove Oedipus to leave Corinth for Phoebus, where he learned the oracle from Phoebus 
(line 776-797), this verb is used when Oedipus recalls his encounter with the old man. 
He says that he "struck in anger" (“paid di，orgef\ line 806), and he struck the old man 
abruptly by the staff in his hand (line 810). It is also used when the messenger mentions 
Oedipus' pierced feet (line 1032), when Oedipus enters violently into Jocasta's 
bedroom (line 1252) as well as when he pierces his eyes (line 1270). 
Despite the fact that his life is filled with tuche, Oedipus refuses Jocasta's 
suggestion that tuche rules the world and it is better for one to live at random without 
plan. Jocasta urges Oedipus to free himself and to evade his responsibility. Knowing 
that the king of Corinth is dead ‘by chance' (by tuche), they find the prophecy, at least 
partially, worthless. Still Oedipus is afraid of another part of the prophecy— he will 
sleep with his mother. Jocasta at this moment already thinks that the prophecy is 
completely pointless, so she tries to relieve Oedipus' fear by her philosophy, 
What 's there for man to fear? The realm of chance {tuche) 
Prevail. True foresight isn't possible. 
His life is best who lives without a plan (line 977-979). 
36 Thomas Gould (1970), note 807 
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Jocasta,S point is that the divinity fails. There is no predetermination at all. Tuche is no 
divine dispensation, on which Oedipus insists, but "pure randomness", “genuinely 
random events", “mere coincidence", "things that neither man nor god be expected to 
figure out ahead of time.,，]? Her suggestion denies the divinity as well as one's 
responsibility for any deeds. Unlike Jocasta, Oedipus stills regards himself the son of 
Tuche, and Tuche the giver of good. Later when he discovers the terrible truth, he 
realizes that Tuche is not the giver of good. Seeing that all the coincidences do not “just 
happen" but occur 'according to’ his god-designed fate, Oedipus takes every 
responsibility imposed by the gods and demanded by himself. He does not kill himself, 
as he knows that suicide is not the best thing he could do, but goes on living and lets his 
fate "continue where it will". This is the very heroic temper of the tragic protagoinst. 
5. Tuche in Euripides' Tragedies 
Tuche becomes dominated and devilish in some of Euripides' tragedies, and her 
accursed power is widely and deeply exposed. Unlike tuche in Oedipus Tyrannus, 
which is eventually recognized as fate, tuche in some of Euripides, s tragedies become 
the dominating power of the world and the ultimate mover of human life, which, as 
Jaeger says, "rules the world and plays with men like puppets".^^ It works without 
“Thomas Gould (1970), note 977 
Jaeger (1965), p. 354 
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‘purpose’ as fate does. It happens randomly, just like what Jocasta suggested {Oedipus 
Tyrannus, line 977-979). It is sometimes made "intelligible" only by referring to the 
gods' act. There are famous lines telling the accursed power of Tuche. To take a famous 
example, in Hecuba, Talthybius says, 
O Zeus, what can I say? 
That you look on man and care? 
Or do we, holding that the gods exist, 
deceive ourselves with unsubstantial dreams 
and lies, while random careless chance and change 
alone control the world? (Line 489-492)^^ 
Jaeger describes the devilish nature of Tuche in Euripides' tragedies as manifold, 
various, fickle, and she changes from one day to another. Jaeger continues, 
Who feels the anger of Tuche to-day may 
be favored to-morrow. She is incalculably capricious. 
5.1 Tuche in Heracles 
The devilish nature and accursed power of Tuche are exposed in a direct and 
explicit way in Euripides' Heracles. Though Aristotle thinks that Euripides "makes the 
most tragic impression of all poets", there are many fortuitous events, in Aristotle's 
sense, in Euripides' tragedies, like the deus ex machina in many of his tragedies, and 
the arrival of Heracles' friend, Theseus, in Heracles. Heracles has been criticized as “ a 
39 Unless otherwise noted, for Heracles I follow the translation of William Arrowsmith, in The Complete 
Greek Tragedies, Euripides II, ed., David Grene and Richmond Lattimore. 
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grotesque abortion" that lacks unity and that the parts are not well connected. The 
sudden break that Heracles turns mad appears to the critics puzzling.斗！ To me, it is 
Euripides' technique to depict the sudden attack of Tuche. She may strike at any time 
and one cannot prepare for it, as Iphigenia says in Iphigenia in Tauris, "Fortune comes 
and goes, invisible and mute, and never whispers where her blow shall fall" ( “ t o 
tiichas tis Old' notoi toiaid esontai”, line 475-476). In this tragedy, Heracles, "struck 
down by one blow of Hera's hate" {''Heras miai plegentes athlioi tucMr, line 1393), 
turns mad suddenly and kills his wife and all his children. His horrible deeds are caused 
by the madness, not by any hamartia. The figure of Madness works like the sudden 
strike of Tuche, and Hera, as Arrowsmith notes, "passes almost insensibly into a 
hovering symbol of all those irrational and random necessities which the Greek and the 
play call Tuche'' ^^ We can see from the above quoted line that Tuche and Hera are 
juxtaposed on the same line. 
The tragedy starts by the laments of Amphityron, Heracles' father and his wife, 
Megara. They, together with Heracles' children, are threatened of their lives by Lycus, 
the usurper of the throne of Thebes. They think that Heracles would not come back to 
their rescue, but to their surprise, Heracles returns after his assigned labors and saves 
Jaeger (1965), p. 354 
41 See Kitto, Greek Tragedy p. 273, William Arrowsmith (1969)，p.44 and Justina Gregory (1977), 
"Euripides' Heracles", note 2 and 3, in Yale Classical Studies, Vol. XXV Greek Tragedy, p. 259-226 
42 William Arrowsmith (1969)，p.51 
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them. Though the suffering caused by Lycus is prevented, the god-sent suffering is 
inevitable. No sooner has the chorus stopped rejoicing and praising Heracles, the figure 
of Madness and Iris appeared on the roof. Iris “explains，’ that it is Hera's plan to make 
Heracles "destroy his sons" and "taint him with fresh murder" {Heracles, line 831 -832). 
Then a messenger comes and he reports the horrible slaughter in Heracles' house. The 
tragedy ends in Heracles' friend, Thesus's saving Heracles from killing himself. There 
is no oracle predicting the suffering of Heracles, it is pure tuche’ as Theseus comforts 
Heracles, 
There is not a man alive that has wholly escaped misfortune's taint, 
nor any god either, if what poets sing is true. 
{oudeis de thneton tais tuchais akeratos, 
ou theon, aoidon eiper oupseudeis logoi (line 1315-131 
Heracles, then, identifies his miseries as the work of tuche and that he is defeated, he 
says, “But now, it seems, I must be fortune's slave" (^'nun d', hos eoike, tei tuchei 
douleuteon, line 1357). To this Theseus replies, "even the strong are overthrown by 
misfortunes" Q'kai tons sthenontas gar kathairousin tucha�, line 1396). The only way 
Heracles can revoke against tuche, as Theseus says, is to endure "such blows as heaven 
deals" and ‘‘does not refuse them" (line 1228). This tragedy ends in Heracles' deciding 
to live through this. 
43 Unless otherwise noted, for Ion I follow the translation of E.P. Coleridge, which is available on-line in 
the Persues Project. 
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5.2 Ironic Unconcern -- The Tragic Response to Tuche 
Through Tuche, the weakness and limited freedom of human are exposed. One can 
win her only by watching the working of Tuche with "ironic unconcern", as in some of 
Euripides' tragedies. Jaeger instances Ion, Helen and Iphigenia in Tauris, ‘4 among 
which Jaeger thinks that Ion, which is about the reunion of Ion with his long-lost 
mother, renders the purest example: "Again and again as it develops, our attention is 
expressly directed to the power of Tuche”的 
5.2.1 Ion 
This tragedy starts with Hermes' prologue telling the story of Cresua and Ion: 
Apollo raped Cresua and Cresua gave birth to Ion. Cresua abandoned Ion out of shame. 
Ion was then saved by Apollo and has been living happily. Cresua was then married to 
Xuthus as a prize, and they remained childless. By coincidence Xuthus and Creusa 
meet Ion and Xuthus takes Ion into his family as a son. Not knowing Ion is her long-lost 
son, Cresua tries to poison Ion out of jealousy. Ion then attempts to take revenge. At a 
critical moment, the Pythian Priestess, who brought up Ion, shows up and provides the 
'sign' for recognition. At the end, Ion and Creusa reunite and enjoy their tuche. 
At the beginning of the tragedy, we are shown that Ion is content with his life as 
44 Jaeger (1965)，p. 334 
Jaeger (1965)，/办p. 335 
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the servant in the temple of Apollo. Then comes Cresua to the temple and they meet 
each other. Learning that Ion is motherless, Cresua tells Ion her own misery. However, -
she is ashamed to tell him that it is her own story, and instead, she says that it is the 
misery of her friend. Learning the misery of Cresua's friend, Ion identifies their joys 
and grief as tuche. He says, “This misfortune is in accord with my sorrow" ("prosoidos 
he tuche tdmdi pathef,, line 359/6. Later when he accuses Cresua of her attempt to 
poison him, Ion says, “I met with a good genius, before I came to the city of Athens, and 
fell into a stepmother's hand" (‘‘ex hemon d' echeis hapanta Phoibou th', hos metesche 
tes tuches”, line 1268-1269). In short, Tuche marks the joy {eutuche) and misery 
{dustuche) of their lives, as they say after they recognize each other, 
Creusa 
Ah! dreadful was my fortune then, 
dreadful these things also; I am whirled 
here and there to misery, and back again to joy; 
but the wind is changing. 
("zo; dejnai men tote tuchai, 
deina de kai tad': helissomesth' ekeithen 
enthade dustuchiaisin eutiichiais te palin, 
methistatai de pneumatcT, line 1502-1506) 
Right after this Ion says, 
O Fortune, you that have already changed the lives of countless mortals, involving 
them in ills, and raising them to happiness again, 
46 Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from Robert Potter's translation (available on-line in the 
Perseus Project) 
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to what a point of life had I come, 
ready to kill my mother and suffer unworthily. 
("d metabalousa murious ede broton 
kai dustuchesai kauthis au praxai kalds, 
Tuche, par' hoian elthomen stathmen biou 
meteraphoneusai kaipathein anoxia”, line 1512-1515) 
At this point, Tuche is “addressed as the deity of perpetual change" Change marks the 
human condition, "Such is man's life. All things must change", as Cresua says earlier 
(line969). Ion's ironic unconcern to Tuche consists in his thanks to her: he “thanks her 
for saving him from doing a grave crime unwittingly, for revealing the marvelous secret 
of his own destiny, and for uniting him happily with his long-lost m o t h e r . I o n even 
asks Cresua to be hopeful to their fortune, he says, 
It was a god's action; but may the rest of our fortune be happy, 
as the past was unfortunate 
(^‘theion tod': alia tapiloipa tes inches 
eudaimonoimen, hos taprosthe dustuchi”，line 1456-1457) 
5.2.2 Iphigenia in Tauris 
Concerning 'the ironic unconcern to Tuche, Iphigenia in Tauris, one of Aristotle's 
favorite tragedies, renders another notable example. In this tragedy, Euripides' tragic 
protagonist, Iphigenia, does not thank Tuche, but more 'interestingly', she makes use of 
what Tuche has done to her and Orestes, and takes a hairbreath to save themselves. 
47 Jaeger (1965), p. 335 
Jaeger (1965),/Z?/式 p. 335 
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Iphigenia'S intrigue is the feature of this tragedy，Jaeger says, "we watch with 
breathless excitement the race of human craft and cunning against the arrow-swift -
flight of Tuchi”Iphigenia is well aware of what tuche can do to them. She says to 
Orestes and Pylades, “ You see how one fortune holds us three, most dear to each other, 
either to return to our native land, or to die" (''horate d' hos treis mia tuche tons 
philtatous, e gespatrdias noston e thanein echei”, line 1065-1066). Similar to Ion, the 
killing between family is prevented. Iphigenia almost kills her brother, Orestes, before 
the recognition. After the recognition, Iphigenia decides to save themselves from the 
Tauris by making use of their suffering and misfortunes: her being bounded to make the 
cruel sacrification in Tauris, and Orestes' matricide forced by Apollo, and his 
temporary madness when he is found by the Tauris on the beach, as a result of the 
Furies' pursuit. Iphigenia tells Orestes, “I will use your sorrows as my contrivance", 
(line 1030): Iphigenia denounces the matricide of Orestes to King Thoas and cheats 
King Thoas with her unwanted authority that she must take Orestes and the stature of 
the Goddess to the sea so as to purify them. She also asks the king and the others to stay 
in-door to prevent contagion. A soldier then exposes the intrigue, and immediately the 
king leads the army to chase them, but was stopped by Athena. Athena commands 
Thoas to let them go, and what Thoas' reply to Athena carries a message with deep 
49 Concerning Iphigenia's intrigue, see also Elizabeth Belfiore (1992), "Aristotle and Iphigenia", in 
Essays on Aristotle 's Poetics, pp. 359-377 
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implication, which is also the common belief held by other tragic poets, 
Lady Athena, whoever hears the words of the gods 
and does not obey, is not thinking rightly. 
I am not angry at Orestes, for going off with the goddess' image, 
or at his sister; for what good is it to contend against 
the strength of gods (line 1476-1480) 
6. The Tragic Views ‘ 
In Euripides' tragedies, the tragic disasters are mostly the result of tuche (rather 
than hamartia), as in Heracles. Often they are prevented and the protagonists enjoy 
happy endings, as in Iphigenia in Tauris and Ion. It is for this reason that Aristotle 
regards Iphigenia in Tauris as a fine tragedy. Also, many critics tend to regard Euripides 
tragedies as melodrama.^^ However, I agree with Gould on that though the tragic 
protagonists 'achieve' their happiness, it is never the triumph of virtue, which Aristotle 
(and other Greek moralists) promises. As in Iphigenia in Tauris, it is Athena who 
stops Thoas from chasing and asks Poseidon to make the sea smooth, so that Iphigenia, 
Orestes and Pylades can sail home safely. Camus writes in The Myth of Sisyphus that 
happiness, like fate, “is without reason，since it is inevitable”. He mocks the modem 
man at their tendency “to take credit for himself, when he doesn't recognized it"". 
Obviously, the Greek tragic poets think in a different way from the modem man. The 
50 Jaeger (1965), p. 334 
5�See for example, Kitto (1985), Greek Tragedy. Belifore (1992) mentions various critics who take 
Euripides' tragedy as melodrama including Kitto, Knox, Platnoaur, Webster etc. 
52 Thomas Gould (1990), The Ancient Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy, p. 277 
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Greek tragic poets are well aware of the gap between virtuous action and happiness, 
hamartia and suffering, as well as that the world is not necessarily in harmony with 
man, but in conflict. Even worse, man is in conflicts with one and other, as Antigone 
shows us. Events happen, things change, and sometimes happenings and changes are 
unmotivated, inexplicable in human terms and without cause. Things may turn out 
Mt 
contrary to beliefs and reasonable expectations. Man can only think of how to live 
through it, the question "why" may be hardly answerable. From this we see the human 
limitation, one of the essentials of the poets' tragic views on man. 
6.1 The Tragic Views on Man - The Mortal Limitation 
Voltaire objects to the plot-structure of Oedipus Tyrannus because it shows the 
failure of logical deduction.^^ To this Segal has an appropriate reply: "But what was a 
fault for the rationalist of the Age of Enlightenment is the very essence of the tragic 
element for the ancient dramatist (Sophocles)".^^ This reply, I think, is applicable to 
Aristotle's Poetics. What he excluded, as we have seen in the first chapter, are the 
essential elements of Greek tragedy. The failure of logical deliberation is precisely the 
cause of shudder (frisson) in this tragedy. Oedipus Tyrannus dramatizes the failure of 
rational deliberations and the impotence of human intelligence when juxtaposing with 
“Albert Camus (1955), The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 115, translated by Justin 0 ' Brien, Penguin 
54 Cf. Charles Segal (1995)，p. 150 
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the divine knowledge/^ Throughout the tragedy, we can see that Oedipus deliberates 
logically and carries out the investigation step by step. However, Oedipus' full 
deliberation and intelligence are shown to be impotent. Then, the bitter quarrel between 
Oedipus and Tiresias shows that human intelligence is in direct conflict with the divine 
knowledge. When quarreling with Tiresias, Oedipus claims that he read Sphinx's riddle 
by his intelligence alone without god-sent signs, by virtue of which Tiresias leams the 
truth (line 380-403). He mocks at Tiresais' blindness, but the fact is, all prophets, who 
see the divine truth, whose skill is to read the divine signs, must be blinded. In return, 
Tiresais shows contempt to Oedipus's failure to see the truth and to know his origin 
(line 412-416)57. The words and speeches he says and his intelligence block him from 
the truth. On the other hand, the divine knowledge “comes (or seems to come) by sheer 
coincidence" for instances, by the drunk man at the feast years ago, the Corinthian 
Messenger and the Old Herdsman. 
6.2 The Role of the Messenger 
I have mentioned in the first chapter that the arrival of the Corinthian Messenger is 
55 Charles Segal (1995), Ibid, p. 150 
56 Heidegger reads such conflict as the conflict between appearance and being, and Oedipus' discovery of 
his origin as "unconcealment", and it is related to the problem of truth. See Martin Heidegger (1959), An 
Introduction to Metaphysics, "The Limitation of Being���pp. 106-107.1 will turn to his reading the Ode on 
Man in Antigone later. 
57 "Hear this, since you have thrown my blindness at me: Your eyes can't see the evil to which you've 
come, Do you know your parent? Not knowing, you are their enemy." 
58 Charles Segal (1995), p. 150 
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a fortuitous event in Aristotle's sense. Generally speaking, the Messenger in Greek 
tragedy, though always anonymous, plays a special role. Sometimes-he reports climatic 
and violent scenes, brings messages that sometimes cause abrupt changes, sometimes 
reveals truth. Also, he reports mysteries and acts like the director of a tragedy. For 
instance, in Euripides' tragedies, as Gmbe notes, “all violent deeds, murders, battles 
and the like occur off-stage, and the audience is told of them through m e s s e n g e r s ，，？ As 
in Heracles, it is the Messenger who reports the terrible slaughters in Heracles' house. 
Also, the message-sending scene is dramatized in Aeschylus' trilogy, and the messages 
may carries ironies, uncertainties and lies. They dramatize the misuse of language. For 
example, in Agamemnon, after Clyteamnestra receives the message about 
Agamemnon's return from war, she sends the messenger back to Agamemnon with a 
message of lies and ironies. 6� 
6.2.1 The Two Messengers in Oedipus Tyrannus 
The presence of Messenger in Sophocles' tragedies often marks the failure of 
deliberation and the limit of intelligence. We have seen that in Sophocles' Oedipus 
Tyrannus, it is the Corinthian Messenger who reveals the truth. His unmotivated 
G.M.A Grube (1961), The Drama of Euripides, p. 25 
60 See Simon Goldhill (1986), Reading Greek Tragedy, p. 4. He writes, "The ironies and uncertainties of 
this message scene mark the difficulties involved in using words as opposed to sending a beacon-signal. 
Language cannot be fitted into a mechanistic model of message sending and receiving. The queen, 
indeed, sends the messenger back to the king with a palpably false message which prepares the way for 
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appearance marks the failure of Oedipus' deliberation, and the triumph of the gods. He 
brings the message about the death of Polybus and tells Oedipus that Polybus is not his -
father. He also forces the Old Herdsman, who has handed Oedipus to the Corinthian 
Messenger, the only survivor of the attack on the three-crossed road, and who has 
concealed the truth for years, to tell the truth. The climatic and violent scene, in which 
Oedipus finds Jocasta kill herself and he blinds his eyes, happened offstage, and is 
reported by the Second Messenger. The Second Messenger then acts like a director to 
dramatize the visual effect by guiding the attention of the audience, he says, 
Now you yourself will see: the bolts of the doors 
are opening. You are about to see 
a vision even one who hates must pity (line 1294-1296). 
6.2.2 The Messenger in Antigone 
Messenger acts like this throughout Sophocles' trilogy. Antigone renders another 
good example. The presence of the Messenger in this tragedy is of significance. In fact, 
the plot sequence of this tragedy, as Segal points out, "is an answer to the confidence in 
human r e a s o n " T h e tragedy starts with Antigone's asking Ismene to help her bury 
their dead brother, Polynies and Ismene,s dissuasion. Then the chorus sings cheerfully 
about the victory and the end of civil war. Creon enters and addresses the public in an 
authoritative and confident manner that no one should bury the traitor. Right after this a 
her plot." 
61 Charles Segal (1995), p. 182 
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sentry enters and reports that the corpse is mysteriously buried. This is the first answer 
to Creon's confidence. Creon's son, Haemon, who is also Antigone's fiance, argues 
with Creon, but in vain and leaves angrily. Antigone is led to a desert place. Until 
Tiresais tells Creon the signs of heaven, which predicts the terrible consequence of 
Creon's deed, Creon decides to free Antigone. The chorus then, similar to the first 
choral, sings a hymn of joy and dances for this apparently happy ending; everything 
seems to be fine. But right after this choral enters the Messenger. He reports to Eurydice, 
Creon's wife, that Antigone has hanged herself and Haemon is found dead beside 
Antigone. This is the second answer to Creon and the chorus' confidence. It is made 
ironic by the joyful choral utterance preceding this episode. Worse still, when Creon 
brings back Haemon's corpse, the Messenger reports to him how Eurydice kills herself. 
We can see that the plot sequence is arranged in such a way that the confidence of Creon 
and the chorus in their deliberations and expectations are struck down one by one, each 
is worse than the preceding one. The message that Antigone and Haemon kill 
themselves brings about violent changes. 
The Messenger plays a similar role in Ajax. In this tragedy, Ajax's speech 
(line646-692), which arouses debates and is called "the dissembling speech”�62 deludes 
Tecmessa. Tecmessa thinks that Ajax is not going to die and that Ajax's wife's begging 
62 John Moore (1977), "The dissembling-speech of Ajax”�in Yale Classical Studies, Vol. XXV: Greek 
Tragedy. 
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moves him. Like the chorus in Antigone, the chorus rejoices at this good turn, and a 
release of tension is effected. Meanwhile, a Messenger enters and announces that 
Calchas has prophesied that Ajax should not be allowed to go out alone, for this is the 
day determining whether Ajax lives or dies. Tecmessa is shocked and sets out to search 
Ajax. Again, working with the chorus, the Messenger makes the scene changes 
abruptly. The tragic endings in both tragedies are discovered by the messengers who 
come too late. 
6.3 The Symbolic Meaning of Nature {Physis) 
6.3.1 The Messenger Speech in Oedipus at Colonus 
Sometimes the Messenger brings bad news; sometimes he reports mysteries with 
symbolic meaning. The narration of the Messenger in Oedipus at Colonus unfolds a 
symbolic meaning of Nature in Sophocles' tragedies. I have mentioned in the first 
chapter that in Oedipus at Colonus, it is the Messenger who reports the mysterious 
disappearance of the aged Oedipus. The long narration from line 1586-1603 of the 
Messenger describes at first in detail the surrounding nature: 
When he had come to the Descending Way, which is bound 
by steps of bronze to earth's deep roots, he paused at one of 
the many branching paths near the basin in the rock, where 
the faithful covenant of Theseus and Peirithous has its memorial. 
He stood midway between that basin and the Leaping stone, and 
between the hollow pear-tree and the marble tomb; then he sat 
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down and loosened his filthy clothing. And then he called his 
daughters, and asked them to bring water from some flowing 
source, so that he might wash and make a drink-offering. They went 
to the hill which was in view, the hill of Demeter who guards the tender 
plants, and in a short time brought what their father had commanded. 
In the Messenger's description, we are shown that Oedipus is situated in the Nature. 
There are "earth's deep roots”，“basin in the rock", “the Leaping stone，，，“the hollow 
pear tree", and "the marble tomb" which symbolizes death. Oedipus also asks his 
daughters to go to “the hill in view", which "guards the tender plants", to bring him 
some flowing water. Then, the Messenger reports the acts of gods and the 
disappearance of Oedipus from the human point of view. To him the happening is 
amazing and mysterious. He says, “In what manner Oedipus passed from this earth, no 
one can tell" (linel655-1655). The narration shows the end of human knowledge, as no 
one knows exactly what happened to Oedipus. Even though Antigone is watching, she 
does not understand what has happened. She says that she can only guess that Oedipus 
is “lifted away to the far dark shore" by an invisible dark hand (line 1680-1682). In 
contrast, Oedipus who leams the divine truth and takes the suffering sent by gods, 
transcends the earth. Here we can see that the earth and the sea circumscribe human 
understanding.^^ It marks the limit, beyond which is the realm of the gods, the realm by 
which the place of human in the world is determined. 
63 See following discussion concerning the symbolic meaning of Nature in Sophocles' tragedies. 
1 2 0 
‘ — 
. - - ‘ . . ‘ 
6.3.2 The “Ode on Man” in Antigone 
The chorus unfolds the symbolic meaning of Nature in Sophocles' tragedies also. 
(The significance of the chorus in Greek tragedy can be by no means ignored. 
Concerning the significance of the chorus, see chapter 5.) To take a notable example, 
the second choral part in Antigone is known as the Ode on Man. The Ode on Man, 
which shows great philosophical wisdom, runs f rom line 332 to 365: 
Wonders are many, and none is more wonderful than man. 
This power spans the sea, even when it surges white before 
the gales of the south-wind, and makes a path under swells 
that threaten to engulf him. Earth, too, the eldest of the gods, 
the immortal, the unwearied, he wears away to his own ends, 
turning the soil with the offspring of horses as the plows weave 
to and fro year after year. 
The light-hearted tribe of birds and the clans of wild beasts and the 
sea-brood of the deep he snares in the meshes of his twisted nets, 
and he leads them captive, very-skilled man. He masters by his arts 
the beast who dwells in the wilds and roams the hills. He tames 
the shaggy-maned horse, putting the yoke upon its neck, 
and tames the tireless mountain bull. 
Speech and thought fast as the wind and the moods that 
give order to a city he has taught himself, and 
how to flee the arrows of the inhospitable frost under clear skies 
and the arrows of the storming rain. He has resource for everything. 
Lacking resource in nothing he strides towards what must come. 
From Death alone he shall procure no escape, but from baffling 
diseases he has devised flights. 
Possessing resourceful skill, a subtlety beyond expectation 
He moves now to evil, now to good. When he honors the laws of the land 
and the justice of the gods to which he is bound by oath, his city prospers. 
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But banned from his city is he who, thanks to his rashness, 
couples with disgrace. Never may he share my home, 
ever think my thoughts, who does these things! 64 
The symbolic meaning between man and nature is made explicit, as Segal says, 
"the ode uses the motifs of birds, sea, and the contrast between man's control of his 
world and the unpredictable and dangerous powers of nature and the gods already 
established in the play”.65 Man is first described as “deinoteron”，“the most wonderful", 
"the strangest", his rational aspects come later in the third phase. This choral part is a 
description of man, not a definition. The word deinoteron, Heidegger says, 
“encompasses the extreme limits and abrupt abysmal of his being".^^ This ode presents 
man as flesh and bone, a contradictory and a paradoxical being: he is powerful but 
limited; he can be good and bad. ^^At first, we are shown that man is powerful. He can 
sail against the storm and waves, tack through the mountain, make use of the Earth; he 
can hunt other beasts in the wilderness and creatures in the sea. He can also use 
language and thought to rule, he is able to escape from the danger brought by other men 
or nature. He is overpowering, but immediately, the ode suggests that there is one thing 
that man has no power to escape from or to triumph over ~ Death. Death is an absolute 
limit, which marks also the end of man's possibility. His prosperity rests on the law of 
似 Unless otherwise noted, for Antigone I follow Sir Richard Jebb's translation (available on the Perseus 
Project) 
65 Charles Segal (1955), p. 182 
6b Martin Heidegger (1959), p. 149. 
67 L. Goldman writes in The Hidden Got/(1964)/'Man is a contradictory being, a mixture of strength and 
weakness, greatness and poverty, living in a world which, like himself, is made up of opposites, of 
antagonistic forces that fight against on another without hope of truce or victory, of elements that are 
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the land and also of the gods. His power and limitation are manifested only when he 
exists on the Earth and beneath the Sky，together with other men, beasts and creatures. 
This is our mortal condition, Segal says, which we can understand “only when we have 
grasped our relation to the interconnected powers of earth, death, and the gods".^^ But 
such an understanding can only be reached by suffering. 
7. Conclusion: Tuche and Nature 
In Oedipus Tyr annus. Nature is related to tuche. After Oedipus claims himself the 
children of Tuche, as Gould notes, "The idea of tuche is now enriched by the picture of 
Oedipus as a dweller on Cithaeron, a wild, trackless mountain. Tuche almost becomes 
"Nature" and the wild".^^ Despite what the Corinthian Messenger tells him (that he 
was his savior) and what Jocasta suggests (that Tuche rules the world), Oedipus claims 
himself the child of Tuche and is reluctant to believe that he was a foundling. To prove 
he is true to his nature, he refuses to give up the search for his own birth. The truth is 
that he was a dweller on Cithaeron, a “wild and trackless mountain", and a foundling 
that the Old Herdsman took to Cithaeron and handed him to the Corinthian Messenger. 
It is also the place where the Old Herdsman and the Corinthian know each other. The 
Corinthain Messenger tells Oedipus that he was his Savior and he found Oedipus “in 
complementary but permanently unable to form a whole", p.61. 
68 Charles Segal (1955), p. 212 
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the forest hallows of Cithaeron" (line 1026). His being rescued happened on the “wild 
pasture" of the mountain (-line l280), where his misfortunes begin. Oedipus cries 
bitterly later, 
May he be destroyed, whoever freed the savage shackles 
from my feet when I'd been sent to the wild pasture, 
whoever rescued me from murder and become my savior-
a bitter gift: , 
if I had died then, 
I'd not have been such grief to self and kin" (line 1349-1355) 
I'd not have returned to be my father's murderer; 
I'd not be called by men my mother's bridegroom (line 1357-1359). 
All the chance events would have been prevented if Oedipus were not saved in the 
mountain. His being saved invokes a series of necessary chance: the Old Herdsman's 
pity, Oedipus' being handed to the Messenger, then to the childless king of Corinth. 
Oedipus has no control of these happenings. In short, Tuche, together with Nature, 
marks the limit of human endeavor, like the condition of a pilot sailing in an agitated 
sea. 
69 Thomas Gould (1970), note 1080 
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Chapter 5: Tragedy and Philosophy 
We do not learn who man is by learned definitions,  
we leam it only when he creates original poetry, when 
he builds poetically. 
Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics 
It behoves us to say, before all, that philosophy 
lies closer to poetry than to science. 
Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life 
1. From Particular to Universal - The Significance of the Chorus 
Each tragic poet has his own world-views presented in his works. And different 
tragedies carry different messages. Their views are necessarily pluralistic. ^ The above 
and below discussions are not attempts to generalize the differences, but to pick out 
particular aspects. "For tragedy is a many-sided thing, and can be approached from 
widely different points of view", as Jaeger tell us.^ Aristotle's formal analysis, use of 
definition and one-sided ethical view on tragedy are shown to be inadequate? He fails 
even to account for his favorite tragedies, and many desperately tragic problems are 
lightened or left aside. 
Despite the different views, there is always a kind of universality in each of the 
tragedy. Viewed from the tragic protagonists played by professional actors (Aeschylus 
1 For the pluralistic views of the tragic poets, see Vemant，Segal and Gould. 
2 Jaeger, Paideia, vol. One, p. 246 
^Aristotle's formal analysis is also whatNietzche's objection to Aristotle based on. See Nietzche, The 
Birth of Tragedy, and Lawrence J. Hatab (1990), Myth and Philosophy. 
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is one of them), they wear masks'^ which mark them as the heroes/ heroines, and the 
paradigms from whom we leam the human condition. Viewed from the choruses 
made up by the citizens, who are anonymous, without mask and wear uniform, from 
which the tragic views are expressed in the collective and abstract way. It seems that 
there is a dichotomy between the protagonist and chorus: the former is individual 
while the latter is collective. The dichotomy is also shown in other aspects. Firstly，the 
language and the meter adopted by the protagonists and choruses are different. The 
language in Greek tragedy is “ daring and lofty imaginative", but the choruses in 
particular, deliberately avoids using ordinary language. For instance, man is usually 
called "mortal", the word of religious significance, which also distinguishes him from 
the gods. Secondly, the protagonists usually speak in dialogue form with simple meter, 
the choral lyric adopts various and relative complex meter? 
It is known that the chorus in Greek tragedy originates from religious rituals and 
therefore, it is of religious significance. Though Aristotle thinks that chorus in Greek 
tragedy should 'evolve' into an actor and speaks nothing more of it, its various roles 
I have mentioned in the first chapter that Aristotle thinks tragic poets should not trouble themselves 
with spectacles. However，the tragic is effected，to a significant extent, by the tragic masks. For 
example, in the mask Oedipus wore in Oedipus Tyrannus, which show the horrible and pitiable sight of 
man's condition. Concerning the visual effects in Oedipus Tyrannus. see Claude Calame (1993), 
“Vision, Blindedness and Mask: The Radicalization of the emotion in Sophocles" Oedipus Rex", in 
Tragedy and the Tragic, pp. 17-37. See also Vemant and Vidal -Naquet (1988), Myth and Tragedy. 
5 For the language used in Greek tragedy, see Jaeger, Paideia, volume. One. p. 248-249; Vemant and 
Vidal- Naquet (1988), Myth and Tragedy. See also Thomas Gould，Oedipus Tyrannus {1910) p. xii-xiv 
for the various meters the chorus adopted. 
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are worth noting.^ Sometimes it represents the common people, who hold collective 
and common beliefs; sometimes-it is one of the actors, like the chorus in Aeschylus's 
The Suppliants. Sometimes it acts like a spectator; sometimes it suspends the horrible 
discovery; sometimes it serves as "the poets' mouthpiece"; sometimes it sings in a 
conclusive way about the life of the tragic protagonist.^ I have discussed above the 
Ode on Man by the chorus in Antigone, which describes vividly the human condition. 
It is a notable example of how the chorus helps bring out the universal significance of 
particular tragedy. It acquires significance that, as Segal says, "extends beyond the 
explicit personal knowledge of the chorus as an actor".^ To take particular examples, 
the tragic views that “Call no man happy until his death", that mortals leam by 
suffering and that mortals cannot resist immortals, are repeated by the choruses in 
various Greek tragedies? Also, in Trachiniae, there is another famous Ode by the 
chorus, which sings about human vicissitudes. After Deianeira learnt that her long 
separated husban'd, Heracles is “slaved” by another woman and that they are coming 
6 Nietzsche, on the other hand, stresses the importance of chorus, see The Birth of Tragedy. 
7 Segal says, "Viewed performatively, the choruses enact rituals that mark the seriousness of the action 
or offer breaks that provide variety and entertainment, musical and choreographic divertimenti to 
relieve the intense concentration on somber events. Viewed theatrically, they effects an emotional and 
lyrical echoing of the man actors' words and concerns; like the Homeric "someone will say.....”�or 
give the perspective of a collective character intervening through its own distinctive mode of 
performative action and verbal action at a critical moment, and so on." See Sophocles ‘ Tragic World, p. 
183. For the role of chorus in Greek tragedy, see also Vemant and Vidal- Naquet (1988)，Myth and 
Tragedy, Segal (1995); Sophocles‘ Tragic World, Chapter 8，"The Chorus and the God"; G.M.A. Grube 
(1941), The Drama o^f Euripides, Chapter VII, "The Chorus"; G. F. Else (1965), The origin and early 
form of Greek trage^\ John Gould (1993)，"Tragedy and Collective Experience" and Simon Goldhill 
(1993)，"Collective and Otherness -- The Authority of the Tragic Chorus: Response to Gould, in 
Tragedy and The Tragic, pp. 217-255. 
8 Charles Segal (1995), Sophocles' Tragic World, pp. 181-182 
9 See also the first chapter, part V’ "The Problem Qf Pathos,, 
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back, the chorus made up by the woman of Trachis enter and sing. There are many 
. images in this ode, such as marriage and death, which are also the major issues of this 
tragedy 10, sun and night, seas and coast, winds and tides. Marriage and death are the 
perfect opposition, which symbolizes here joy and sorrow in human life. At the near 
end, the ode's concern of the human vicissitudes is made explicit by the following 
lines: 
Starry night does not remain constant with men, 
nor does tribulation, nor wealth; 
in a moment it is gone from us, 
and to another in his turn come both 
gladness and bereavement，’ (line 131-135)." 
At this moment, the chorus is able to foresee the tragic end of the protagonist. The ode 
encompasses already the whole story of the tragedy. 
Such perspective the chorus introduced, Segal says further, “looks beyond the 
particular purpose or struggle of the protagonists at this moment, and even beyond 
what the chorus, as a human participant and character can fully know，，]� It views 
from a cosmological perspective the very existence of man in the world. From the 
particular struggle of protagonist to the ode of the chorus, the tragic views are 
extended from the concrete and particular situation to the abstract and universal 
condition. 
1° See Segal (1995), "Marriage in Trachiniae Women", in Sophocles ‘ Tragic World 
u For Trachiniae, I follow the translation of Sir Richard Jebb, which is available on-line in the Perseus 
Project 
' 'Charles Segal (1995), p. 182 
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2. The Different Way of Formulating Question 
From this we can turn to the different ways how the tragic poets and the 
philosopher (Socrates) formulate their questions. Their ways of raising questions are 
worth noting. Williams suggests that the ancient moralists tends to raise impersonal 
question like Socrates' “How should one live", which invites impersonal and singular 
answer. The question is timeless and general, as he argues farther, “ it stands at a 
distance from any actual and particular occasion of considering what to do" and “it 
invites me to think about my life from no particular point of view，，.!� If Williams' 
understanding of Socrates' question is right, I would say that Greek tragedy always 
raises question in first person singular, which the protagonists thinks from his own 
point of view for his own particular situation. And we are invited to think for the very 
particular case. Greek tragedy always let the protagonist "live out this debate", places 
him "in he crossroads of a choice in which they are totally committed" and to make 
decision” So often the protagonists raise question like "What shall I do now". In 
Aeschylus' Libation Bearer, Orestes, struggling between to kill or not to kill his 
mother, cries "What shall I do? Shall I spare my mother out of pity?" In Oedipus 
Tyrannus, Oedipus says, "That this is not the best thing I shall do" (line 1363). Also, it 
Bernard Williams (1985), Ethics and The Limit of Philosophy, Chapter One, "Socrates' Question". 
“ M y concern here is what Williams speaks of the nature of the question, his views on traditional 
ethical theories is not in my scope of discussion. 
丨5 Vemant (1987), "Tensions and Ambiguities in Greek Tragedy" 
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is interesting to note that in Aeschylus' The Suppliants, the king says, “I am perplexed, 
and fear possesses my soul whether to act, or not to act and take what fortune sends" 
C'amechand de kaiphohos m' echeiphrenas drasai te me drasai te kai tuchen helein”, 
line 380-381). At the very crossed road of choices ~ to help the suppliants or not to 
help ~ the king realizes that he is tempting his tuche. Questions and speeches as such 
invite us to think for their particular situations, given their different characters and 
moral beliefs. Those questions, as Jaspers says, are already philosophical in substance. 
Their differences from philosophy are that "they are still formulated in visual, 
dramatic terms". They are not formulated in the theoretical and abstract way as 
philosophy. They spring from what actually occurs and what we audience or readers 
progressively experienced. 
3. The Different Conception of Truth -- Plato's Simile of Cave and Oedipus Tyrannus 
In addition to ways of formulating questions and expressing, the views of the 
tragic poets, as Gould notes, are “always askew from the philosophers' single world 
views，，.Take the problem of truth as example, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle believe 
that truth and happiness are positively related, while the tragic poets believe that truth 
is learned by suffering, like the chorus in Agamemnon sings, "suffer into tmth". On 
16 Thomas Gould (1990), Ancient Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy, p.277. Thomas Gould 
writes, "The world view we are left with its remarkably different from play to play, and it is always 
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the other hand, the truth may be so terrible that one cannot take it, like what Oedipus 
discovers. I think, this contrast could be best illustrated by contrasting Plato's "simile 
of cave" in the Republic and Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus. "Truth" {aletheia/aX^Oeia) 
in Greek means “unconcealment，，，"imhiddeness", as Heidegger keeps reminding us•口 
Heidegger says in "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" that Plato's simile of cave reveals the 
very process of truth as unconcealment. It the process of turning from the shadow 
inside the cave to the reality outside. Heidegger also reads Oedipus' discovery of truth 
as the struggle between appearance and unconcealment.^^ Contrasting Plato's simile 
and Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus, we see that to Plato, whoever acquires the truth 
can achieve his happiness, become virtuous and be qualified as the philosopher king, 
while to Sophocles (and Aeschylus), the truth is unbearable, and may completely 
destroy a virtuous man's happiness. Though Plato describes vividly that sunlight hurts 
the escaped prisoner and one suffers a little bit for the truth, the truth is bearable and 
one nevertheless achieves his happiness. No wonder Goldman suspects in The Hidden 
GoJ that some of Plato's dialogues are directed not only against the Sophists, but also 
against Sophocles. He points out that Plato is not only maintaining that this truth is 
objective, but that it is "bearable to man，，and is "likely to make him happier and more 
slightly askew from the Socratic point of view." 
17 See Heidegger, Being and Time, Introduction to Metaphysics, "The Essence of Truth" and "Plato on 
the Doctrine of Truth", in Pathmarks. 
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virtuous.丨9 However, truth to the tragic poets is divided, through which one comes to 
recognize the limits.2� 
4.Conculsion: Greek Tragedy as Philosophy 
All in all, Greek tragedy not only shows us the religious and mythical culture of 
the ancient Greeks, but also serves like philosophy in the tragic ages. The problems 
Greek tragedy and philosophy deal with are of the same origin - man. As Jaspers says, 
they (including religion and arts) are “the one language of truth" and they are an "all-
inclusive and indivisible whole", a whole "that shapes man's life and makes it 
complete” .21 Greek tragedy reflects the ancient Greek philosophical thoughts, their 
quests for the meaning of existence, life and death and various philosophical issues, 
such as truth, justice, change and self. It presents not only the terrible side of life, as 
Schopenhauer accounts, "the wailing and lamentation of mankind, the dominion of 
chance and error； the fall of the righteous, the triumph of the wicked", but suggests 
also how to face them. The Greek takes the tragic heroes as paradigms. Through 
citing the heroes' legends, they have the courage to face miseries and misfortunes, to 
choose, to act and to be responsible. 
19 L. Goldman (1964), The Hidden God: A Study of Tragic Vision In The PENSEES of Pascal and The 
Tragedies of Racine, p.45 
20 For the problem of truth in Greek Tragedy, see also Jasper (1969), Tragedy is not Enough, Chapter 
Three, "The Problem of Truth." 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not 
‘ think that know a thing till they have grasped the 'why’ of 
it (which is to grasp its primary cause). 
Aristotle, Physics, 194b 18-19 
Chance is probably the most universally resented 
non-human cause of failure in human rational endeavors, 
in a secular world at least. 
Thomas Gould, The Ancient Quarrel 
between Poetry and Philosophy 
In this thesis, we proceed by discussing the ancient quarrel between poetry and 
philosophy, Aristotle's Poetics in particular, to see how Aristotle attempts to 
incorporate tragedy into his philosophy. Aristotle's attempt is bound to be inadequate, 
for many essential problems in Greek tragedy are ignored or covered up. The problem 
I pick out to analyze is tuche. When comparing how the tragic poets and Aristotle deal 
with this concept, we see how the tragic poets and Aristotle differ in their problematic 
and their ways of formulating questions. In addition to that, we see how Aristotle 
incorporates tuche into his philosophy: in the Physics, tuche is not a proper cause but 
an accidental cause. In the Eudemian Ethics, instead tuche, Aristotle suggests that 
natural impulse is a better explanation for one's being fortunate. In Nicomachean 
Ethics, it contributes little to our happiness and success. Consistently, he ignores the 
role of divinity in contributing the downfall of the tragic protagonists, and the 
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importance of tuche is altogether left aside. Instead, he fills the explanatory gap by his 
own notion, hamartia. Viewed from the tragic poets, we see how they expose their 
protagonists to the strike of tuche, how tuche alters their actions and lives. As a 
goddess, Tuche represents changes, which Plato despises while Aristotle tries hard to 
give explanation to. 
In fact, tuche relates to several important philosophical issues. To the Greeks, 
when something is happened by tuche, it means a “cause，，in non-human terms, that is, 
no cause at all. To us, it implies the absence of causation, or there is a gap between 
cause and effect. The justifiability of causality has long been a crucial philosophical 
problem. It matters to science significantly. Hume tells us the necessary relation 
between cause and effect cannot be justified, for they reflect our psychological habit 
only. It seems that it is Reason that urges us to quest for causal relation. Absence of 
causation amounts to the failure of our rational endeavors, and will render things 
inexplicable. Concerning the failure of rational endeavors, I think Kieslowski's 
Dekalog One offers a paradigm example. In this film, the young son always asks, 
“can I go ice-skating today?" His father teaches him to input the information of the 
weather to the computer in order to calculate the thickness of the i c e � W h e n it is thick 
1 It is known that weather prediction is extremely difficult and is a matter of probability. See Choas and 
Fractals, Larry D. Bradley, http://www.pha.jua.edu Modem scientific study of the problem of 
contingency, such as the butterfly effect in the Chaos theory, is also an answer to the problem of 
causality. The butterfly effect tells us that a trivial cause may have a dramatic effect, and that the cause 
and effect relation is not necessarily proportional. It is suggested that, in the realm of probability, the 
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enough, he can go. One day, the calculation shows that he can go, but the ice breaks 
and he is drowned." 
Besides, we can find the shadow of tuche in modern ethical discussion. The 
moral luck problem shows that scholars come to realize that accidents or social reality 
can crush a project or an agent, and that ethical theories stressing on duty or 
•e 
consequence fails to attend to it. Williams' Gauguin case and the distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic luck reflect in a way his beliefs in what he calls "the 
supernatural power's lack of style", which means certain purposeless happenings that 
ruin one's worthy project? Together with Nagel's distinction between resultant, 
circumstantial, causal and constitutive luck, it shows their beliefs in that luck may 
permeate our life to a significant extent."^ 
Throughout the history of western philosophy, there have been issues pointing to 
a range beyond rationality. The belief in the existence of God and the hope for 
immortality, for examples, are out of the range of rationality. Pascal's wager argument 
tells us that there is no rational argument for the existence of God. It is our heart, the 
effect is usually the result of contingency. That is to say, if the probability is 70 percent, the actual 
result is often the other 30 percent. See also Chen, Tien Chi, Xu Zhuoyun and Kwan, Tze Wan edited, 
《系統視野與宇宙人生� ’ Chapter 6, 8 and 9，1999 
2 In fact, the problem of contingency is featuring in several films and novels over these decades. In 
addition to Kieslowski's films, Tom Tykwer's Run Lola Run (1998) and M. Kundera's The Unbearable 
Lightness of Being (1985) brood also on the problem of contingency in our life. 
3 Intrinsic luck arises from the elements of the project or action under consideration. Extrinsic luck 
arises from something outside the project. In the Gauguin case, a painter decides to actualize his talent 
at the expense of his family. If it turns out that Gauguin is not a talented painter and so his project fails, 
it is intrinsic luck. On the other hand, if an accident befall him that he cannot paint anymore, it is 
extrinsic luck. See Bernard Williams (1976&1990)，"Moral Luck" and Shame and Necessity, p. 14. 
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faculty of feeling, wagering on God's existence.^ In Phaedo, Socrates' warning 
against misology is indeed another example of the limit of logical reasoning. In 
response to Cebes and Simmias，argument against his own for immortality, Socrates 
warns them against misology, that is, the hatred or the distrust of logos. To Socrates, 
misology is the greatest evil. Therefore, Socrates gives a new account of 
philosopher's duty, that is “to persevere in trying to vindicate the argument for 
immortality" and to refute its counterpart.^ This very dialogue shows indeed that 
immortality is our hope, and Socrates is urging his students to give justification to this 
hope. Also, H.M. Kallen's and H. Plessner, s studies on laughter and tears point also 
to the fact that Reason is sometimes impotent, nonetheless, one must face it with 
rationality.^ In addition, Unamuno in The Tragic Sense of Life advocates that man is 
not merely a "rational animal", but one of flesh and bone, one with heart as well as 
head. To Unamuno, it is the very conflict between head and heart that constitutes the 
tragic sense of life.^ I agree wholeheartedly with Unamuno on this. Man is 
“deinoterorT for he has head and heart. Head alone would not mark the peculiarity of 
man, but the very conflict and paradox arise out of both. These are also the very 
4 Nagel (1976), "Moral Luck" 
5 See Pascal, Pensee and also M. Goldmann (1964), The Hidden God -- A study of tragic vision in the 
Pensee of Pascal and the tragedy of Racine 
6 See Peter J. Ahrensdorf (1995), The Death of Socrates and the Life of Philosophy -- An Interpretation 
of Plato's Phaedo 
7 See Horace M. Kallen (1968), Liberty, Laughter and Tears, Helmuth Plessner (1961) Lachen und 
Weinen. See also Kwan, Tze Wan (2000), <說悲劇情懷-從情感先驗性看生命與哲學的悲劇性〉 
初稿。 
1 3 6 
. . • . - . . 
• , - . ‘ ‘ 
1 ‘ • - ‘‘ 
spirits of Greek tragedy: as Zhu Gaungqian points out, tragic poets must be very 
intellectual and passionate? 
We modem people live in a world of technology and advancement. We no longer 
believe in gods who cause madness, thunder and storm. However, it does not 
conclude that Greek tragedy has nothing to do with us today. In fact, tuche can be 
understood as chance or contingency in our lives, where something happens to strike 
us, which is uncontrollable, without intelligible cause and inexplicable. Death, which 
marks our limits and peculiarities (as "the Ode on Man" tells us), is a kind of 
"necessary chances" (^'tes anankaias tucMs”）. It is inevitable, it lies in there waiting 
but one never knows when it strikes. Learning that his beloved son is dead, the heart-
broken father in Dekalog One rushes to a church and cries bitterly, but there remains 
only a stature of Mary and silence. There is no answer. Nevertheless, we have to face 
it and live with it. Chance strikes not only in films and novels, but our daily lives. 
END 
s Miguel de Unamuno (1972), The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations, chapter 1 • 
9 朱^潛（1976), p. 261 
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Appendices: Related Pictures^ 
1. The Image of Tuche (of Antioch) on a Coin: draped, with turreted crown, 
seated on Mount Oropos, above the swimming river god, Orontes. 
M 
2. The Image of Tuche of Ephesus on a Coin: wearing a turreted crown, 
facing right, 
_ 




: • . -.‘ . . . i • . . . ; 
• f - . . . . 
• • ‘ 
. • • • . -
- ‘ , - •‘ \ 
\ 




4. Oedipus and the Sphinx 
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6 The Images of Achilles and Priam in a Cup Painting � 
On Shoulder: the ransom of Hector, as described by Homer, with Priam entering and 
grabbing Achilles by the knees (24.475-83). Achilles is reclining on a couch, as Priam ’ 
enters from the left. The king strides forward, stretching both arms out to grasp Achilles 
knees He is balding in front; his mouth is open in supplication. Achilles is dining, cutting 
on a piece of meat with the knife in his right hand. In a gruesome detail, blood from the 
meat drawn with added red, drips on Hector's corpse, which lies on the floor below. 










5 • The Image of Achilles and Priam in a Vase Painting I 
Side A: the ransom of Hector. Achilles (second from the right) wreathed and beardless, 
reclines on his couch. Priam, in the center of the scene, wears a chiton and himation and , 
strides towards Achilles, his arms extended imploringly. Hector's nude corpse lies on the [ 
ground in front of Achilles' couch and food-laden serving table. To the left of Priam is a 
youth who carries the ransom goods: a tripod and three stackedphialai. Hermes stands at 
the far left, holding the kerykeion in his right hand. Hector's corpse lies on its back, the | 
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7. The Images of Ajax and Odysseus on a Vase Painting 
Side A: argument between Odysseus and Ajax over the possession 
of the arms of Achilles. At center, Agamemnon stands between Ajax 
and Odysseus who pull away from one another forming a V-shaped 
composition. Other figures restrain the contestants. 
V 
I 
• • I 
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8. Side B: the casting of votes to award the arms. At center, platform . 
with uneven piles of stones from casting of the votes. There are fifteen 
votes for Odysseus who probably stands at left with Athena. There are 
fourteen votes for Ajax, who stands isolated to the far right behind a tree : 
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9. Tondo (the inner bottom of the Vase): Tecmessa covers body of Ajax. 
Ajax lies on his back, with the sword running through his body. 
Ground is rendered with dilute washes and tiny dots 
to indicate sandy, pebbly beach. Tecmessa, with a fillet in her hair, 
rushes in with a shroud, decorated on the edges, to cover the body. 
Tecmessa, s himation and the shroud are decorated with widely spaced 
groups of dots. Scabbard hangs in field. Ajax' feet protrude beyond 
meander border of tondo. 
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